Theoretical analysis and preference modelling for the valuation of ecosystem services from native pollinators in selected Thai rural communities by Narjes, Manuel
 
 
 
University of Hohenheim 
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
Institute of Farm Management 
Production Theory and Resource Economics 
Prof. Dr. Stephan Dabbert, Prof. Dr. Christian Lippert 
 
 
Theoretical analysis and preference modelling for the valuation of ecosystem services from 
native pollinators in selected Thai rural communities 
 
 
Cumulative dissertation 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree “Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften”  
(Dr. sc. agr. in Agricultural Sciences) to the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences 
 
 
Presented by 
Manuel Ernesto Narjes 
Born in Berlin, Germany 
 
 
 
This work was financially supported by the 
Foundation fiat panis. 
 
 
Stuttgart-Hohenheim, 2018 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was accepted as a doctoral dissertation in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
“Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften” (Dr. sc. agr. in Agricultural Sciences).  
 
Dekan Prof. Dr. Ralf T. Vögele 
 
Examination Committee 
 
Supervisor and reviewer Prof. Dr. Christian Lippert 
Co-reviewer Prof. Dr. Manfred Zeller 
Additional examiner Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Piepho 
Head of examination Prof. Dr. Markus Rodehutscord 
  
Special reviewer Prof. Dr. Tilman Becker 
  
Date of oral examination 18.10.2018 
III 
 
 
 
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS 
 
This doctoral thesis is a cumulative dissertation and its body of research consists of the following three 
scientific articles1:   
 
PAPER 1 (Chapter 2) Narjes, M. E., & Lippert, C. (2019). The optimal supply of crop pollination 
and honey from wild and managed bees: an analytical framework for diverse 
socio-economic and ecological settings. Ecological Economics 157: 278-290. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.11.018 
 
PAPER 2 (Chapter 3) Narjes, M. E., & Lippert, C. (2016). Longan fruit farmers' demand for policies 
aimed at conserving native pollinating bees in Northern Thailand. Ecosystem 
Services 18: 58-67. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.10.010 
 
PAPER 3 (Chapter 4) Narjes, M. E., & Lippert, C. Regional differences in farmers’ preferences for a 
native bee conservation policy: the case of farming communities in Northern 
and Eastern Thailand. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
1 Cross-references have been added to the scientific manuscripts constituting this thesis and the articles’ original 
numbering format has been modified to fit the span of this cumulative dissertation. Chapters 3 and 4 are otherwise 
verbatim copies of the respectively published and submitted manuscripts. On the other hand, a revised version of 
Chapter 2 was published in compliance with the journal’s peer review process.   
To my parents 
V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Although a few paragraphs will not do justice to all the people who made this work possible, I want to use 
this space to express my thankfulness to all of them. 
Foremost, my sincerest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Christian Lippert, who encouraged me 
and patiently offered me his guidance throughout my doctorate. His dependability, humbleness, cordiality 
and readiness to provide insightful advice cannot be taken for granted.      
I would also like to extend my earnest appreciation to Prof. Dr. Stephan Dabbert for his kind support and 
to my colleagues at the Department of Production Theory and Resource Economics (410a) for their 
constructive criticism, for the much-needed coffee breaks and for the stimulating and friendly work 
environment.  
Special thanks are due to Fon Muenthaisong, Pim Rittang and to my other research assistants for their 
commitment and hard work in Thailand. My appreciation also goes to the farmers, beekeepers and honey 
hunters of Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi who participated in this study for sharing their invaluable 
knowledge and time. 
I gratefully acknowledge my sponsors for making this research possible: the Foundation fiat panis, the 
German Academic Exchange service (DAAD) and the State Graduate Sponsorship (LGFG) of Baden-
Wuerttemberg for funding my PhD work, and the Uplands Program (SFB 564) for hosting me in Thailand. 
Completing this thesis would have been all the more difficult were it not for Johi (and the Sieß family), 
Lisa Hegemann, Martin Benz, Isabel Luotto, Martina Frapporti, Marcelo Carauta, Andrea Vasquez, Juan 
Laso, Stefan Burkart and Linda Brode, who among many other friends, I could always count on for moral 
support during this journey. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Villia Jefremovas and Joachim Voss for 
their friendship and for being a source of great inspiration.   
Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional support. I will always be indebted to my 
mom and dad for their loving patience and for believing in me through the toughest moments. Los amo! 

VII 
CONTENTS 
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS ............................................................................................................................. III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................V 
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................................................X 
LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................................... XI 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS ......................................................... XII 
1 General introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Pollination: basic principles and ecological significance ......................................................... 1 
1.2 Pollination by bees .................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Global pollination crisis: drivers and pollinator conservation initiatives ................................. 5 
1.4 Economic valuation of pollinating bees .................................................................................... 8 
1.4.1 State of the art ........................................................................................................................... 9 
1.4.1.1 Market prices based valuation ........................................................................................... 9 
1.4.1.2 Production function approaches ........................................................................................ 9 
1.4.1.3 Cost based methods ......................................................................................................... 13 
1.4.2 Challenges for valuing conservation policies with stated preference methods ....................... 14 
1.4.3 Choice modelling: supplementary theoretical background ..................................................... 16 
1.4.3.1 Derivation and properties of the logit probabilities ......................................................... 17 
1.4.3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation, hypothesis testing and goodness of fit 
measures .......................................................................................................................... 19 
1.5 Motivation and objectives ....................................................................................................... 21 
1.6 Research questions .................................................................................................................. 22 
1.7 Study sites ............................................................................................................................... 23 
1.8 Overview of data and software ............................................................................................... 24 
1.9 Thesis structure ....................................................................................................................... 25 
1.10 References ............................................................................................................................... 26 
2 The optimal supply of crop pollination and honey from wild and managed bees: an 
analytical framework for diverse socio-economic and ecological settings .................................... 35 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 36 
2.1.1 The role of managed and wild bees in crop pollination .......................................................... 36 
2.1.2 Markets for pollination services and floral nectar .................................................................. 38 
2.2 A general theoretical framework for the optimal allocation of pollinating bees .................... 41 
2.2.1 Basic economic model: deriving equilibrium stocking densities ............................................ 41 
VIII 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Bioeconomic equilibria and extensions to the basic model .................................................... 42 
2.2.2.1 No cooperation occurs between farmers and beekeepers ................................................ 42 
2.2.2.2 Farmers pay beekeepers for pollination services ............................................................. 43 
2.2.2.3 Beekeepers pay farmers for the privilege of placing their bee colonies on 
cultivated land ................................................................................................................. 44 
2.2.2.4 Farmers and beekeepers cooperate with no monetary payments involved ...................... 45 
2.2.2.5 Beekeepers deliver crop pollination as an externality ..................................................... 45 
2.2.2.6 Beekeepers interact with farmers in an agro-ecosystem that sustains wild bees ............. 46 
2.2.2.7 Farmers consider engaging in on-farm beekeeping ......................................................... 49 
2.3 Applying the analytical framework to real world beekeeping-farming interactions .............. 51 
2.4 Discussion and conclusions .................................................................................................... 55 
2.5 References ............................................................................................................................... 57 
3 Longan fruit farmers’ demand for policies aimed at conserving native pollinating bees in 
Northern Thailand ............................................................................................................................. 63 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 64 
3.2 The economic value of pollination services ............................................................................ 65 
3.3 Material and methods .............................................................................................................. 67 
3.3.1 The discrete choice experiment .............................................................................................. 67 
3.3.2 Economic theory of discrete choice modelling ....................................................................... 67 
3.3.3 Hypotheses underlying this study and experimental design ................................................... 69 
3.3.4 Survey and sampling ............................................................................................................... 72 
3.4 Results ..................................................................................................................................... 74 
3.5 Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 77 
3.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 79 
3.7 References ............................................................................................................................... 80 
3.8 Errata ....................................................................................................................................... 84 
4 Regional differences in farmers’ preferences for a native bee conservation policy: the 
case of farming communities in Northern and Eastern Thailand ................................................. 87 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 88 
4.1.1 Context: current status of beekeeping and pollination services in Thailand ........................... 88 
4.1.2 A policy to conserve native bees in Thailand ......................................................................... 90 
4.2 Materials and methods ............................................................................................................ 91 
4.2.1 Discrete choice experiments ................................................................................................... 91 
4.2.2 Mixed Logit (ML) and Generalized Mixed Logit (GMXL) models ....................................... 92 
IX 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses underlying this study ........................................................................................... 95 
4.2.4 Experimental design and survey ............................................................................................. 96 
4.3 Results ..................................................................................................................................... 98 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................... 98 
4.3.2 Identifying sources of preference and overall scale heterogeneity ....................................... 100 
4.3.3 Willingness to pay estimation ............................................................................................... 106 
4.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 107 
4.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 110 
4.6 References ............................................................................................................................. 112 
5 Discussion and conclusions ............................................................................................................. 119 
5.1 Contributions of this thesis ................................................................................................... 119 
5.1.1 Conceptual model ................................................................................................................. 119 
5.1.2 Elicitation format .................................................................................................................. 120 
5.1.3 Choice modelling applicability ............................................................................................. 120 
5.1.4 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 122 
5.1.5 Case studies........................................................................................................................... 122 
5.2 Caveats .................................................................................................................................. 122 
5.3 Outlook ................................................................................................................................. 125 
5.4 References ............................................................................................................................. 127 
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................. 129 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ......................................................................................................................... 131 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ............................................................................................................... 135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1. Choice alternative attributes and corresponding design levels ................................................... 70 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of the sampled population ........................................................................ 73 
Table 3.3. Mixed logit coefficients for an all-parameters-random model and for a fixed-cost 
model with corresponding WTP estimates ................................................................................ 75 
Table 3.4. Average and aggregated consumer surplus change estimates .................................................... 76 
Table 3.5. Estimated longan production losses attributed to declining bee pollination services ................ 77 
Table 3.6. Corrigendum for fixed-cost model (with corresponding WTP estimates) of Table 3.3 ............. 85 
Table 3.7. Corrigendum for Table 3.4: Avg. and aggregated consumer surplus change estimates ............. 86 
Table 3.8. Corrigendum for Table 3.5: estimated longan production lossesa) attributed to 
declining bee pollination services ............................................................................................. 86 
Table 4.1. Choice alternative attributes, corresponding design levels and other variable 
definitions .................................................................................................................................. 98 
Table 4.2. Sample characteristics based on respondents’ per-household values, 2013 ............................... 99 
Table 4.3. Mixed and generalized mixed logit (𝜸𝜸 fixed at 1) models fitted on Chiang Mai dataset ......... 103 
Table 4.4. Mixed (ML) and generalized mixed logit (GMXL; 𝜸𝜸 fixed at 1) models fitted on 
Chanthaburi dataset and GMXL fitted on pooled data ............................................................ 104 
Table 4.5. Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Thai Baht (THB) for Chanthaburi, Chiang 
Mai and pooled datasets (costs parameter fixed at 1 with std. dev=0) .................................... 105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XI 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 .................................................................................................................................................... 11 
Figure 1.2. ................................................................................................................................................... 12 
Figure 1.3 .................................................................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 1.4 .................................................................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 2.1. ................................................................................................................................................... 43 
Figure 2.2. ................................................................................................................................................... 44 
Figure 2.3. ................................................................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 2.4. ................................................................................................................................................... 46 
Figure 2.5. ................................................................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 2.6.   ................................................................................................................................................. 50 
Figure 2.7. ................................................................................................................................................... 51 
Figure 3.1. ................................................................................................................................................... 71 
Figure 3.2. ................................................................................................................................................... 73 
Figure 4.1. ................................................................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 5.1 .................................................................................................................................................. 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XII 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS 
 
AIC Akaike information criterion  
ASC Alternative specific constant  
BIC Bayesian information criterion  
DCE Discrete choice experiment  
d.f. Degrees of freedom  
DoAE Department of Agricultural Economics (Thailand)  
EUR / € Euro  
EV1 Extreme value type 1 (Gumbel) distribution  
F F-test  
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
GMXL Generalized mixed logit  
H0 Null hypothesis  
Ha  Alternative hypothesis (a = 1,…, A)  
ha Hectare  
I Number of surveyed individuals (alternatively n or N)  
IIA Independent of irrelevant alternatives   
IID Independently and identically distributed  
IPI-POA International Pollinator Initiative’s Plan of Action  
K Number of estimated parameters  
kg Kilogram  
LL Log-likelihood function  
LRT Likelihood ratio test  
ML Mixed logit (also known as random parameter logit)  
MLE Maximum likelihood estimation  
MSL Maximum simulated likelihood  
N Number of choice observations (alternatively number of surveyed individuals)  
OLS Ordinary least squares  
R2 Coefficient of determination R squared  
RPL Random parameter logit (also known as mixed logit)  
RUT Random utility theory  
TEV Total economic value  
THB / ฿ Thai baht  
TVMP Total value of marginal products  
USA United States of America  
USD United States dollar  
VMPH Value of marginal product of fruit (from bee pollination)  
VMPF Value of marginal product of honey  
WTP Willingness to pay  ~ 𝜒𝜒2 Chi-squared distributed  ~ 𝑁𝑁 Normally distributed  
1 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
 General introduction 
Manuel Ernesto Narjes 
University of Hohenheim, Germany 
 
In this chapter, I review the research approach and basic concepts that were applied throughout this 
dissertation, as follows. Section 1.1 gives a brief overview of the principles of pollination biology, of the 
importance of this ecosystem function to the reproduction and genetic improvement of plants, and of its 
contribution to food security. Section 1.2 explains the role of bees as pollinators of wild plants and crops, 
placing emphasis on the importance of pollinator diversity to agricultural production. I introduce the 
current global pollinator crisis and the international initiatives that aim at conserving bees and other 
pollinators in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the state of the art in the economic valuation of pollinating 
bees and gives a supplementary review on the principles of choice modelling, which I propose for 
addressing the challenge of capturing non-use values of bees. The motivation and objectives of this thesis 
are presented in Section 1.5, followed by Section 1.6 with the research questions I pursue to answer. An 
overview of the sites that I chose for my research and of the data and software that were used is given in 
Sections 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. Finally, Section 1.9 outlines this dissertation’s body of research. 
1.1 Pollination: basic principles and ecological significance 
Pollination is the process by which pollen grains, containing male gametes, are transferred from the male 
to the female reproductive organs (i.e., to the stigma in angiosperms or directly to the naked ovule in 
gymnosperms2) of spermatophytes (i.e., seed-producing plants) from the same species, and thus precedes 
their sexual reproduction (Delaplane and Mayer 2000; Flamini 2012). In angiosperms (i.e., flowering 
plants) for instance, when a pollen grain gets from the anthers of one flower to the stigmatic surface of the 
same or another flower, the germination of a pollen tube is induced, after which it grows to penetrate the 
ovary where it delivers two male gametes, one of which will effectuate ovule fertilization giving rise to a 
zygote (i.e. a diploid embryonic seed). The other gamete fuses with a female diploid nucleus, the resulting 
cell of which divides repeatedly forming the triploid endosperm tissue that will provide nutrition to the 
developing embryo (Willmer 2011). Fertilization is a fundamental stage in the development of seeds (in 
                                                     
 
2 Gymnosperm is a taxonomically loose term for all spermatophytes other than angiosperms. It is etymologically 
indicative of the “exposed seeds”, a defining characteristic of gymnosperms that contrasts with the “hidden seeds” 
of flowering plants (Willmer 2011). 
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all seed plants), which store food reserves for the early seedling growth, mainly in the form of 
carbohydrates, oils and fats, and proteins; thus the importance of seeds as major sources of food for 
humans and animals (Bewley and Black 1994). Moreover, a unique aspect of angiosperms is the 
development of fruits as their seeds mature. Botanically, a fruit is the structure containing the seeds, i.e., 
the pericarp that is formed from the wall of a mature ovary after the flowering stage. However, the flesh in 
some fruits may partly develop from various floral components, such as the receptacle, sepal and 
inflorescence. Fruit formation in plants has evolved as a seed dispersal strategy, insofar the energy and 
nutrition contents of fleshy fruits may attract surrounding animals that may disseminate the seeds after 
ingesting and defecating them, or during the process of eating the fruit pulp (Nath et al. 2014). Moreover, 
in many plant species the growth of fruit flesh is associated with the activity of the developing seeds and 
in some cases (e.g., in melon and other Cucurbitaceae) fruit size is positively correlated with seed number 
(Bewley and Black 1994).  
Technically, pollination does not include pollen germination and ovule fertilization (Willmer 2011), yet 
describing these processes contextualizes pollen transfer, thus highlighting its importance as a regulating 
ecosystem function. 
Plants, lacking motility themselves, also rely on moving agents to increase the chances of immotile male 
gametes reaching equally immotile female gametes. Such agents may be abiotic, i.e., wind or water 
currents, and/or biotic i.e., mobile animals (in particular flying ones), commonly referred to as pollinators 
(Willmer 2011). Most flowering plants are pollinated by animals3 (i.e., zoophilous), especially by insects 
(i.e., entomophilous), with a minority of species relying on abiotic pollen vectors, mainly wind 
(anemophilous) (Ollerton et al. 2011). The opposite is true for gymnosperms, which are mostly 
anemophilous, and among which only Gnetales (the closest living relatives of angiosperms) and Cycadales 
present entomophily (Crepet 1974; Labandeiraet al. 2007; Nepi et al. 2009; Willmer 2011).   
Pollinators are especially important to ensure cross-pollination, which refers to the transfer of pollen 
between different plants from the same species (i.e., conspecific pollen transfer). Cross-pollination is an 
evolutionary strategy of angiosperms to promote outbreeding that is more commonly found among 
perennials than among short-lived annual plants. Self-fertilizing4 plants are more vulnerable to inbreeding 
depression, which often manifests in smaller seed size, lower seed count, slower germination and slower 
growth. Therefore, almost all habitually self-pollinating plants have also the ability to cross-pollinate. 
                                                     
 
3 Ollerton et al. (2011) estimated the proportion of animal-pollinated species of flowering plants (i.e., angiosperms) 
to increase from a mean of 78% in temperate-zone communities to 94% in tropical communities. Correcting for the 
latitudinal diversity, this proportion results in 88% of the estimated global species-level diversity of flowering 
plants. 
4 Darwin (1876) proposed that plants adapt to self-pollination as a (backup) reproductive assurance when outcrossing 
fails. Kalisz et al. (2004) corroborate that hypothesis providing empirical evidence for an increase of self-
fertilization rates in Collinsia verna in periods of infrequent pollinator visits. 
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Furthermore, the visit of pollinators to facultative cross-pollinating plants often results in improved seed or 
fruit quantity and/or quality (or uniformity) (Willmer 2011). For instance coffee (Coffea arabica), which 
is capable of self-pollination, will produce significantly higher yields with lower peaberry5 incidence in 
the presence of abundant native or introduced bees (Roubik 2002; Ricketts et al. 2004).  
Pollinators can be important contributors to the provision of calories in the human diet, are critical to the 
production of a considerable portion of its vitamins and minerals and support the production of many 
plant-derived medicines. Thus, pollinators are essential to food security and sound nutrition, and to the 
biodiversity that enriches our diet and medicine (El-Berry et al. 1974; FAO 1995; Canter et al. 2005; Ellis 
et al. 2015; Eilers et al. 2011). Animal-mediated pollination, in particular by bees (i.e., melittophily), is 
important for the sexual reproduction of 87 of the 124 leading global crops6 used directly by humans, and 
of the majority of wild plants (Klein et al. 2007).  
1.2 Pollination by bees  
To take advantage of the behavioral flexibility of pollinators, plants reward flower visitors (mainly) with 
pollen and nectar. Bees (Hymenoptera: Apoidea: Anthophila), which (with the exception of a few species) 
rely exclusively on floral resources for both larval and adult nutrition, have a higher flower visitation rate, 
and vary considerably more in their interaction with flowers, than any other taxon. Furthermore, their 
sizes, hairy bodies, variably long tongues, learning capabilities and floral constancy (among other 
adaptations that may be species-specific), equip bees especially well to visit flowers efficiently and make 
them effective pollinators (Willmer 2011). Bees are thus usually the most effective pollinators of the 
various crops and wild plants that are not wind-pollinated (Free 1993; Batra 1995; Delaplane and Mayer 
2000). 
The benefits humans draw from pollination make this ecosystem function an essential ecosystem service 
(de Groot et al. 2002; Pascual et al. 2010). Crop pollination is an ecosystem service in that wild 
pollinators, particularly wild bees, supply a valuable input to agricultural production. It may also be 
considered a farm management tool when domesticated bees are kept, purchased or rented by farmers in 
many countries to either supplement the local pollinator fauna or to restore the decline of its services 
(Richards 1993; Heard 1999; Ricketts et al. 2008; Gallai et al. 2009). In this regard, it should be noted that 
the contribution of wild bees to crop pollination has generally been underestimated: the European 
honeybee (Apis mellifera L.) has often been credited with pollination services actually provided by non-
Apis bee species and other wild pollinators (Parker et al. 1987). In fact, A. mellifera is currently the single 
                                                     
 
5 In coffee, peaberries are small misshapen seeds resulting from one of the two ovules failing to develop (Ricketts et 
al 2004). 
6 Crop plants constitute < 0.1% of all flowering plant species (Ollerton et al. 2011), which represent about 80% of all 
known living plant species on earth (Cronquist, et al., 2016). 
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most commonly used species in managed pollination services worldwide and is particularly deployed 
within highly productive crops that flower intensively for brief periods (Slaa et al. 2006; Potts et al. 2010; 
Magrach et al. 2017; see also Section 2.1.1).  
On the other hand, there are an estimated over 40,000 bee species globally, of which more than 25,000 
have so far been fully described. The majority of all bee species7 are so-called solitary bees (in the sense 
that each female, being fertile, makes and stocks her own nest), which encompass many genera (e.g., 
Osmia and Megachile) in most of the bee families. Solitary bees belong to one of six groups of bees that 
Willmer (2011) classifies as melittophily subsyndromes8, the other five being carpenter bees (i.e., mainly 
Xylocopini), euglossine bees (Euglossini), bumblebees (Bombini), stingless bees (Meliponini) and 
honeybees (Apini). Within the Apidae family, all species in the latter three groups (tribes) are eusocial 
bees9, a condition only present in a minority of bee species, while only degrees of sociality are displayed 
by some members of the Xylocopini and Euglossini tribes (Willmer 2011).  
Solitary bees tend to form specialized mutualisms with particular plant species and are therefore said to be 
more effective10 pollinators (per visit) than social bees (Welsford and Johnson 2012). The latter have more 
generalized flower-visiting habits as they cover a longer sequence of forage plants to feed their colonies, 
which compared to solitary bees, are active for much longer periods over the year. Social bees may thus 
also offer flower-visiting behaviours that favour pollination: in addition to being generalists, they tend to 
cover substantially larger foraging ranges than solitary bees, communicate foraging site locations among 
individuals (thus saving individual efforts of searching for forage) and can visit flowers even in 
unpropitious weather conditions, among other features (Willmer 2011). Klein et al. (2003) showed that, 
for 24 agroforestry systems in Indonesia, bee diversity rather than abundance explains the variability in 
fruit set of highland coffee (Coffea arabica). In additional experiments, they showed that the (per visit) 
pollination effectiveness of solitary bee species was indeed significantly higher (leading to higher fruit set) 
than that of social bee species. Nevertheless, the collective role of a species-rich bee community was 
ultimately important for the successful pollination of highland coffee, i.e., social bees matter, due to their 
                                                     
 
7 According to Batra (1984) more than 85% of all bee species are solitary. 
8 A pollination syndrome is a grouping of flower species (often from very different taxonomic groups) that are 
classified according to traits they have developed in convergent evolution in order to attract a particular pollinator 
(Willmer 2011). In this regard, a subsyndrome of melittophily refers here to a group of bees, for the visits of which 
flowers have specialized. 
9 Eusociality is the highest form of social organization in animals, involving different morphological types (castes) or 
age groups that assume different social functions. A eusocial bee colony usually consists of one fertile queen that 
engages in egg production, one or more fertile males that fertilize eggs, and one or more classes of sterile workers 
that exclusively engage in food gathering, nest maintenance, colony defence and cooperative brood care 
(Strickberger 2005). 
10 For consistency purposes, I use the term “effective” throughout this section to refer to the “per visit effectiveness” 
of a pollinator species, as defined by Willmer (2011). Welsford and Johnson (2012) for instance use “effectiveness” 
to describe what Klein et al. (2003) call “efficiency”, when referring to the “fruit set after a single visit of a specific 
bee species to a single virginal previously bagged coffee flower.”  
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high visit frequency, and solitary bees due to their pollination effectiveness (ibid). Brittain et al. (2013) 
arrived to a similar conclusion after conducting field experiments in 25 Californian almond (Prunus 
dulcis) orchards that were visited by both Osmia lignaria and A. mellifera bees. One may thus not 
categorically say that one type of bee is a better pollinator than the other. After all, a visitor’s pollination 
effectiveness involves both measures: i) per visit effectiveness (as in e.g., seed set, or preferably the 
amount of conspecific pollen deposited on the stigma); and ii) visit frequency. At any rate, the concept of 
pollination syndromes represents an oversimplification: predicting a plant’s pollinator by just cataloguing 
its key floral traits is constrained by external ecological factors. In reality, in a diurnally and seasonally 
changing environment, most flowers are generalists rather than specialists and can be potentially visited by 
a range of pollinators, which in turn may vary in their pollination effectiveness through time and space 
(Willmer 2011). 
The last several decades have seen an increasing interest in the development of management practices for 
applied crop pollination with non-honeybee pollinators (Slaa et al. 2006), such as bumblebees [e.g., 
Bombus impatiens for greenhouse tomatoes (Lycopersicon esculentum) (as described by Morandin et al. 
2001 for Ontario, Canada)], solitary bees [e.g., O. lignaria in almond (Prunus amygdalus), apple (Malus 
domestica) and pear (Pyrus communis) orchards in Utah, USA (Bosch and Kemp 2000) and Nomia 
melanderi for alfalfa (Medicago sativa) in the Touchet Valley, USA (Cane 2008)] and stingless bees11 
(Heard 1999; Slaa et al. 2006). The importance of finding alternatives to A. mellifera crop pollination has 
increased as, in recent years, Europe and the USA have experienced severe honeybee stock declines, 
which have drawn attention to the vulnerability of this species to diseases (e.g., viruses), pathogens 
(especially the ectoparasitic mite Varroa destructor) and other environmental stressors that may act 
synergistically. The increasing dependence of agricultural crops (and possibly of wild plants) on the 
pollination services from A. mellifera alone is thus worrisome (Potts et al. 2010).  
1.3 Global pollination crisis: drivers and pollinator conservation initiatives 
In their study, Aizen and Harder (2009) claim that despite increasing evidence of regional and local 
declines in pollinators, the global population of managed European honeybees has increased by ~45% 
during the last half century. Nevertheless, the same study reveals that the share of agricultural output that 
requires animal pollination has increased by more than 300% (in response to increasing demand per 
capita) during the same period, which is likely to exceed the global honeybee pollination capacity. As a 
consequence of such an increase of pollinator dependency in global agriculture, the relative reduction in 
                                                     
 
11 For instance, the Sumatran Trigona minangkaba for greenhouse strawberries (Fragaria chiloensis × ananassa) in 
Shimane, Japan (Kakutani et al. 1993), Melipona subnitida for greenhouse sweet peppers (Capsicum annuum) in 
Fortaleza, Brazil (de Oliveira Cruz et al. 2005) and Tetragonula laeviceps in Chanthaburi, Thailand (Chuttong et al. 
2015; see also Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). 
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pollination services may offset the expected benefits from agricultural intensification (Deguines et al. 
2014). Moreover, Aizen et al. (2009) propose that pollination shortages will intensify demand for 
agricultural land, this trend currently being more pronounced in the two-thirds of global cultivated land 
corresponding to the so called developing world. 
Landscape alteration is one of five main global change pressures to which pollinator declines have been 
attributed, the other four being agricultural intensification, species invasions, the spread of pathogens and 
climate change (González-Varó et al. 2013; Goulson et al. 2015). Habitat loss (or more commonly habitat 
fragmentation) is thought to be the most important contributor to reductions in bee diversity and 
abundance (Potts et al. 2010). A quantitative meta-analysis that Winfree et al. (2009) conducted over 54 
studies on the effects of anthropogenic disturbances to bee abundance and/or richness significantly 
supports such hypothesis. Lately, the decline in habitat availability has been sharpest in the tropics, where 
species richness is greater and, according to a meta-analysis by Vamosi et al. (2006), the risk of pollinator 
and plant diversity losses is higher. Nevertheless, like other drivers that affect biodiversity and pollinator 
populations, land-use change rarely acts in isolation (Schweiger et al. 2010; Potts et al. 2010). Agricultural 
intensification, thought to be a major driver of pollinator declines, generally occurs in the most altered 
landscapes, which can make it difficult to disentangle its effect on pollinator communities from that of 
habitat degradation. Intensive agriculture is characterized by monocultures with increasing farm sizes, 
which in combination with an intensive application of herbicides, reduce the diversity and spatiotemporal 
availability of foraging resources and nesting sites for bees (Willmer 2011; Potts et al. 2010; González-
Varó et al. 2013). Additionally, intensive pesticide use has a well-documented effect on pollinators, 
especially on wild ones. Poisoning of honeybees can for instance result in direct mortality, abnormal 
communication dances, inability to fly and displacement of queens (Johansen et al. 1983; Kearns et al. 
1998; Potts et al. 2010; Willmer 2011). Recently, a relatively new class of globally used insecticides called 
neonicotinoids (chemically similar to nicotine), have become an important subject for public debate as 
they have been directly implicated in the declines of bee populations including honeybees, bumble bees 
and solitary bees. Neonicotinoids compromise the central nervous system of pest-insects, paralyzing and 
killing them. At sub-lethal levels12 however, molecules of these neuro-toxic insecticides influence the 
cognitive abilities of non-target insects such as bees, weakening their performance and ultimately 
impacting the viability of their colonies (Blacquière et al. 2012; Sánchez-Bayo et al. 2016). Furthermore, 
scientific evidence points at synergistic effects between neonicotinoids and pathogen infection (Alaux et 
al. 2010; González-Varó et al. 2013) and at a significantly higher propensity of colony failure when bees 
                                                     
 
12 Neonicotinoid insecticides can for instance be translocated into the pollen and nectar (e.g., from seeds that have 
been coated to systemically protect the plant) that are collected by foraging bees (Girolami et al. 2009; Cresswell 
2011). 
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are exposed to neonicotinoids in combination with another commonly applied pesticide (i.e. 𝜆𝜆-cyhalothrin) 
(Gill et al. 2012). 
Habitat fragmentation and agricultural intensification are also likely to partly explain the recently reported 
substantial losses of flying insect biomass (i.e., more than 75%) in protected nature areas of Germany 
(Hallmann, et al. 2017). The total insect biomass was measured with standardized protocols over 27 years 
(between 1989 and 2016)  in natural reserves of limited size, most of which (94%) are enclosed by 
agricultural fields and thus characterize a typical West-European fragmented landscape. These declines are 
especially alarming considering that they were recorded in areas that have been designated for the 
preservation of ecosystem functions and biodiversity (ibid).   
For nearly three decades now, declines of wild and managed pollinators have been reported in every 
continent (except for Antarctica) in at least one region and/or country (FAO 2008; Willmer 2011). The 
prospect of a global pollination crisis (Kluser and Peduzzi 2007), although controversial in the past 
(Ghazoul 2005a, b; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2005), has raised concerns among the scientific community 
and national and international policy-makers (Dias et al. 1999; Kremen et al. 2002; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assesment 2005; FAO 2008; Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009; Potts et al. 2010; Vanbergen et al. 2013; 
Goulson et al. 2015; IPBES 2016). The São Paulo Declaration on Pollinators (Dias et al. 1999) made such 
concerns explicit and laid the conceptual foundations to develop the International Initiative for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Pollinators (also known as the International Pollinator Initiative - 
IPI) that was officially established in May 2000 at the 5th Conference of the Parties of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity in Nairobi, Kenya (Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009; Willmer 2011). The initiative’s plan 
of action (IPI-POA) offers guidelines for the improvement and/or development of policies and practices 
that enhance the conservation of pollinators and that restore their habitats, which can be summarized in 
four elements: i) assesment of bees and their services; ii) adaptive management; iii) building capacity; and 
iv) getting bees into policy-mainstreaming. The globally coordinated implementation of such guidelenes 
aims at reaching four main objectives, namely: a) monitoring pollinator declines, their causes and impacts 
on pollination services; b) addressing the lack of taxonomic information on pollinators; c) assessing the 
economic value of pollination and the economic impact of pollinator declines; and d) promoting the 
conservation, restoration and sustainable use of pollinator diversity in agriculture and related ecosystems 
(Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009; CBD Secretariat 2017). Since its formation, several other initiatives have 
joined IPI both at the regional level (e.g., the African Pollinator Initiative, the North American Pollinator 
Protection Campaign and the Oceania Pollinator Initiative) and at the national level (e.g., the Brazilian and 
Colombian Pollinator Initiatives and the UK Insect Pollinators Initiative). Other organizations that have 
the common goal of conserving pollinators include the Xerces Society, the STEP (i.e., Status and Trends 
in European Pollinators) project and COLOSS (i.e., Prevention of honey bee Colony LOSSes) (FAO 2017; 
COLOSS 2017; STEP 2017; Xerces Society 2017).  
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Neonicotinoids have also entered the policy arena in the European Union, where on the Commission’s 
(EC) request, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assessed the risks associated with the 
application of three neonicotinoid varieties, namely imidacloprid (i.e., the most used insecticide 
worldwide), clothianidin and thiamethoxam. After the EFSA released its conclusions confirming their 
toxicity (European Food Safety Authority 2013a, b, c), the EC issued in 2013, on precautionary principle, 
a two-year moratorium on these chemicals. Agrochemical companies have nevertheless disputed the 
laboratory studies from which such conclusions were drawn, arguing that they are not realistic as they did 
not replicate the results of field trials, where a negative effect could neither be established on honeybees 
[see reviews by Blacquière et al. (2012) and by Carreck and Ratnieks (2014), but cf. meta-analysis by 
Cresswell (2011)] nor on wild bee species (Carreck and Ratnieks 2014; Schmuck and Lewis 2016). Since 
the moratorium expired in December 2015, the EFSA has updated its assessments based on new 
evaluations, including a recently released 2-year-long study (Woodcock et al. 2017) that was funded by 
Syngenta Ltd. and Bayer CropScience, which provides a country-specific verdict on the effect of two 
neonicotinoids (clothianidin and thiamethoxam) on honeybees and wild bees. According to Woodcock et 
al. (2017), domesticated honeybees were harmed by these substances in the United Kingdom and 
Hungary, while in Germany they showed no treatment effect. Wild bees (i.e., Bombus terrestris and the 
solitary bee Osmia bicornis) nevertheless had a less differentiated response between countries and showed 
a depressed reproductive potential that was associated with the neonicotinoid residues found in their nests 
(ibid). These results corroborate previous findings regarding the harmful effect of neonicotinoids to wild 
bees [e.g., from a field study by Rundlöf et al. (2015) and from field-realistic laboratory trials by Laycock 
et al. (2012), by Whitehorn et al. (2012) and by Sandrock et al. (2014)] and to honeybees [e.g., from field 
realistic experiments by Henry et al. (2012)]. Following two separate consultations with EU Member State 
pesticide experts, the EFSA has concluded in a series of recent reports (European Food Safety Authority 
2018a, b, c) that the risk posed by neonicotinoids to bees (i.e., managed: A. mellifera and bumblebees, and 
wild: bumblebees and Osmia bicornis as a representative species for wild solitary bees) is confirmed. 
According to the EFSA (2018d), their conclusions are to be assessed by risk managers from the EC and 
Member States for potential revisions of the current restrictions on neonicotinoids, which in spite of 
Bayer’s maintained objections, are likely to become tighter (Stokstad 2018). 
1.4 Economic valuation of pollinating bees  
According to the TEV classification by Pascual et al. 2010, the economic value of (conserving or losing) 
pollinating bees can be classified into the direct and indirect use value (actual or future), and the non-use 
value categories of their total economic value (TEV). Direct use values of pollinating bees are derived 
from their hive products (i.e., honey, pollen, royal jelly, wax and/or propolis) and less commonly 
(depending on the bee species) from their venom. The ecosystem service of pollinating crops and wild 
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plants is classified under the indirect use values of bees and is likely to contribute the most to their TEV. 
Among the non-use values of pollinating bees, one can classify the value perceived for their mere 
existence and the cultural and religious significance that human societies assign to them. Other non-use 
values include the philantropic satisfaction of having other humans derive benefits from bees in the 
present or the future (ibid).  
Moreover, the ecosystem services provided to agriculture by wild bees have the characteristic of public 
goods. Given the case of becoming insufficient nevertheless, crop pollination can be supplemented or 
reinstated with managed bees and thus acquire characteristics of a private good and/or of a positive 
externality.  
1.4.1 State of the art 
The appeal for methods to estimate the value of ecosystem services has increased since, in the 1970s, this 
concept started developing around the usefulness of ecosystem functions to humans, giving rise to the 
adoption of utilitarian arguments for biodiversity conservation (Westman 1977; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; 
Daily 1997; de Groot et al. 2002; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010).  
After the urgency of assessing the economic impact of pollinator declines was expressed with the 
establishment of the IPI (see Section 1.3), the FAO published a review of methods for the economic 
valuation of ecosystem services (Mburu et al. 2006). Among the approaches listed by Mburu et al. (2006), 
they deem three ways suitable for the valuation of pollination services, namely 1) the market price 
method, 2) the production function approaches and 3) the cost-based methods (preventive expenditure, 
damage costs avoided and replacement costs).  
1.4.1.1 Market prices based valuation 
The first approach consists in observing market prices for commercial pollination services (i.e., managed 
bees) at different provision levels (i.e., beehive quantities and strengths), and then obtaining the 
aggregated farmers’ willingness to hire such services (i.e., the demand function) and the aggragated costs 
of commercial beekeepers to supply them, in order to calculate the consumer surplus (CS) and the 
producer surplus (PS) resulting from commercial pollination. This method could for instance be applied to 
the case of pollination services hired by Californian almond orchardists (see Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2), 
provided that the transaction costs would be negligible and that the relevant agricultural markets would be 
undistorted by subsidies.  
1.4.1.2 Production function approaches 
In the literature, one of the earliest attempts to estimate the value of pollination services concerns the 
second approach and dates back to the first half of the 20th century, when Butler (1943) assumed that 
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honeybees were responsible for half of Britain’s commercial fruit crop production and as a result valued 
their pollination at £4 million per annum. He juxtaposed this value with the £1.287 million worth of honey 
yearly produced by the 429 thousand honeybee colonies available to Britain’s agriculture at the time, and 
thus estimated their total contribution to the nation’s economy at £5.287 million per annum (i.e., £12.32 
per colony and year). These estimates suggest that, at the time of Butler’s publication, the contribution of 
honeybees to Britain’s agriculture would have been worth 3.1 times the value of the honey they produced. 
Carreck and Williams (1998) re-estimated the 1943 value of honeybee pollination at £22.06 million, by 
weighting that year’s crop values13 with factors that represent three categories of insect pollination 
dependency, namely 0.1 (low), 0.5 (medium) and 0.9 (high), and further attributing 80% of insect 
pollination to domesticated honeybees. Accordingly, they estimated the total value of honeybees in 1996 
at £153.6 million (£137.8 million thereof corresponding to crop pollination). The proportion to which the 
value of honeybee pollination stands relative to the value of honey in the UK would thus be 8.7 in 1996 
and (if corrected ex post) 17.1 for 1943.14 These estimates can give a first impression of the importance of 
bee pollination services to agriculture by comparing their indirect use value with the direct use value of 
beehive products, thus offering a straightforward economic argument for their conservation.  
Butler (1943) and Carreck and Williams (1998), like other studies [e.g., Morse and Calderone (2000) and 
Losey and Vaughan (2006)], also convey in their valuation approach the idea that bee pollination is a crop 
production input, the value of which can be equated with that of the production reductions they ascribe to 
a complete loss of pollinators, as assumed with the application of pollination dependence ratios. In other 
words, if 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐵𝐵) expresses the quantity of fruit produced as a function of the number of pollinating bee 
colonies 𝐵𝐵, it follows (according to this approach) that their pollination related value equals their 
contribution to crop yields multiplied by the crop price 𝑃𝑃, as given by 𝑉𝑉(𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃𝑃 ∗ ∫ (𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵⁄ )𝐵𝐵0 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵. Other 
studies have in contrast implicitly applied a 100 percent dependence ratio by assigning the total value of 
entomophilous crops to pollinators [e.g., Levin (1983) and (Costanza et al. 1997)]. At any rate, simply 
multiplying the changes in crop output with farm-gate prices (i.e., calculating changes in revenues) gives 
an approximation to the economic value of pollinators that can be problematic in view of following 
caveats: i) it is based on revenue considerations that neglect the costs that farmers may save through short 
term adaptations (e.g., by hiring less labour for the reduced harvest), thus potentially leading to an 
overestimation of pollination-deficit related production losses; ii) it assumes that changes in the 
                                                     
 
13 Carreck and Williams (1998) re-estimated the 1943 crop values using that year’s relevant agricultural statistic 
reports from the UK Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Agriculture for Scotland and the Government of 
Northern Ireland. 
14 The corresponding proportion was estimated at 135 (i.e., USD 18.9 billion worth of pollination vs. USD 140 
million worth of honey and beeswax) for the USA in 1981 (Levin 1983), while a more recent bulletin published 
by FAO reported this factor to range between 30 and 50 for Western Europe and to be 100 for Africa (Bradbear 
2009). 
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availability of pollination services do not affect the market, which would only be sensible if such changes 
were only relevant at the local level, or if a crop yield reduction (increase) would not lead to substantial 
increases (decreases) in crop prices; iii) it does not give a complete picture of the changes in social welfare 
(ΔW) as it neglects the demand function and thus the consumer surplus (see area III in Figure 1.1); iv) the 
dependence ratios are applied under the assumption that the reference yields (i.e., from which changes in 
crop-pollination are considered) were realized at the optimum crop pollination level (i.e., where the 
production function’s first-order condition with respect to pollination equals zero): this is evidently often 
not the case (see Section 1.3) and using reference yields that are below the potential pollination optimum 
would lead to an underestimation of the contribution of pollinators; v) dependence ratios taken from the 
literature do not reflect the variability in cultivars, in pollinator density and composition, and need not 
necessarily fit the agronomic conditions that are found in practice (Melathopoulos et al. 2015); vi) value 
estimates that are solely based on market prices may neglect the non-use value components of an 
ecosystem service’s TEV (cf. Pascual et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 1.1 Estimating the value of pollinator declines by solely equating them with changes in crop 
revenues (i.e., area 𝑰𝑰 + 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰) may i) lead to an overestimation corresponding to area 𝑰𝑰, as 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴´ (i.e., the 
marginal costs that farmers may save when crop output declines from 𝑭𝑭𝟎𝟎 to 𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏) are neglected and ii) 
neglect the demand function 𝑷𝑷(𝑭𝑭) and thus the consumer surplus corresponding to area 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰. 
Evidently, applying pollination dependence ratios to correctly estimate the effects on social welfare from 
changes in the provision of pollinattion services requires full information on the demand and supply of the 
crops in question. Southwick and Southwick (1992) constructed demand functions (with long term time 
series on US agricultural outputs and prices, and household incomes) for an array of agricultural 
commodities and then calculated the effect that changes in pollination services (and thus yields, according 
to different pollination dependence ratios) had on consumer surplus CS (see also Figure 1.2), as given by: 
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∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (𝑃𝑃1𝐹𝐹1 − 𝑃𝑃0𝐹𝐹0) + � [𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹)]𝐹𝐹0
𝐹𝐹1
𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹  , (1.1) 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹) is the demand function (i.e. prices as a function of fruit quantities), 𝐹𝐹1 and 𝑃𝑃1 are the fruit 
quantity and price without insect-mediated pollination, and 𝐹𝐹0 and 𝑃𝑃0 are the fruit quantity and price with 
insect-mediated pollination. The first term of the Equation (1.1) is the difference between farmer revenues 
with and without insect pollination. The second term is the aggregated marginal willingness to pay of 
consumers (WTP) for the agricultural products that would have been sold at the lower price 𝑃𝑃0 (due to 
optimal pollination levels) and are instead sold at higher prices (up to 𝑃𝑃1) after pollinator populations start 
declining (adding both terms yields areas I and II in Figure 1.2). Gallai et al. (2009) also follow this 
approach to estimate the worldwide economic value of crop pollination, yet use the dependence ratios 
offered by Klein et al. (2007) and make assumptions regarding the value and shape of 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹), due to the 
difficulty of estimating elasticities for each crop at a global scale. By further assuming a long-run 
(perfectly elastic) aggregate supply curve (i.e., ∆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶=0 and ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ∆𝑊𝑊 = 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼), both studies (Southwick 
and Southwick 1992; Gallai et al. 2009) address caveats i) through iii), yet fail to address caveats iv) 
through vi).  
 
Figure 1.2. Economic valuation of pollinator declines based on consumer preferences (basic approach): 
crop yield declines (𝑭𝑭𝟎𝟎 → 𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏), price response (𝑷𝑷𝟎𝟎 → 𝑷𝑷𝟏𝟏) and corresponding consumer surplus loss 
(∆𝑴𝑴𝑪𝑪 = 𝑰𝑰 + 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰) are attributed to a deficient crop pollination. Modified from Southwick and Southwick 
(1992). 
Neglecting important components of the TEV of pollinators [i.e., caveat vi)] could lead to a substantial 
underestimation of ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, thus adding uncertainty to the overall welfare effects. Furthermore, such 
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uncertainty increases with the proportion of crop yields that depends on insect-mediated pollination 
(Mburu et al. 2006).  
Crop pollination is only one of the positive externalities derived from bees, which among others comprise 
the pollination of wild plants (also an indirect use value) and the existence value associated with specific 
bee species and/or with bee diversity (i.e. non-use values). If one additionally considers that crop 
pollination is mostly dominated by a few (often unthreatened) bee species (see Section 1.2), its economic 
value becomes an argument of less weight for the conservation of pollinator communities. Conservation 
efforts that are solely guided by this argument may therefore be of limited impact, i.e., they may result in a 
sub-optimal allocation of bee colonies (see Figure 1.3) and/or may only target a subset of unthreatened bee 
species (Kleijn et al. 2015; Melathopoulos et al. 2015).  
 
Figure 1.3 The total marginal benefits from bees (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻) are the consumers’ aggregated willingness to 
pay for the marginal non-use benefits (𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵, e.g., existence value, not explicitly shown in the diagram) 
that bees generate, and for the fruits F [𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑭𝑭 = 𝑷𝑷(𝑭𝑭), where 𝑷𝑷 is the fruit price] resulting from their 
pollination; thus, 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 = 𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 + 𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑭𝑭. At a given fruit price 𝑷𝑷𝟎𝟎, farmers’ incentive to conserve bees 
is limited to the contribution that 𝑻𝑻𝟎𝟎 colonies can make to the corresponding fruit production, disregarding 
the additional utility (additional externality) that, for instance, may be derived from their existence. Thus, 
when only use values are considered (e.g., crop pollination), the change in social welfare arising from a 
loss of 𝑻𝑻𝟎𝟎 colonies is underestimated by the value corresponding to area 𝑰𝑰. Area 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 represents the net 
benefits potentially forgone if conservation efforts allocate 𝑻𝑻𝟎𝟎 colonies instead of the optimum level 𝑻𝑻∗. 
1.4.1.3 Cost based methods 
An example of the third approach that Mburu et al. (2006) list in their review is given by Allsopp et al. 
(2008), who ascribed value to the wild and managed pollination services in the Western Cape deciduous 
fruit industry of South Africa, by calculating the costs of replacing them with pollen dusting and hand 
pollination [using adjusted insect and managed pollinator dependence ratios and thus also being prone to 
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caveats iv) and v) above]. This valuation approach is manifestly not based on consumer preferences and 
thus not appropriate for the measurement of welfare changes. Cost-based methods should be applied when 
maintaining or replacing the ecosystem service in question (or mitigating the damages arising from its 
deterioration) is imperative and the mitigation measures considered should be implemented at any cost. 
Section 3.2 also briefly discusses Allsopp et al. (2008) and provides further examples of efforts to estimate 
the economic value of pollinators and their services. 
1.4.2 Challenges for valuing conservation policies with stated preference methods  
The so called stated preference (SP) approach consists of letting (potential) consumers directly state their 
willingness to pay (or preference) for a public good, as opposed to indirectly revealing it through a 
behavioral or physical link to a marketable good (i.e., revealed preference approach). It encompasses the 
discrete choice experiments (DCEs)15 and the contingent valuation (CV) method, which elicit the 
preferences of a representative consumer population’s sample in a survey context and potentially take into 
account all TEV components when estimating consumer preferences for ecosystem services. In their 
review of methods, Mburu et al. (2006) mention stated preference methods as a fourth valuation approach 
that they consider inadequate for the valuation of pollination services. Mburu et al. (2006) sensibly argue 
that, in order for CV and DCEs to be reliable valuation tools with regard to pollination services, all 
respondents would have to fully understand how much pollinators contribute to agricultural production, a 
condition that is unlikely to be fulfilled.  
To overcome unfamiliarity with the service to be valued, the SP approach often involves informing lay 
respondents about the complexities of the ecosystem function in question before the survey is 
administered. This has raised concerns about the extent to which the provided information may contribute 
to preference formation (i.e., information bias) and thus lead to distorted value estimates (Spash 2002; 
Barkmann et al. 2008). Another issue of SP methods has to do with their hypothetical nature, which 
paradoxically is one of their main advantages over other valuation approaches: confronting respondents 
with hypothetical goods (or hypothetical combinations of goods) allows elicitng consumers’ ex-ante 
preferences for a good before introducing it to the market or for a policy before implementing it. On the 
other hand, asking respondents about hypothetical goods may introduce a hypothetical bias, which refers 
to the discrepancy between the expressed preferences and the preferences that would be embedded in 
actual market transactions (Hausman 2012; Rakotonarivo et al. 2016). These biases are some of the 
caveats16 of the SP approach that can compromise the validity (i.e., the extent to which a study measured 
                                                     
 
15 Discrete choice experiments are often mistaken for conjoint analysis, which is just a generic term used to refer to 
several ways of eliciting preferences that have a limited relationship to utility theory (Louviere et al. 2010; 
Carson and Louviere 2011). 
16 For an in-depth typology of SP methods related caveats, the interested reader is referred to Bateman et al. (2002). 
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the intended quantity) and reliability (i.e., a measurement’s degree of replicability) of its applications. 
They are often rooted in following assumptions that SP practitioners make: i) that respondents have well 
formed and stable preferences, which they engage when providing their valuation responses; and ii) that 
such preferences are consistent with standard economic theory (Bateman et al. 2002). These caveats also 
reflect a general attitude of SP economists, who often take preferences as given (regardless of how 
irrational they may seem), and frequently neglect the behavioral aspects that may motivate respondents to 
act erratically (e.g., to behave differently during a survey than how they would act in a real market 
context), or to display seemingly inconsistent preferences [e.g., the commonly found evidence of large 
disparities between individuals’ maximal WTP to acquire a good and the minimal willingness to accept 
compenstaion to give it up (Tversky and Kahneman 1991)].  
Fortunately, many of the issues mentioned above can be dealt with during the experimental and survey 
design phases of an SP study (e.g., by correctly identifying and specifying the environmental good and 
corresponding attributes to be valued, and/or by reducing the task complexity on respondents) (Carlsson 
2002; Barkmann et al. 2008). Moreover, with regard to the concerns raised by Mburu et al. (2006), the SP 
approach can be applied to estimate the value of nature conservation measures and thus to inform the 
design of conservation policies (Lienhoop et al. 2015), rather than to value complex ecosystem functions 
per se. Perhaps the most prominent example in this context is the case where, after the 1989 infamous 
Exxon Valdez disaster occured in open waters of the Prince William Sound in Alaska, Carson et al. (2003) 
conducted a CV to estimate household WTP for a measure that would prevent another marine oil spill. 
This study aimed at assessing the liability of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker’s owners to compensate the 
general public for the related damages (i.e., for the harm to the local fisheries, recreation and tourism 
industries and for the degraded and lost services of non-use value character). The anticipation of a 
compensation (or of a fee, or penalty) may nevertheless induce a strategic bias in the value estimates, 
which results from respondents’ preferences having been deliberately misrepresented in order to influence 
the study’s outcome and thus the decision making processes it may guide (Bateman et al. 2002; 
Venkatachalam 2004; Flachaire and Hollard 2007). To circumvent such bias, Carson et al. (2003) used a 
double-bounded dichotomous choice elicitation format, as proposed by Hanemann et al. (1991). This 
solution in turn may drive respondents to adopt heuristic decision rules (e.g., the tendency to yea-saying), 
which accentuate the starting-point bias that arises when respondents (directly or indirectly) anchor their 
WTP to the initial bid introduced by the interviewer (Mitchell and Carson 1989; Bateman et al. 2002; 
Chien et al. 2005).  
As DCEs have overcome some of the limitations of CV (e.g., the proneness to strategic bias) (Bennett and 
Adamowicz 2001) and, in recent years, computational advances have allowed the estimation of 
increasingly sophisticated econometric models (Train 2003), this method has gained popularity as a 
valuation tool for nature conservation policies. For isntance, Hanley et al. (2003) applied a DCE to assess 
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public preferences over the design of a policy aimed at conserving wild geese in Scotland. Other DCE 
applications dealing with the design and public acceptance of conservation policies include Bauer et al. 
(2004), Colombo et al. (2005) and Greiner et al. (2014).  
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation are an attempt to estimate the value of policies directed at conserving 
wild bees in agro-forest ecosystems of Northern and Eastern Thailand. We defined these policies as a 
combination of preventive and corrective measures, following the recommendations of the IPI-POA 
(Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009), and the potential effect of such measures on the local population of wild 
(native) bees. Accordingly, three conservation measures were presented in this study’s DCE surveys, 
which consisted of following strategies to be hypothetically implemented at the village level with the 
support of extension services:    
Preventive measures: 
i) “bee-friendly pest control”, consisting of an educational program under which farmers would get 
information on methods (e.g., integrated pest management and spraying during times with low bee 
activity levels) and products that offer an alternative to conventional use of agro-chemicals, thus 
reducing the risk of bee poisoning. 
ii) “improving native bee habitat”, which consists of the provision of native tree seedlings and expert 
advice to promote the rehabilitation and management of natural habitats in public lands and near 
cropland, aiming at offering nesting sites and food resources for native bees within agro-forest 
ecosystems. 
Corrective measure: 
iii) “adopting on-farm native bee husbandry”, which entails the transfer of technical knowledge on how 
to build bee hives that keep native bee species such as stingless bees or the Asian honeybee (Apis 
cerana F.). 
1.4.3 Choice modelling: supplementary theoretical background  
The hypotheses postulated in Chapters 3 and 4 were tested modelling DCE data. Therefore, the theory 
underlying the DCE approach and choice modelling is partly explained in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for 
random parameter logit [also known as mixed logit (ML)] models, and in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 for 
generalized mixed logit (GMXL) models. In the following subsections, I supplement such theoretical 
background on choice modelling with a review concerning the derivation of the logit probabilities and the 
estimation of the marginal contributions to utilitiy that DCE respondents derive from a choice alternative’s 
attributes; such contributions will henceforth also be referred to as part-worths.  
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1.4.3.1 Derivation and properties of the logit probabilities 
The utility that individuals derive from the DCE choice alternatives (Equation 3.1 in chapter 3) is a 
continuous (latent) variable underlying each observed choice decision (Agresti 2007) and thus each choice 
probability. In the context of choice analysis nevertheless, the absolute value of such utility is irrelevant, 
as for choice probabilities only differences in utility matter. This can be expressed as 
                                    𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = 𝑃𝑃[(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖ℎ > 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)] = 𝑃𝑃[(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) > (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ)]    ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ ℎ                         (3.2) 
 (cf. Equation 3.2 in Section 3.3.2), which is the probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ of an individual i choosing alternative ℎ 
over any other alternative 𝑗𝑗 (from a given set of  𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , ℎ, … , 𝐽𝐽 choices), provided that the relative 
standing of the underlying utilities corresponds to the utility maximization rule17 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖ℎ > 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The 
(unobserved) stochastic term (i.e., random error) 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents the difference between the true utility 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 
experienced by the individual and the utility portion that the researcher captures in the systematic 
component 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖, i.e., the representative utility (Train 2003). From Equation (3.2) it becomes apparent that 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ follows a cumulative distribution, as it is the probability of the random term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ taking smaller 
values than the measured quantity 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Taking into account the actual choice observations (from the 
DCE survey), 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ can be reexpressed as the 𝐽𝐽 dimensional integral   
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = � 𝕀𝕀
𝜀𝜀
�𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ�𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    ∀𝑗𝑗 ≠ ℎ  , 
where 𝕀𝕀(. ) equals one to indicate when the expression in parentheses is empirically true (and zero 
otherwise), and 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) is the joint density of the random error vector 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 〈𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖〉 (ibid).  
The researcher must specify a functional form for 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖), which in turn defines the distribution she assumes 
for 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and thus the discrete choice model to be estimated. For instance, probit models are derived from 
assuming a multivariate normal distribution (ibid). The standard logit model, on the other hand, is 
obtained from assuming that each 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is distributed independently and identically (IID) extreme value type 
1 (EV1)18, which corresponds to following cumulative distribution19:  
                                           𝐹𝐹�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑒𝑒−𝑒𝑒−𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,   𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉1(0.57721,𝜋𝜋2 6⁄ ).                                      (1.2) 
The EV1 distribution’s variance is 𝜋𝜋2 6⁄  and has implications over how the scale of utility is normalized 
(which will be discussed in Section 4.2.2). Its mean is non-zero, which  nevertheless is immaterial for 
choice modelling, considering that only differences in utility matter and that the difference between two 
                                                     
 
17 This rule is based on the assumption that individuals behave rationally, in the sense that they are completely aware 
of their preferences and that they use all the relevant information at their disposal (e.g., on the probabilities of 
events, and on potential costs and risks) to assist their choice decisions. 
18 The EV1 distribution has slightly fatter tails than the normal, which allows for a moderately more divergent 
behavior than the normal (Train 2003). 
19 The underlying probability density function for each unobserved utility portion is 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝑒𝑒−𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(Train 
2003). 
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random variables with equal means has in itself a zero mean (Train 2003). The difference between two 
EV1 errors 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ with density 𝑔𝑔(𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ) follows a logistic distribution, such that the cumulative 
distribution of its 𝐽𝐽 − 1 dimernsional vector corresponds to the binary logit model 
                                                  𝐺𝐺�𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ� = exp(𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ) (1 +⁄ exp(𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ))  .                                                 (1.3) 
In accordance to McFadden’s (1974) derivation of choice probabilites, one can rewrite Equation (3.2) as 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = 𝑃𝑃[(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) > (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)], such that for a given 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ this cumulative distribution can be evaluated 
for each 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 at 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Furthermore, assuming IID EV1 errors, one can insert 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 into Equation 
(1.2) to obtain the cumulative distribution 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ = exp(− exp�−(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�)) ∀𝑗𝑗 ≠ ℎ, which is 
the product of the individual cumulative distributions (ibid). As 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ is unknown, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ is the integral of 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ over all values of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ weighted by 𝑓𝑓(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖): 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = ���𝑒𝑒−𝑒𝑒−(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ+𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ−𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖≠ℎ
�𝑒𝑒−𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑒𝑒−𝑒𝑒
−𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ   . 
This integral can be algebraically manipulated (for the detailed algebra leading to Equation (1.3) see Train 
2003, p. 85ff.) to obtain the multinomial (conditional) logit choice model 
                                                              𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = exp(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ) ∑ exp(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1�                                                  (1.4) 
which yields probabilities Pij that add up to one for each individual 𝑖𝑖, and is the basic closed-form 
expression (with analytically tractable solution) upon which the open-form models applied in Chapters 3 
and 4 of this dissertation are built. The standard logit model [according to Equations (1.3) and (1.4)] 
implies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property, which presupposes that for any two 
alternatives ℎ and 𝑔𝑔, the ratio 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄  is independent from alternatives other than ℎ and 𝑔𝑔. In 
other words, IIA preserves the relative odds of choosing ℎ over 𝑔𝑔, regardless of the availability (or 
attribute composition) of other alternatives. This property and its restrictive substitution patterns originate 
from the inherently assumed IID condition of standard logit models, which imposes a zero correlation in 
the part-worths (Train 2003). IIA is restrictive in that it fails to acknowledge that, for the odds ratio (of a 
subset of choice alternatives) to remain unchanged in the presence of an added irrelevant alternative (i.e., 
irrelevant in that it may be a perfect substitute for either alternative in the choice subset), the choice 
probabilities may have to adjust.   
The ML and GMXL models result from partly relaxing the IID condition: the unobserved (stochastic) 
utility portion is decomposed into two parts, the first one of which contains all the correlation and 
heteroskedasticity of the part-worth utilities, while the second part remains ~ IID EV1. Based on the 
assumption that the distributions of both parts are mixed, the researcher may assign any distribution (e.g., 
normal, log-normal, etc.) to the first part, which is introduced as additional stochastic elements through the 
random part-worths [cf. Equation (3.4) in Chapter 3 and Equations (4.4) and (4.5) in Chapter 4]. Thus, 
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each of the 𝑛𝑛 part-worths of the attributes constituting the choice alternatives may be assigned a variance 
term, which for a model with an assumed unrestricted20 covariance matrix will generate 𝑘𝑘(𝑘𝑘 − 1) 
covariances. This covariance matrix identifies the interdependence of attributes within and between 
alternatives, depending on whether the part-worths are specified as generic or alternative-specific (Tain 
2003; Hensher et al. 2005). When specifying ML or GMXL models, the goal of the researcher is to 
estimate the parameters that describe the density of the part-worths (not the part-worths themselves), i.e., 
the mean and covariance of the distribution she assumed for the additional stochastic elements that 
resulted from decomposing the unexplained utility portion. 
1.4.3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation, hypothesis testing and goodness of fit measures 
Representative utility is typically specified as a linear function of its part-woths21 𝛽𝛽, as 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽´𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, where 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observed variables that describe alternative 𝑗𝑗. Choice probabilities can nevertheless be 
expressed as a nonlinear function of the (latent) utility parameters (see Section 1.4.3.1), which is 
conveniently modeled using the maximum likelihood estimation method (MLE), instead of ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In this section I briefly describe the traditional MLE, which applies to logit probabilities 
when they take a closed form (as in Equation 1.4), i.e., that are conditional on homogeneous 𝛽𝛽. MLE also 
constitutes the basic estimation principle of the maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) procedure, which 
applies when choice probabilities are integrals with no closed form (i.e., conditioned on the stochastic 
elements that are added to specify individual-specific part-worths 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) that have to be approximated via 
simulation in order to estimate the moments of the probability density function of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 (i.e., not the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 
themselves). Sections 3.3.2 and 4.2.2 describe MSL in the ML and GMXL contexts respectively.  
An observed DCE choice can be related to the modeled choice probabilities through the following 
expression:  
��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
  , 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if respondent 𝑖𝑖 chose alternative 𝑗𝑗 and zero otherwise, and thus represents the probability of 
a choice actually made (Train 2003; Agresti 2007). Thereby, the probability of the observed data can be 
expressed as a function of the part-worths 𝛽𝛽 
      𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ���𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   ,
𝑖𝑖∈𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
 (1.5) 
                                                     
 
20 The researcher may also place structure on the covariance matrix in order to represent specific sources of non-
independence (Train 2003).  
21 All choice models in this dissertation have assumed such linear specification. 
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where 𝐼𝐼 denotes the total number of respondents 𝑖𝑖. The product of probabilities may yield very small 
values that are likely to escape detection by computer packages, an issue that is solved by taking the 
logarithm of Equation (1.5) as 
          𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
  , (1.6) 
which according to McFadden (1974) is globally concave for utilitiy specifications that are linear in 𝛽𝛽. 
The part-worths are thus estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) through an iterative 
process that involves computing a numerical maximization algorithm (e.g., Newton–Raphson or Fisher 
scoring) that finds the ?̂?𝛽 which satisfy the first order condition 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) 𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽⁄ = 0 (Train 2003; Hensher et 
al. 2005). Inserting the logit probabilities (1.4) in Equation (1.6), this condition becomes                  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = ���𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
  . (1.7) 
Considering that 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (i.e., the difference between one or zero, depending on an individual’s actual 
choice, and the probability of that choice) are the residuals, Equation (1.7) can be interpreted as follows: 
MLE finds the ?̂?𝛽 that set the sample covariance of the residuals with the explanatory variables equal to 
zero. Equation (1.7) can be rearranged and divided by 𝐼𝐼 to obtain               1
𝐼𝐼
��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 1
𝐼𝐼
��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
  , (1.8) 
where the left hand side, denoted ?̅?𝑥, is the average of 𝑥𝑥 over the observed chosen alternatives, while the 
right hand side, denoted 𝑥𝑥�, is the average of 𝑥𝑥 over the predicted choices. The maximum likelihood 
estimates are therefore those ?̂?𝛽 that reproduce the observed sample average ?̅?𝑥 with the predicted average 𝑥𝑥� 
(Train 2003).  
As shown by McFadden (1974), the distribution of the estimator ?̂?𝛽 is asymptotically normal with mean 𝛽𝛽 
and covariance matrix  
 
Ω = 𝑋𝑋′𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋 
 
(Hensher et al. 2005). The large-sample normality of the ML estimator ?̂?𝛽 can be used to conduct 
hypothesis testing for any attribute 𝑘𝑘’s part-worth, such as 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 , by computing the Wald-statistic:  
𝑧𝑧 = ?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘 − 𝛽𝛽0
�𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎�𝑟𝑟(?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘)  . 
This test statistic can be compared to a critical Wald-value (at various levels of confidence) and its 
interpretation is equivalent to that of the OLS t-statistic (Hensher et al. 2005; Agresti 2007; Rodríguez 
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2007). This procedure was applied to test the hypotheses concerning part-worths and other choice 
modeling parameters that are postulated in Sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.3 of this dissertation.  
The overall level of significance of a logit model can be determined when comparing its log likelihood (at 
MLE convergence) with that of a nested (restricted) model (i.e., the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 of a model where all or some of 
the parameters are set equal to zero), by computing a likelihood-ratio chi-squared statistic as follows: 
−2 log(𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛⁄ ) = −2(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛) ~ 𝜒𝜒2 , 
with d.f. corresponding to the difference in the number of parameters estimated for the two models 
(Hensher et al. 2005). Similarly the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 function can be used to compute goodness of fit measures such as 
the McFadden Pseudo R-squared: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 𝑅𝑅2 = 1 − 𝜅𝜅 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛
  . 
The adjusted Pseudo R-squared measure is obtained by penalizing the 𝐾𝐾 number of free parameters in the 
full model through the factor 𝜅𝜅 = (∑ ∑ 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑁𝑁) [(∑ ∑ 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑁𝑁) − 𝐾𝐾]⁄ , where ∑ ∑ 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the number of 𝐽𝐽 
choice alternatives per 𝑁𝑁 choice observations (i.e., over 𝐼𝐼 individuals and 𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 choice sets). The non-
adjusted measure is thus obtained with κ = 1. Note that the Pseudo R-squared is not equivalent to the OLS 
coefficient of determination. A Pseudo R-squared between 0.3 and 0.4 is approximately analogous to an 
OLS R2 between 0.6 and 0.8, and thus represents a decent to good model fit (Hensher et al. 2005).  
The likelihood-ratio chi-squared statistics and goodness of fit measures presented in Chapters 3 and 4 were 
computed using nested models that estimate two constants only, i.e., that reproduce with the estimated 
choice probabilities each of the three choice alternatives’ sample shares. Thus, the degrees of freedom of 
these tests correspond to 𝐾𝐾 parameters minus two. 
1.5 Motivation and objectives  
Engaging in this doctoral research was motivated by the work I conducted for my master thesis “An 
economic analysis of beekeeping and honey hunting as additional income alternatives for the rural poor in 
the Philippine Cordillera, Luzon”, which as its title suggests, examines the potential for rural development 
found in the hive products of bees, both wild and managed. Thereby, it became apparent to me that, 
beyond their direct use benefits, wild bees generate values that are neglected in many cost-benefit 
calculations. 
This doctoral thesis aims at contributing to the efforts of estimating the value of pollinators (specifically of 
wild bees) in view of their sustained declines in recent decades. Thereby, this work supplements the 
efforts summoned by the IPI-POA under the objective of  “assessing the economic value of pollination 
and the economic impact of pollinator decline” and thus provides economic arguments that may contribute 
to “getting bees into policy-mainstreaming” (Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009, cf. Section 1.3). 
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One specific objective of this thesis is to offer an analytical framework to describe the economics of 
farmer-beekeeper interactions under different provision levels of wild bee pollination. This objective is 
pursued in Chapter 2, where the microeconomic model by Rucker et al. (2012), which describes the 
determinants of equilibrium wages paid by almond farmers to commercial beekeepers in California, is 
generalized in order to accommodate a broader spectrum of farmer-beekeeper interactions. Classifying a 
specific farmer-beekeeper interaction into one of the exemplary cases presented in Section 2.2.2 may, for 
instance, help structuring the research questions before undertaking an economic valuation of pollinating 
bees: e.g., knowing the magnitude and direction of the payments between farmers and beekeepers can hint 
at whether the valuation questions should be framed in a context of corrective or preventive action. 
A second specific objective of this dissertation is to capture the non-use values of pollinating bees by 
estimating a lower bound TEV of conserving them and their services in Northern and Eastern Thailand. 
This was approached with the DCEs presented in Chapters 3 and 4 (the first applications of this kind to 
attempt at valuating pollinators) that were conducted with farmers of melittophilous crop species in both 
locations (i.e., Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi provinces, respectively).  
Lastly, the third objective of this study is to compare the preferences (and WTP) of farmers for selected 
bee conservation features (cf. Section 1.4.2) between both provinces. Such comparison is relevant 
considering that pollinator declines have reportedly impaired crop yields in Chanthaburi (while no such 
evidence exists for Chiang Mai) and thus may have shifted the value perceptions (and enhanced the 
knowledge regarding bee-mediated crop pollination) of the affected farmers. To this end, the part-worth 
estimates obtained for both locations had to be made comparable, especially in consideration of the 
difference between the experimental designs22 that underlied the DCEs conducted in both study sites.  
1.6 Research questions 
Following research questions guided the attainment of this dissertation’s specific objectives: 
a) How do agro-ecological, institutional and socio-economic factors determine the interaction 
between beekeepers and bee-dependent crop farmers, ultimately leading to the different equilibria 
observed globally, which include the cases of Californian almond growers and of Chiang Mai 
(Northern Thailand) and Chanthaburi (Eastern Thailand) orchardists?  
b) How can stated preference methods be applied, or, more precisely, a discrete choice experiment be 
conceived, in order to capture non-use value components of wild pollinating bees, while taking 
into account that the concerned farmers (respondents) are likely to lack the knowledge regarding 
the quantitative contribution of pollination to their agricultural production? 
                                                     
 
22 The part-worths that resulted from modelling the Chiang Mai dataset were used as priors to obtain a more efficient 
experimental design for the DCE conducted in Chanthaburi. 
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c) How do the preferences and WTP of Thai farmers for different bee conservation measures and for 
changes in the local population of wild bees stand relative to each other?  
d) Do experiences of past crop pollination deficits (i.e., that are attributed to wild bee population 
declines) have an effect on farmers’ preferences for wild bee conservation measures and, if so, 
does such effect translate into farmers preferring corrective over preventive measures (cf. Section 
1.4.2)? 
e) Are farmers’ preferences for the conservation policy attributes heterogeneous and, if so, can such 
heterogeneity be traced back to idiosyncratic effects on preference? 
f) Can a choice model specification separate preference heterogeneity from the potential differences 
of how each individual scales utility (i.e., how each individual’s part-worth covariance matrix is 
weighted), and if so, can the latter effect be explained by regional differences (i.e., differences 
between Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi) and/or by differences in the overall understanding of the 
DCE exercise and/or of the ecological underpinning of crop pollination?   
The research questions that are particular to choice modelling are postulated as testable hypotheses in 
Sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.3.  
1.7 Study sites 
The data used for the analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4 were obtained from separate discrete choice 
experiments in the Thai provinces of Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi, respectively (see Figure 1.4). These 
regions were selected for presenting contrasting beekeeper-farmer interactions that seemingly pertain to 
socio-economic and agro-ecologic differences, the latter of which may further affect the provision of crop 
pollination services from wild bees. On the one hand, beekeepers in Chiang Mai tend to pay for the right 
of placing their bee hives on the land of orchardists; there, surrounding natural habitats seem to 
sufficiently supply the pollination of crops [especially of longan (Dimocarpus longan)], which in turn are 
a rich nectar source for the large local honey industry. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence points at a 
deficient natural crop pollination in Chanthaburi, which in the past drove orchardists [especially rambutan 
(Nephelium lappaceum) farmers] to rent hives from beekeepers, a corrective measure that more recently 
developed into farmers adopting meliponiculture (i.e., the occupation of keeping and managing native 
stingless bee species). The phenomenon in Chiang Mai has been classified under the particular case of 
beekeeping-farmer interactions presented in Section 2.2.2.3, while Sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.7 describe 
the phenomena that have been reported for Chanthaburi. Additionally, the socio-demographic and 
agronomic aspects that were considered of relevance to the analyses conducted for Chiang Mai and 
Chanthaburi are discussed in Sections 3.3.4 and 4.2.4, respectively, while the corresponding descriptive 
statistics are compared in Section 4.3.1. 
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Figure 1.4 The research area comprises 10 villages from two districts of Chiang Mai province (Northern 
Thailand) and 6 villages from two districts in Chanthaburi province (Eastern Thailand). Source: own 
representation with data from DIVA-GIS (2014). 
1.8 Overview of data and software 
The choice models presented in Chapters 3 and 4 were fitted on primary data from the two above 
mentioned DCE surveys in Chiang Mai, in June 2013, and in Chanthaburi, in November 2013.  
A sampling technique of probability proportional to acreage [cultivated with longan (Dimocarpus longan)] 
was applied to select ten villages in Chiang Mai. This was followed by a random selection of households 
that, at that time, were registered as longan farming in each village’s DoAE (Department of Agricultural 
Extension) office. As a result, the DCE in Chiang Mai yielded a total of 2376 choice observations from 
198 household heads each answering 12 choice exercises. In Chanthaburi, in contrast, neither the selection 
of villages nor of the respondents could be guided by a random procedure, as this was not allowed by the 
competent authorities (e.g., the provincial administration and each village’s head). Accordingly, the 
Chanthaburi dataset consists of 1524 (non-representative) choice observations from 127 farmers that were 
selected by village heads from their corresponding fruit (i.e., rambutan, longan and durian) growing 
communities, the latter of which were designated for the survey by local administrative and academic 
authorities.  
Both DCEs were based on efficient designs for random parameter models that were generated by inserting 
prior parameter values (i.e., prior part-worth estimates) into Ngene (version 1.1.1) software. The “priors” 
that informed the generation of the experimental design for Chiang Mai were estimated by fitting a 
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conditional logit model on a DCE pilot that was conducted with 27 respondents from three villages in the 
district of Saraphi, namely Pa Khed Thee (May 26, 2013), Dea Hgon (May 28, 2013) and Ton Heaw (May 
29, 2013). On the other hand, the priors for the experimental design of Chanthaburi were estimated with a 
conditional logit model that was fitted on the data obtained from the final DCE survey conducted in 
Chiang Mai. 
The raw DCE data was inserted into MS Excel spreadsheets that were converted with Stat/Transfer 
(version 12) into the .lpj data format that is used to run choice analyses with the NLOGIT 5/LIMDEP 10 
statistical package.     
1.9 Thesis structure 
The body of research of this cumulative dissertation consists of three scientific papers23 that are presented 
in logical (not chronological) order in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, in accordance with the sequence of specific 
objectives that is offered in Section 1.5.  
Chapter 2 presents an analytical framework to optimize supply of crop pollination and honey from wild 
and managed bees for diverse socio-economic and ecological settings. Among this dissertation’s articles, it 
comprehends the (chronologically) last analyses of my research. It builds on the microeconomic model by 
Rucker et al. (2012) and aims at explaining a more diverse range of equilibria resulting from the 
interaction between beekeepers and bee-dependent crop farmers. 
Chapter 3 presents the random parameter logit models that were fitted on the Chiang Mai dataset alone. 
Here, we estimated the marginal preferences (i.e., part-worths) and WTP of longan farmers for the 
attributes constituting the DCE’s hypothetical bee conservation policies (cf. Section 1.4.2) and explained 
the corresponding preference heterogeneity with idiosyncratic variables.  
In Chapter 4, we compare the preferences and WTP of orchardists from Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi, by 
fitting the pooled datasets with generalized mixed logit models. We specified these models such as to 
control for possible differences in the overall scale of utility between (and within) both samples and to 
further test whether understanding the DCE exercise and/or possessing the relevant knowledge (regarding 
the importance of conserving pollinators) may have reduced the subjectiveness of farmers and thus the 
variability in the unobserved influences on their choice decisions. The GMXL model framework 
additionally offers a specification that we used to obtain WTP space estimates, which are not prone to the 
potential biases resulting from calculating WTP point estimates.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 offers an overall discussion concerning this dissertation’s analyses, contributions and 
caveats, and concludes with recommendations and an outlook over future research perspectives.  
                                                     
 
23 Cross-references have been added to the scientific articles constituting this thesis and the articles’ original 
numbering format has been modified to fit the span of this cumulative dissertation. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
otherwise verbatim copies of the submitted (published in the case of Chapter 3) manuscripts. 
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Chapter II 
 The optimal supply of crop pollination and honey from wild and managed bees: an analytical 
framework for diverse socio-economic and ecological settings24 
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University of Hohenheim, Germany 
Keywords: Bee-mediated crop pollination, Honey production, Ecosystem services, Pollination markets, 
Conservation policy, Transaction costs, Bio-economic model. 
Abstract 
Hiring pollination services has become an important strategy to secure fruit set in many pollinator-
dependent crops, especially in monocultures such as the Californian almond (Prunus dulcis) groves, where 
the European honeybee (Apis mellifera) is frequently deployed to compensate deficiencies in the natural 
provision of insect-mediated pollination. Such beekeeper-farmer cooperation has been the focus of many 
economic models, although it is only one in a variety of setups under which bees (wild and managed) 
contribute to agriculture. Based on a thorough literature review we extend the basic model by Rucker et al. 
(2012) to describe farmer-beekeeper interactions as determined by diverse agro-ecological, institutional 
and socioeconomic conditions. The generalized model serves as an analytical framework to classify real 
world farmer-ecosystem-beekeeper interactions, to identify possible causes for a suboptimal (or deficient) 
crop pollination and to formulate informed policy recommendations. 
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2.1 Introduction 
With ever diminishing wild pollinator populations worldwide (Potts et al. 2010; González-Varo et al. 
2013), the role of pollination markets has increased and, in some instances, commercial crop-pollination 
has almost completely substituted for this ecosystem service (Klein et al. 2012). This paper builds on the 
theoretical model proposed by Rucker et al. (2012), which describes the determinants of equilibrium bee 
wages (i.e., per colony remuneration to beekeepers consisting of both in-kind honey payments and 
pollination fees) in the specific case of almond (Prunus dulcis) pollination markets of California, USA, 
where commercial pollination services are almost exclusively provided by Apis mellifera beekeepers from 
across the nation. We extend this model by taking into account the economic benefits from a given agro-
ecosystem’s wild bees and diversity of domesticable bee species, thus covering a broader range of agro-
ecological contexts. After an overview on the role of bees in crop pollination (Section 2.1.1) and on 
pollination related markets (Section 2.1.2), we depart from the model by Rucker et al. (2012) (Section 
2.2.1) to gradually add complexity and derive exemplary equilibria (Section 2.2.2), which we analyse and 
discuss as we compare them with real world cases (Section 2.3). We are convinced that the extension of 
the well-founded model by Rucker et al. (2012) is necessary if one wants to analyse all relevant farmer-
beekeeper-nature interactions. In fact, the simpler model (Rucker et al. 2012) fails to represent many of 
such interactions that have been described in the literature or that we have observed ourselves, and which 
will be discussed in this study. 
2.1.1 The role of managed and wild bees in crop pollination 
A conspicuous example of pollination deficits is provided by the almond (Prunus dulcis) groves in 
California, USA. This state alone currently produces 80% of world’s almonds, and has more than doubled 
the area cultivated with this crop in the last three decades, from 168,000 ha (in 1986) to 364,000 ha (in 
2016), in reaction to increasing global demand (United States Department of Agriculture 2016a). 
Californian almond orchards rely heavily on insect pollinators to set fruit (Connell 2000), yet when 
managed as intensive monocultures, they create areas of permanent spatial and temporal homogeneity in 
the agro-ecosystem that restrict wild pollinators to the field margins for most of the year (National 
Research Council 2007; Marini et al. 2012; Saunders and Luck 2014; Saunders 2016). Wild bee species 
can therefore only be found visiting almond flowers in orchards with adjacent semi-natural habitat or 
vegetation strips (Klein et al. 2012). In fact, Californian almond growers rely almost exclusively on 
managed European honeybees for crop pollination. In 2016, approximately 76% of the 2.59 million 
nationwide available honeybee colonies were required in the central valleys of California for almond 
pollination; the state of California itself provided 1.14 million thereof (Goodrich 2016; United States 
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Department of Agriculture, 2016b), while the remainder were brought by migratory beekeepers25 from 
other parts of the USA (Rucker et al. 2012). The reliance on a single pollinator species has nevertheless 
become problematic in the USA, where the combination of parasites (esp. the parasitic mite Varroa 
destructor) and a syndrome known as colony collapse disorder (CCD) has compromised the health of 
managed honeybee (A. mellifera) colonies (van Engelsdorp et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2015; United States 
Department of Agriculture 2016b; Watson and Stallins 2016) and consequently their availability for 
pollination services in the last decade (National Research Council 2007; Goodrich 2016). On the other 
hand, wild pollinator abundance and diversity offer an insurance when health issues or adverse 
environmental conditions prevent crop flower visitation by honeybees (Winfree et al. 2007; Brittain et al. 
2013; Klein et al. 2012), and may even enhance fruit set regardless of honeybee abundance (Garibaldi et 
al. 2013).  
The Californian almond groves manifest an extreme case of natural pollination services being almost 
entirely replaced by managed European honeybees. As a matter of fact, in most agro-ecosystems 
worldwide, wild bees and other wild pollinators continue to play a key role in crop pollination (Roubik 
1995; Klein et al. 2007), which may be supplemented, rather than substituted for, by managed honeybees 
(Garibaldi et al. 2013). In Chiang Mai province (Northern Thailand), for instance, wild pollinators still 
seem to fulfil the pollination requirements of longan (Dimocarpus longan), a perennial tree crop that is 
widely cultivated in the lowlands of the Chiang Mai–Lamphun valley and depends on flower visitation 
from honeybees (especially the Eastern honeybee Apis cerana) and stingless bees (Hymenoptera: Apidae: 
Meliponini) to set fruit (Blanche et al. 2006; Pham 2012). To our knowledge, no crop pollination crisis has 
yet been reported for this region, although its wild pollinator populations may be at risk, considering that 
in the last several decades the remaining forest cover of Northern Thailand (the largest relative to other 
regions in Thailand) has experienced a rapid decline due to agricultural expansion and deforestation, 
among other causes (Giri et al. 2003; Thomas 2006; Trisurat et al. 2010). Moreover, this region’s land 
(i.e., planted in both traditional staples and forestland) is increasingly being converted, giving way to the 
intensive commercial production of fruit trees, in response to higher returns to land and labor (Ekasingh 
and Ngamsomsuke 2005; Thomas 2006). 
Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development plan has oriented the country’s agriculture to the 
production of capital-intensive cash crops (Kasem and Thapa 2012), demanding a fourfold increase in 
pesticide imports over the past decade (Thapinta and Hudak 2000; Panuwet et al. 2012). This is especially 
true for Chanthaburi province (Eastern Thailand), which encompasses one of the largest fruit producing 
                                                     
 
25 Migratory beekeeping is the practice of moving bee hives from farm to farm in search of different foraging 
sources. It often involves traveling long distances and following the blooming periods of different crops throughout 
the year. 
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areas in the country (Thai Office of Agricultural Economics 2014). In some farming communities of this 
province, rambutan (Nephelium lappaceum) and durian (Durio zibethinus)26 farmers started managing 
stingless bees (mainly from the genera Tetragonula and Lepidotrigona) to compensate for presumed 
deficits in their crops’ pollination (Thanuart and Makhonpas 2013; Boongird 2014; Chuttong et al. 2014). 
With this respect, experts (Thanuart and Makhonpas 2013) and focus group discussions informed us in 
2013 that rambutan and durian farmers preferred keeping stingless bees (a practice known as 
meliponiculture), over European honeybees, due to their shorter flight range27, which reduces their 
exposure to the pesticides that may be applied in neighbouring farms. Phankaew (2016) further reports 
that A. mellifera beekeepers in Soi Dao district (Chanthaburi province) avoided placing their honeybee 
colonies on off-season longan farms, where flowering is induced with potassium chlorate to produce year-
round off-season fruit. This treatment thus results in crop protection schedules that vary over neighboring 
farms and make it difficult for beekeepers to protect their colonies from pesticide exposure.  
2.1.2 Markets for pollination services and floral nectar 
Thailand offers an interesting case for how markets can adapt to ecologically different regions with regard 
to their ability to provide an environmental good. In Chanthaburi province, for instance, a beekeeper had 
been renting, for already 10 years (in 2014), European honeybee colonies to longan orchardists as a 
pollination supplement, at a price of 50 Thai baht (i.e., €1.12, as of June 1, 2014) per colony, per season 
(Phankaew 2016). Nevertheless, many Chanthaburi farmers have opted for becoming meliponiculturists 
(Chuttong et al. 2014), due to the advantages that stingless bees have over European honeybees, i.e., the 
reduced hazard of exposure to synthetic pesticides and the relatively lower costs28 incurred with this 
practice.  
In Chiang Mai province, in contrast, beekeepers often pay longan farmers a fee to let their colonies forage 
longan nectar on their farm (Wongsiri et al. 2000; Narjes and Lippert 2018, Chapter 4). During our 2013 
                                                     
 
26 Durians (D. zibethinus) are exclusively pollinated by nocturnal pollinators such as fruit bats. Stingless bees 
(Hymenoptera: Apidae: Meliponini) and honeybees are nevertheless the major diurnal flower visitors of durians, 
yet they do not succeed in transferring pollen onto the stigmata (Bumrungsri et al. 2009). Bees are thus mistakenly 
credited for the pollination of durians (Boongird 1992), a perception that seems to be shared among Chanthaburi 
durian farmers (Boongird 2014; Narjes and Lippert 2018).  
27 The flight range of stingless bees is proportional to their body size, which may constrain the dispersion capacity of 
smaller species within the limits of forest fragments, further increasing the risk of extinction in their local 
population (Araújo et al. 2004). Compared to the wide foraging range of honeybees (A. mellifera), typically 
reaching distances of 5 km (Beekman and Ratnieks 2000), stingless bees have a considerably smaller flight radius: 
e.g. ~600 m for the subgenus Trigona (Boontop et al. 2008). Boonithee et al. (1991), for instance, reported a high 
abundance of Trigona spp. in a longan orchard in Northern Thailand within distances of 50 and 200 m from the 
adjoining forest, yet decreasing sharply between 2.5 and 4 km. 
28 Stingless bee colonies can be easily extracted from nearby forests, their propagation is relatively simple and 
consumes considerably less time and inputs for their maintenance and honey harvest than European honeybees 
(Narjes and Lippert 2010; Chantawannakul et al. 2004; Chuttong et al. 2014). 
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survey (Narjes and Lippert 2016, Chapter 3), 57 longan orchardists (from 198 that were interviewed) 
reported that, each flowering season, they allowed an average of 66.47 colonies on their farm (between 10 
and 250 colonies per farm) and received an average payment of 0.56 USD (SD=0.60 USD)29 per honeybee 
colony per season, and/or an average in kind payment of 7.1 bottles (SD=11.3 bottles) of honey 
(containing each 750 ml ≈ 1 kg) per season. Longan flowers produce abundant nectar of which honey can 
be sold at a premium price, i.e., 1.5 USD/kg, which is 50% higher than honey from the second major 
honey plant in the region, i.e., Siam weed (Chromolaena odorata, formerly Eupatorium odoratum) (Thapa 
and Wongsiri 1997, Chantawannakul et al. 2004). Moreover, large-scale beekeeping operations have been 
attracted to this region where, each blooming season (February-March), they move about 120,000 A. 
mellifera colonies to longan farms in the lowlands of the Chiang Mai–Lamphun valley. They produce 
approximately 4,200 metric tons of longan honey each year, 55-60% of which is destined for the export 
market (Wongsiri et al. 1998; Chantawannakul et al. 2004; Seanbualuang 2012). 
Contrary to almond honey, which is considered unpalatable to humans and therefore commercially 
uncompetitive (National Research Council 2007; Goodrich 2016), longan honey is highly valued and 
enjoys a great demand in the Asian (especially in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore) and U.S. 
markets (Wongsiri et al. 1998). The same is true for stingless bee honey, which is highly regarded for its 
organoleptic and (presumed) medicinal properties (Chuttong et al. 2014; Chuttong et al. 2016).  
The value of honey is an important determinant in the price formation of pollination fees (Cheung 1973; 
Rucker et al. 2012) and constitutes a defining aspect in the differences between the beekeeper-orchadist 
dynamics of the Californian almond groves and those of the Thai agro-ecosystems described by Narjes 
and Lippert (2018). Another such aspect is the role of wild (native) pollinators in crop-pollination, which 
is marginal in the Californian almond groves, while it is still (seemingly) important in the longan orchards 
of Chiang Mai province. Moreover, unlike in California, Thailand’s native bee fauna includes many wild 
species that produce honey (i.e., of the genus Apis: A. dorsata, A. florea, A. andreniformis and A. cerana, 
and many stingless bee spp.), of which some can be managed in hive boxes (i.e. kept permanently or 
baited and temporally kept until they abscond), such as A. cerana and some stingless bee species of the 
genera Tetragonula and Lepidotrigona (Wongsiri et al. 2000; Chuttong et al. 2016).  
The scenario currently found in Chanthaburi province, where many farmers have responded to pollination 
deficits by becoming beekeepers, is a special case that has not been illustrated by the economic model 
analyses currently found in the literature, which center their focus on the US American pollination markets 
with special regard to the Californian almond groves. For instance, building on the theoretical framework 
first proposed by Cheung (1973), Rucker et al. (2012) developed a theoretical model that explains 
                                                     
 
29 16.9 Thai baht (THB) per colony; 1 USD=30.21 THB, as of June 1, 2013. These values were calculated over the 
57 respondents that allow beekeepers placing honeybee colonies on their orchard. 
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pollination fees by optimizing the stocking density of honeybee colonies (i.e., bee colonies per unit of 
cultivated land) and determining their supply as a function of honey prices, beekeeping costs and 
pollinated crop acreage (cf. Section 2.2.1). They further test these predictions using regression analysis 
and panel data (12 crops) from the annual survey (1987-2009) of Pacific Northwest beekeepers. 
Nevertheless, the analyses by Rucker et al. (2012), like those by Willett and French (1991) and by 
Champetier et al. (2015), which also deal with modeling the economics of crop pollination and honeybee 
products, do not take into account the contribution of wild (native) bees to crop pollination. 
In a simpler set of models, Ward et al. (2010) recognize the role of alternative pollinators (i.e., with 
respect to A. mellifera) in the formation of pollination prices in the Californian almond groves and the 
sweet cherry (Prunus avium, also highly dependent on insect pollination) orchards of California and the 
Pacific Northwest. They regressed pollination fees on the total cultivated acreage and the number of 
available European honeybee colonies and then simulated the effect of a reduced demand of commercial 
pollination services that would result from a partial contribution of the blue orchard bee (Osmia lignaria, a 
native pollinator that can be managed, yet does not produce honey) to crop pollination. Not surprisingly, 
their analyses predict that the availability of an alternative pollinator would result in smaller pollination 
fees, and that this effect would be greater for almonds, since (unlike cherries) almond honey cannot be 
commercialized for human consumption.  
Rucker et al. (2012) denote as “uncommon” the case of beekeepers paying farmers for the privilege of 
placing their colonies on cultivated land. Nevertheless, beyond the boundaries of the Californian almond 
monocultures, this case may be less uncommon than perceived. For instance, according to a 2016 survey, 
the contracts between German beekeepers and farmers concerning the remuneration for the effected crop 
pollination services are crucially based on the proportion to which the resulting honey yields stand relative 
to the additional crop yields that are attributed to bee-mediated pollination. For crops with abundant nectar 
such as canola, buckwheat or sunflower, instead of a pollination fee, the agreement between farmer and 
beekeeper often results in a payment to the former that typically consists of honey (Wolf, 2016). Similarly, 
in the theoretical model by Rucker et al. (2012), this equilibrium results from a substantial marketable 
honey output or a limited marginal contribution of pollination to fruit production at the equilibrium 
stocking density of honeybee colonies (e.g., for crops with low or zero pollinator dependence). In Chiang 
Mai, a limited contribution of European honeybees to longan pollination may result from this service 
already being delivered close to its maximum by abundant wild bees (i.e., further marginal contributions 
to fruit pollination approach zero). Modelling the development of pollination fees in Thailand’s (or 
similar) agro-ecological context would thus require accounting for the contribution of crop pollination 
from commercial beekeepers (i.e., European honeybees) relative to the various levels of pollination 
services that may be delivered by wild bees from adjacent natural and semi-natural habitats. Moreover, the 
analysis by Rucker et al. (2012) does not take into account the transaction and production costs of various 
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beekeeping setups locally available to the farmers as alternative crop-pollination supplements and 
additional income sources.  
2.2 A general theoretical framework for the optimal allocation of pollinating bees  
In view of the deficiencies identified in the previous section, we propose a comprehensive modelling 
framework that can accommodate the complexity and diversity of the agro-ecosystems cultivated with 
melittophilous crops, which offer floral resources to both managed and wild bees and thus determine the 
interaction of farmers with beekeepers.  
We start by identifying the following exemplary cases, which in accordance to the different underlying 
agro-ecological and economic variables, our model should be able to describe as bioeconomic (market) 
equilibria: 
1) No cooperation occurs between farmers and beekeepers 
2) Farmers pay beekeepers for pollination services   
3) Beekeepers pay farmers for the privilege of placing their bee colonies on cultivated land  
4) Farmers and beekeepers cooperate with no monetary payments involved  
5) Beekeepers deliver crop pollination as an externality 
6) Beekeepers interact with farmers in an agro-ecosystem that sustains wild bees 
7) Farmers consider engaging in on-farm beekeeping 
2.2.1 Basic economic model: deriving equilibrium stocking densities 
Our analysis builds on the theoretical model proposed by Rucker et al. (2012), which parts from assuming 
a competitive, hypothetical market in which multi-product firms rent 𝐴𝐴 acres of land and 𝐵𝐵 bee colonies to 
produce both fruit and honey in respective quantities F and H, as given by the following pair of constant-
returns-to-scale functions: 
                                                           𝐻𝐻 = 𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) and  𝐹𝐹 = 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹(𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵).                                                (2.1)  
Rucker et al. (2012) further define the bee stocking density (number of bee colonies per unit of land) 𝑏𝑏
∶= 𝐵𝐵 𝐴𝐴⁄  as the sole determinant of per-acre outputs 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏) and 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏), such that the total (linearly 
homogeneous) outputs 𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 and 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 proportionately increase by the factor 𝐴𝐴. Thus, the objective function of 
a profit maximizing farmer with given acreage is: 
                                              max
𝑏𝑏
𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏) + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏) −𝑤𝑤 ∗ 𝑏𝑏,                                   (2.2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 and 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 are the market prices of honey and fruit and 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 + 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻 𝑏𝑏⁄  represents a market 
“bee wage” that consists of a per-colony pollination fee (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝) and an in-kind honey payment.  
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Restricting (2.2) to be concave, the first order condition for a maximum implies that w equates the sum of 
values of marginal products (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃s) of honey and fruit, i.e., the total value marginal product of bees 
(𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃). A price-taking firm’s optimal decision is therefore a function of factor prices, i.e., the optimum 
stocking density 𝑏𝑏∗ = 𝑏𝑏∗(𝑤𝑤,𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ,𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹), as 
                           𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 ∶= 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑔𝑔′𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏∗) + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑔𝑔′𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏∗) ∶= 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏∗) + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏∗) = 𝑤𝑤.                (2.3)  
The equilibrium bee wage 𝑤𝑤∗ results from the demand (i.e., 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 aggregated over all farmers) meeting 
the supply 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆(𝑤𝑤,𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ,𝑘𝑘), where per-colony cost 𝑘𝑘 sums up factors affecting the costs of beekeeping; both 
functions are aggregated over 𝐴𝐴∗ equilibrium homogenous acres (Rucker et al. 2012). In equilibrium, the 
property rights of honey are assigned to beekeepers, while orchardists retain ownership of the fruit (ibid). 
According to Barzel (1997), this arrangement should maximize the value of the economic rights over these 
assets, as price and production risk tend to be borne by the actors with most influence over the respective 
sources of income variability.  
Notwithstanding that the functional forms of 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏) and 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏) are unknown, we reasonably assume that 
their marginal products (accordingly their corresponding 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃s) diminish with each additional bee colony. 
This model also represents a short- to middle-run optimization problem, as it assumes that the per-acre 
density of fruit trees to be pollinated is given. 
2.2.2 Bioeconomic equilibria and extensions to the basic model 
2.2.2.1 No cooperation occurs between farmers and beekeepers 
We begin our analysis examining equilibrium 1), which may result from either one or a combination of the 
following two circumstances:  
a) The bee wage 𝑤𝑤∗ may be prohibitive vis-à-vis the relatively low potential 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 that a cooperation 
with commercial beekeepers could generate, if they would place their bee colonies in the orchard (Figure 
2.1). In a competitive market, 𝑤𝑤∗ can be seen as the opportunity costs that a beekeeper perceives from 
failing to deploy her colonies on another location that yields a higher 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃, e.g., in another orchard that 
has a higher demand for pollination services and/or which offers more valuable nectar. Accordingly, the 
equilibrium stocking density 𝑏𝑏∗ (supposedly reached when fruit and honey production is optimised) will 
equal zero.  
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Figure 2.1. In equilibrium, 𝐛𝐛∗colonies are placed (𝐛𝐛 ∶= bee colonies/acre); no cooperation occurs between 
farmers and beekeepers. The total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of 
marginal product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘) consist of a 
pollination fee and an in-kind honey payment. 
b) Contracts between farmers and beekeepers can entail prohibitive transaction costs. These may result 
from bringing beekeepers and farmers together and from monitoring and enforcing the agreements, all 
time-consuming tasks that may or may not be relegated to pollination brokers and third-party inspection 
services in exchange for a fee. Additionally, the intricacies of bee-mediated pollination and crop 
pollination requirements impose information costs on farmers, while beekeepers face transportation costs 
and the costs of coordinating pollination services and honey production across different crops and 
blooming seasons (Cheung 1973; Rucker et al. 2001; Rucker et al. 2012; Goodrich 2016). Whereas some 
transaction costs, such as monitoring for hive strength, arise on a per-colony basis, we will for now discuss 
those of fixed character. At any rate, if the fixed transaction costs are higher than the potential welfare 
gains from cooperating, an interaction with farmers and beekeepers will not take place. As follows, the 
welfare gains illustrated in Figure 2.2 (i.e., area IV) and Figure 2.3 (i.e., area IV+V), potentially realizable 
under equilibria 2) and 3) respectively, would become welfare deadweight losses if prohibitive transaction 
costs would force the equilibrium stocking density to 𝑏𝑏′ = 0.  
In the following, we present equilibria 2) and 3), which Rucker et al. (2012) also use to illustrate 
contrasting payment signs, i.e., the direction at which payments between farmers and beekeepers will 
flow. 
2.2.2.2 Farmers pay beekeepers for pollination services 
Figure 2.2 depicts equilibrium 2), where farmers pay beekeepers with both all the honey produced, i.e., 
area I, and a pollination fee amounting to II+III. After subtracting the pollination fee from the value of the 
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additional fruit produced resulting from bee-pollination (equivalent to I+II=II+III+IV), farmers retain the 
surplus IV (cf. Figure 2.2, welfare change for 𝑏𝑏: 0 → 𝑏𝑏∗), which may be used to cover their transaction 
costs30 (and those of the beekeepers) and possibly as an additional payment to incentivize beekeepers, 
beyond the mere coverage of per-hive opportunity costs 𝑤𝑤∗, to place their colonies in the orchard.  
 
 
Welfare changes for 
𝑏𝑏:   0 → 𝑏𝑏∗ 
Beekeepers: I + II + III = 𝑤𝑤∗ × 𝑏𝑏∗  
Farmer: I + II − (II + III) = I − III = IV  (as I = III + IV) 
 
Figure 2.2. In equilibrium, 𝒃𝒃∗colonies are placed (𝒃𝒃 ∶= bee colonies/acre); farmers pay beekeepers for 
crop pollination services. Prohibitive transaction costs may nevertheless force the equilibrium to 𝒃𝒃′. The 
total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) 
and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘) consist of a pollination fee and an in-kind honey 
payment. Modified from Rucker et al. (2012). 
2.2.2.3 Beekeepers pay farmers for the privilege of placing their bee colonies on cultivated land  
A converse scenario, where beekeepers pay farmers, is conceivable for an orchard that, at equilibrium, 
delivers marginal benefits from honey that are superior to the marginal benefits from fruit, such as oranges 
(Citrus aurantium). Figure 2.3 illustrates equilibrium 3), one such scenario where beekeepers would place 
𝑏𝑏� colonies (per acre) for free (i.e., until the marginal benefits from nectar equal their opportunity costs 
𝑤𝑤∗). However, under negligible transaction costs, farmers would demand additional colonies (i.e., beyond 
𝑏𝑏�) until reaching the equilibrium  𝑏𝑏∗. In that case, beekeepers would at maximum pay farmers a value 
equivalent to IV minus III for the exclusive right to place their colonies in the orchard, while farmers 
would retain the surplus from pollination V, plus a certain share from the honey production surplus.  
                                                     
 
30 Notice: finding the optimum 𝑏𝑏∗ and the magnitude of the payment II+III is not possible without incurring a certain 
amount of transaction costs. 
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Welfare changes for 
𝑏𝑏:   0 → 𝑏𝑏∗ 
Beekeepers: I + II + IV − (IV − III) = I + II + III = 𝑤𝑤∗ × 𝑏𝑏∗ 
Farmer: I + (IV − III) = IV + V (as V + III = I) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. In equilibrium, beekeepers will place 𝒃𝒃� colonies for free, yet the farmer will demand 
additional colonies until reaching the optimum 𝒃𝒃∗ (𝒃𝒃 ∶= bee colonies/acre); beekeepers pay farmers for 
exclusive rights to floral resources. Prohibitive transaction costs may nevertheless force the equilibrium to 
𝒃𝒃′. The total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal product of fruit 
(𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘) consist of a pollination fee and an in-kind 
honey payment. Modified from Rucker et al. (2012). 
2.2.2.4 Farmers and beekeepers cooperate with no monetary payments involved 
Decisive for the direction of payments is thus the proportion to which (net of transaction costs) the honey 
surplus (available to the beekeepers to compensate the farmer) stands relative to the share of total crop 
pollination benefits that the farmer has to invest to balance the opportunity costs of beekeepers that could 
not be met with honey benefits, i.e., the ratio of area IV to area III in Figure 2.3. If IV > III, beekeepers 
will pay farmers, while the opposite is true when III > IV. In light of this, it becomes evident that case 4), 
an interaction between farmers and beekeepers involving no monetary payments, is likelier to take place 
as III ≈ IV (Figure 2.3).  
2.2.2.5 Beekeepers deliver crop pollination as an externality 
For an orchard with relatively low 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹, the fixed transaction costs are, at least from the farmer’s 
perspective, unlikely to be trivial: they may be prohibitive or leave little incentive for the farmer to enter 
into an agreement that also accommodates the additional benefits from crop pollination. In other words, 
the costs of e.g. estimating the actual 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 and enforcing the agreement may be perceived by the farmer 
as higher than the aggregated 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹they would expect. Such circumstance leads us to equilibrium 5), the 
case where, in an orchard with high  𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 (relative to 𝑤𝑤∗), beekeepers and farmers agree to interact, 
contemplating solely the marginal benefits of honey. Figure 2.4 shows the equilibrium stocking density 
being settled at 𝑏𝑏�, as beekeepers compare 𝑤𝑤∗ to the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻. After covering their opportunity costs (area 
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I+II), beekeepers are left with a surplus of honey benefits (area III), while farmers enjoy the externality of 
crop pollination (area IV, equivalent to area I). Here too, beekeepers may use part of (or at maximum) the 
surplus III (e.g., as in-kind honey payments) as an additional incentive for the farmer to give them 
exclusive rights to the orchard’s nectar. In this case, failing to reach the optimum 𝑏𝑏∗ due to transaction 
costs entails deadweight losses amounting to V. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Pollination as an externality: in equilibrium, beekeepers place 𝒃𝒃� colonies (𝒃𝒃 ∶= bee 
colonies/acre); beekeepers pay farmers for exclusive rights to floral resources and allocate the stocking 
density solely based on honey. The optimum 𝒃𝒃∗ is missed due to transaction costs relevant to 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭. The 
total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) 
and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘) consist of a pollination fee and an in-kind honey 
payment. 
2.2.2.6 Beekeepers interact with farmers in an agro-ecosystem that sustains wild bees 
Until now, the marginal benefits from an interaction between the orchard and wild bees have not been 
made explicit in our analysis. In fact, the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 curves we have discussed so far are implicitly shaped by 
the agro-ecological conditions that determine, among other factors, the local population of wild bees.  
Our analysis proceeds including the marginal benefits of wild bees, by redefining the variable 𝑏𝑏 (Eq. 2.2) 
such that it captures the sum of wild and managed bee colonies (respectively 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 and 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒) that in a given 
agro-ecosystem are available to pollinate each orchard’s acre and to produce honey from its nectar. The 
distinction between wild and managed bees may seem arbitrary, being that some species can 
simultaneously fall into both categories. For the sake of simplicity one may nevertheless assume that, in a 
given agro-ecosystem, the marginal benefits from all bee species within each category (i.e., wild and 
managed) can be derived from the per-acre production functions 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤) and 𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤) and ℎ𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒) and 
ℎ𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒) respectively. In doing so, one has to be wary about the possible differences between each 
category’s per-colony marginal benefit curves from pollination and honey. Therein, the issue arises of 
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which bees, i.e., wild or managed, will visit the orchard first, thus yielding the highest potential marginal 
benefits. This is immaterial with regard to crop pollination, since all of its related benefits are retained by 
the farm regardless of which bees are delivering them. On the other hand, the issue remains of which bees 
will produce honey from the first units of available nectar, given that the honey produced by wild bees 
may or may not be harvested. We therefore introduce another simplifying yet sensible assumption, namely 
that the proximity to natural or semi-natural habitats will give wild bees priority access to the orchard’s 
floral resources. Consequently, our analyses ascribe the first units of nectar to the production of honey 
from wild bees.  
We further assume that an orchardist will only consider hiring a commercial beekeeper’s pollination 
services if wild bees leave unrealized positive marginal benefits from crop pollination after having 
finished visiting the orchard’s flowers31. At any rate, the marginal benefits in the equilibria presented 
above set their baseline (i.e., b=0) immediately after the last available wild bee colony has delivered its 
benefits. It thus becomes apparent that 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏) and 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏) (Eq. 2.2) are piecewise per-acre production 
functions that are defined by the sub-functions and corresponding intervals specific to 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 and 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 in the 
main function’s domain. For our analyses, the value of 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 is assumed to be a parameter given by each 
particular agro-ecosystem (i.e., regardless of whether wild bees are displaced by managed bees)32, while 
𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 is the variable to be optimized.  
We represent the marginal benefits of the two distinct bee categories in a rectangular coordinate system, 
by setting one colony of managed bees as the common unit. Thereby, we arbitrarily set the equivalence 
between both bee categories at the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹, i.e., 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒  is equivalent to the number of managed bee colonies 
required to deliver the per-acre pollination services of the locally available bee colonies33; the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 of 
wild bees are accordingly adjusted to 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 . We further assume that the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 diminishes at an equal rate for 
𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 and 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 , thus leading to a smooth transition down the pollination demand curve.  
Figure 2.5 illustrates one possible case for equilibrium 6), in which the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 curve radically changes 
when the managed bee colonies are placed in the orchard. The relatively small 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 corresponding to 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒  
could represent the case of a farmer being able to only recover a small portion of the wild honey produced 
                                                     
 
31 Beekeepers may nevertheless see in rich floral resources an incentive to bring their colonies to the orchard, 
regardless of the abundance of wild bees. In the case of beekeeping with European honeybees (A. mellifera), 
which have been extensively introduced to almost every region in the world, it has been widely reported that this 
species tends to displace other bee species from the richest source of forage to less profitable ones (Goulson 
2003). 
32 Bearing in mind that managed bees are likely to be the dominant orchard visitor, the number of available wild bee 
colonies (if there are any) could theoretically be displaced closer to the origin, i.e., a level below the full potential 
range of  𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤. 
33 Kakutani et al. (1993) for instance conclude from their fertilization experiments that stingless bees (Trigona 
minangkabau) require 1.8 times the amount of workers of a honeybee (Apis mellifera) colony (i.e., 2:1 mature or 
8:1 small stingless bee colonies per honeybee colony) to attain an equivalently efficient pollination of 
strawberries (Fragaria chiloensis × ananassa). 
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by directly gathering it from the wild bee’s natural habitat, a labor-intensive practice known as honey 
hunting34. Here, the diminishing marginal benefits could exemplify the increased effort the farmer has to 
invest as she searches farther away from her orchard to find the next wild bee colony. The 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 
increases from the point at which managed bees are brought to the orchard, as more of the orchard’s nectar 
benefits can be harvested and transformed into honey more efficiently. This step in the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 curve 
(Figure 2.5), indicates the baseline for equilibrium 3) (𝑏𝑏′ = 0 in Figure 2.3). It is worthwhile mentioning 
that in this example, the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 are low relative to the marginal benefits from honey of managed bees 
(𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻), due to a significant contribution to the orchard’s pollination needs on account of wild bees, i.e., a 
positive environmental externality. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Managed bees are brought to the orchard after wild bees have finished delivering their 
pollination services.  In equilibrium, 𝒃𝒃𝒎𝒎∗  colonies are placed (𝒃𝒃 ∶= bee colonies/acre); 𝒃𝒃𝒘𝒘𝒆𝒆  is the equivalent 
number of managed bee colonies that would deliver the pollination services of the locally available wild 
bee colonies (𝒃𝒃𝒘𝒘). The total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal 
product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘) consist of a pollination fee and 
an in-kind honey payment. 
The equilibria presented above could be based on the assumption that multi-product firms optimize the 
stocking density of managed bees, i.e. regardless of how the benefits will ultimately be distributed 
between farmers and beekeepers in the real world. At this stage, nevertheless, a sensible question would be 
whether the farmer can extract a greater benefit from the orchard’s nectar, i.e., capturing the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 
without requiring the intermediation of external commercial beekeepers. This consideration is important, 
since it has implications on how the costs of beekeeping enter the optimization.  
                                                     
 
34 This practice requires a special set of skills and is very time consuming. It is rarely practiced by farmers as an 
important source of additional income (Narjes and Lippert 2010). 
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2.2.2.7 Farmers consider engaging in on-farm beekeeping 
So far, the marginal costs of beekeeping 𝑘𝑘 have implicitly been assumed to be zero (in the profit function) 
and the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃s from managed bees have diminished only to account for the constraints inherent to the 
agro-ecosystem. In the profit maximization problem offered by Rucker et al. (2012), the costs of 
beekeeping (e.g., per colony hive box investments and maintenance) can be assumed to be equal in every 
location. If we rewrite Equation (2.2), such to make the costs of commercial beekeeping 𝑘𝑘 explicit as 
follows 
                                  max
𝑏𝑏
𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏) + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏) − 𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝑏𝑏 − (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑘𝑘) ∗ 𝑏𝑏,                             (2.4) 
it becomes evident that k is cancelled out by the identical costs that would be incurred at any alternative 
location that offers the opportunity to earn 𝑤𝑤∗. Nevertheless, on-farm beekeeping generates a different 
type of opportunity costs. As a part-time beekeeper, a farmer is typically bound to leave her bee colonies 
on (or near) the farm and can hardly practice migratory beekeeping with the same flexibility that 
commercial operations enjoy, due to e.g., infrastructure and time limitations. Therefore, instead of failing 
to capture the benefits from alternative beekeeping locations, a part-time beekeeper’s opportunity costs 
mainly consist of the forgone benefits from investing her labor capacity in other activities, e.g. on the own 
farm. We therefore distinguish the opportunity costs of commercial beekeeping 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 from those of on-farm 
beekeeping 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜 (i.e., per colony forgone labor wage) and specify the on-farm beekeeping profit 
maximization problem as follows: 
                                max
𝑏𝑏
𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∗ ℎ𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) + 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 ∗ ℎ𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) − 𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,                       (2.5) 
where ℎ𝐻𝐻(𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) and ℎ𝑓𝑓(𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) are the production sub-functions corresponding to on-farm beekeeping, as 
denoted by the sub-index o, for 𝑃𝑃 = 1, … , 𝐶𝐶 bee species that are capable of being domesticated and 
available to the farmer. It is apparent that, in contrast to commercial beekeeping (Eq. 2.4), k is now 
relevant for on-farm beekeeping: commercial beekeepers already own the necessary infrastructure, while 
for farmers acquiring it involves a new investment. In fact, if in the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 for equilibrium 6) (Figure 2.5) 
we would have otherwise accounted for the difference in marginal costs between on-farm beekeeping and 
allowing wild bees in the orchard, its curve would have depicted a sudden downward shift (and a steeper 
slope if increasing marginal costs were assumed) in the segment that corresponds to managed bees. 
However, to make the analysis of the next equilibria simpler, we deduct the entire costs of either 
beekeeping activity entirely from the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻. Thereby, the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 is identical for commercial and on-farm 
beekeeping and the smooth transition on its curve (between wild and managed bees) is conveniently 
maintained, thus characterizing the nature of positive externality that pollination potentially assumes.  
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 represent equilibrium 7), the case of farmers considering the possibility of 
becoming themselves beekeepers. They depict the total value of marginal products (𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃s) of any bee 
species s that can be managed both on the farm (as an additional farming activity), or on a larger scale for 
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commercial purposes (including renting out colonies for crop-pollination). Both figures set their baselines 
(𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 = 0) immediately after the last wild bee has delivered its pollination benefits (and neglect the benefits 
from wild honey). For simplicity’s sake, we assume that both beekeeping activities (i.e., on-farm and 
commercial) use the same bee species and therefore produce equal honey yields that fetch the same honey 
price. Thereby, equilibria 7.a) and 7.b) (respectively Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7) differ in the (constant) per 
colony investments of on-farm beekeeping (𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜): in both figures 𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜 > 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐, yet in the former 𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜 is much 
higher than in the latter. Accordingly, only the resulting 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 is affected; the 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 curves are not 
depicted, yet can be inferred with the common 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 curve. To make a comparison possible, both 
equilibria are also based on the same wild bee populations (i.e., remaining crop-pollination requirements) 
and same opportunity costs 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐∗ and 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜∗, where 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐∗ > 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜∗.  
In equilibrium 7.a), it becomes clear that commercial beekeeping is preferred over on-farm beekeeping: 
the aggregated 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 of on-farm beekeeping is much lower than the aggregated marginal benefits from 
commercial beekeeping (corresponding to I < II in Figure 2.6). The farmer would thus be better off hiring 
commercial beekeeping and retaining a surplus equivalent to area II (i.e., provided she has sufficient 
bargaining power to keep all the surplus II).  
 
 
Hiring crop-pollination services 
from commercial beekeepers is 
preferred over on-farm 
beekeeping: the surplus of the 
former exceeds that of the latter, 
i.e., II > I.   
Figure 2.6.  On-farm vs. commercial beekeeping: the alternatives’ characteristic opportunity costs (𝒘𝒘𝒐𝒐∗  for 
the former and 𝒘𝒘𝒄𝒄∗ for the latter), lead to the corresponding equilibria, i.e., 𝒃𝒃𝒐𝒐∗  and 𝒃𝒃𝒄𝒄∗, respectively. The 
total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) 
and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). The 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯 for on-farm and commercial beekeeping (here not depicted for 
simplicity in visual representation), only differ in the corresponding marginal costs of beekeeping 𝒌𝒌, i.e., 
𝒌𝒌𝒐𝒐 > 𝒌𝒌𝒄𝒄. 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝒐𝒐𝑯𝑯 − 𝒌𝒌𝒐𝒐 and 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯 can be inferred by subtracting 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭 from their corresponding 
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷s. Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘𝒄𝒄) consist of a pollination fee and an in-kind honey payment; 𝒘𝒘𝒐𝒐 
represents the per-colony forgone labor wage of the beekeeping farmer. 
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Equilibrium 7.b) (Figure 2.7) reverses the relative positions of on-farm and commercial beekeeping, as the 
former delivers positive benefits from honey production that result in a surplus equivalent to area I+II+III, 
which is greater than the surplus of the latter, i.e., area IV.  
It is conceivable that farmers will engage in modern beekeeping (i.e., with A. mellifera) as an additional 
farming activity, i.e., at a small scale or as a hobby (thus accounting for relatively small or even 
disregarding opportunity costs of labor 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜). For a smallholder farmer nonetheless, especially in regions 
where A. mellifera is a foreign species, the investments 𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜 required to adopt and run modern beekeeping, 
even at a small scale, may be prohibitive. On the other hand, traditional beekeeping with native bees (if 
such are available), typically requires marginal infrastructure, little capital and easy-to-learn skills, and can 
thus be an affordable alternative for smallholders (especially in developing countries) to derive greater 
value from the local floral resources and bee fauna (Narjes and Lippert 2010; Gupta et al. 2014; Kasangaki 
et al. 2014). 
 
 
On-farm beekeeping is 
preferred over hiring crop-
pollination services from 
commercial beekeepers: the 
surplus of the former exceeds 
that of the latter, i.e., I+II+III 
> IV.   
Figure 2.7. On-farm vs. commercial beekeeping: the alternatives’ characteristic opportunity costs (𝒘𝒘𝒐𝒐∗  for 
the former and 𝒘𝒘𝒄𝒄∗ for the latter), lead to the corresponding equilibria, i.e., 𝒃𝒃𝒐𝒐∗  and 𝒃𝒃𝒄𝒄∗, respectively. The 
total value of marginal products (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷) equals the sum of values of marginal product of fruit (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭) 
and of honey (𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯). The 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑯𝑯 for on-farm and commercial beekeeping (here not depicted for 
simplicity in visual representation), only differ in the corresponding marginal costs of beekeeping 𝒌𝒌, i.e., 
𝒌𝒌𝒐𝒐 > 𝒌𝒌𝒄𝒄. 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝒐𝒐𝑯𝑯 − 𝒌𝒌𝒐𝒐 and 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝒄𝒄𝑯𝑯 can be inferred by subtracting 𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷𝑭𝑭 from their corresponding 
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴𝑷𝑷s. Per-colony bee wages (𝒘𝒘𝒄𝒄) consist of a pollination fee and an in-kind honey payment; 𝒘𝒘𝒐𝒐 
represents the per-colony forgone labor wage of the beekeeping farmer. 
2.3 Applying the analytical framework to real world beekeeping-farming interactions 
In the following, we associate the above presented equilibria with real world examples of interactions 
between beekeeping and farming activities that we obtained from a literature review and our own 
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observations. Although based on anecdotal evidence, these associations and their classification according 
to our analytical framework may further guide the formulation of future testable empirical research 
questions. In this regard, giving context to the proposed theoretical equilibria may further hint at the agro-
ecological and socio-economic conditions that favour the cooperation between beekeepers and farmers or 
the adoption of beekeeping by the latter. 
We start with 1.a), which we compare to the case of crops with overlapping flowering periods, especially 
if there are differences in the value of their corresponding marginal products of fruit and/or honey. This 
may result in the under-provision of pollination services for crops that compete for pollinators with crops 
that have comparatively higher total value marginal product. For instance, apples and strawberries, both 
members of the Rosacea family, are likely to overlap in their pollination faunas. Both crops are cultivated 
in the Mid-Atlantic region of the USA, where Grab et al. (2017) determined a negative effect on 
strawberry yields when this crop’s bloom coincided with the mass flowering of apples during early and 
peak bloom periods. Grab et al. (2017) also report that A. mellifera beekeepers often bring their colonies to 
pollinate apples but not strawberries. Similarly in California, avocadoes and early blooming cherries 
compete for honeybee pollination with almond orchards (Sumner and Boriss 2006); such competition is 
especially relevant for avocadoes, whose nectar and honey are relatively unattractive to honeybees (i.e., 
low 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 curve) when other foraging sources are available, thus often leading to an insufficient 
pollination (Ish-Am and Eiskowitch 1998; Akik et al.  2006). With the acreage expansion of Californian 
almonds, the demand for pollination services has exceeded the supply of honeybee colonies (Sumner and 
Boriss 2006; Pilati and Prestamburgo 2016), resulting in almond pollination fees (167.0 USD/colony) that 
in 2016 were far superior to those paid for cherries and avocadoes (68.6 USD/colony and 40.8 
USD/colony, respectively) (United States Department of Agriculture 2016c); for avocados this means a 
high 𝑤𝑤∗. Although, to our knowledge, a decline in avocado and cherry yields has not been reported in 
connection with uncompetitive pollination fees or honey revenues, it is to be expected that migratory 
commercial beekeepers will respond to such price signals and corresponding opportunity costs by 
deploying as many bee colonies on almond orchards. In the absence of wild pollinators this may result in 
reduced avocado and cherry yields.  
As described under 1.b), transaction costs may also discourage the cooperation between beekeepers and 
farmers. This could be the case for the Lake Constance fruit producing region in Southern Germany, 
where small-scale agriculture is the dominant land use and, according to Wolf (2016), beekeepers are 
mostly hobbyists with no more than 30 colonies. Wolf (2016) further reports that the first contact between 
farmers and beekeepers in this region is typically not facilitated by intermediaries, and pollination 
contracts are usually informal (e.g., verbal agreements). Transaction costs may thus arise from establishing 
a first contact, from contract enforcement (especially concerning the risk of pesticide exposure to bees) 
and from the uncertainty regarding the demand for pollination services and the corresponding fees. In this 
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regard, some beekeepers refused pursuing a contact to offer farmers their pollination services, arguing that 
the pollinator density of this region is high and that it is therefore difficult to establish a pollination fee 
based on their bees’ marginal contribution to crop yields (𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 being already quite low at 𝑏𝑏 = 0; cf. 
Figure 2.5). Moreover, some beekeepers stated that they offer honey as an in-kind compensation to the 
farmer. Notwithstanding these accounts, a pollination demand seems to exist in some parts of this region: 
large-scale migratory beekeepers (>300 colonies) travel to Lake Constance every year to offer the 
pollination services that, due to a lack of mobility, many local beekeepers cannot deliver. The average 
pollination fee paid by farmers is €21/colony (SD=€21/colony)35. This price may nevertheless indicate a 
low marginal productivity of managed honeybee pollination, relative to the average per-colony pollination 
fee (€47; SD=€4) that is paid in the Altes Land, Germany’s largest coherent fruit producing region. The 
pollination fees in one of Lake Constance’s districts may also be influenced by a local beekeepers’ 
association whose members, motivated by the ideal of a non-monetary cooperation with farmers, 
deliberately renounce to a remuneration for their pollination services as a measure against the formation of 
a pollination market (ibid).  
At any rate, the marginal productivity of honeybee-mediated crop pollination seems to be heterogeneous 
over Lake Constance’s fruit producing subregions, as suggested by the pollination fees’ standard 
deviation. Furthermore, the proportion of honeybee hives’ density to pollinator-dependent orchards’ 
density varies between Lake Constance’s subregions (Dabbert et al. 2017), thus hinting at a heterogeneous 
provision of managed pollination services. In view of this, some subregions are likelier to be described by 
equilibrium 5), where rather than hindering a cooperation between farmers and beekeepers altogether, 
transaction costs lead to a cooperation that is only based on honey benefits and render the concomitant 
pollination services an externality (cf. Figure 2.4). After all, beekeepers depend on floral resources from 
different orchards to at least guarantee the subsistence of their bee colonies throughout the year, thus 
setting a basis on honey benefits for a beekeeper-farmer cooperation. On the other hand, some subregions 
of Lake Constance may present an incipient pollination market resembling equilibrium 2) (cf. Figure 2.2).   
Equilibrium 2) may also describe the Altes Land region, where a pollination market started to emerge in 
the 1940s, two decades after the introduction of synthetic pesticides entailed an important reduction of 
pollinators in this region’s sweet cherry orchards (Hausschildt 2003; Reise 2005). A centralized 
organization for pollination services (the only one in Germany) has been established there (since the 
Esteburg Fruit-Growing Centre was founded in Jork in 1929) to procure from migratory beekeepers of 
other regions the additional 3,000 to 4,000 honeybee colonies that are required for the pollination of local 
orchards (Dabbert et al. 2017).  
                                                     
 
35 These figures were calculated over all surveyed contracts in this region (N=10), of which 50% involved a 
pollination fee of €0/colony. Neglecting the zero values, the average pollination fee changes to €41/colony (SD = 
€5/colony).    
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A situation where beekeepers pay orchadists, i.e., equilibrium 3) (corresponding to IV > III in Figure 2.3), 
may partly explain the case of the Chiang Mai-Lamphun valley lowlands (Northern Thailand), where a 
large A. mellifera honey industry that competes for exclusive rights to the floral resources of longan 
(Dimocarpus longan) orchards has been established. The heterogeneous remuneration to longan farmers 
(cf. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) could nevertheless also reflect regional differences in the marginal 
productivity of honeybee hives: it is for instance conceivable that orchadists who have perceived 
appreciable yield improvements from managed A. mellifera pollination would be willing to accept a lower 
remuneration from beekeepers than those farmers whose orchards yield no further benefits from crop 
pollination. One could thus further hypothesize that instances approaching equilibrium 4) (corresponding 
to IV ≈ III in Figure 2.3) are also represented in the Chiang Mai case: some farmers and beekeepers may 
decide to cooperate without involving a payment. Equilibrium 4) is instead less pertinent to Lake 
Constance, as most beekeepers there are hobbyists and thus less likely to incur important opportunity 
costs. 
Thailand also offers examples for the proposed model extensions that lead to equilibria 6) and 7). Chiang 
Mai’s presumably abundant wild bee endowment can for instance be taken into account as an important 
contributor to the local production of fruit: longan’s high demand for bee-mediated pollination seems to 
be, in general, adequately covered by wild bees, yet many orchards may also be delivering additional 
benefits attributable to managed honeybees. In fact, 81% of the interviewed longan farmers that allow 
honeybee colonies being placed in their orchards stated having experienced improved yields due to 
pollination services from managed honeybees; for obvious reasons, they could not specify the magnitude 
of such contribution and instead provided a subjective account, i.e., reporting either a moderate (67%), a 
great (14%), or no (19%) yield improvement (calculations with data from our research project). These 
figures suggest that, in most reported cases in Chiang Mai, wild bees delivered the bulk of crop 
pollination, relegating a remainder of relatively low or negligible marginal benefits from this task to 
managed honeybees.  
Our model accounts for a possible direct influence of local wild bee populations (ceteris paribus) on the 
productivity of managed honeybees, which can thus partly explain differences in the magnitude and 
direction of payments between farmers and beekeepers within and between regions. In this respect, the 
pollination deficits that reportedly affected the productivity of orchards in Chanthaburi province (Eastern 
Thailand) can be represented by setting the equivalent population of locally available pollinating wild bees 
(𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 ) closer to the origin 𝑏𝑏 = 0 (cf. Figure 2.5), thus making the supplement of crop-pollination with 
managed honeybees more relevant. Under this circumstance, many Chanthaburi farmers were confronted 
with the choice of either renting A. mellifera colonies from professional beekeepers, or adopting on-farm 
beekeeping themselves. Ultimately, 55% of the interviewed farmers who blamed past yield declines on 
wild bee pollination deficits decided to supplement their orchards’ insufficient pollination by adopting 
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meliponiculture (calculation with data from our research project), a practice that consists of keeping and 
propagating stingless bee colonies that have typically been first collected in the wild. This choice may 
reflect the rationale of equilibrium 7.b) (cf. 𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜∗ in Figure 2.7), especially considering that, relative to A. 
mellifera beekeeping, meliponiculture entails low marginal production and opportunity costs (cf. Section 
2.1.2). On the contrary, 7.a) (cf. 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐∗ in Figure 2.6) may rather represent the case of the Altes Land region in 
Northern Germany and the Californian almond groves in the USA. In both cases, the opportunity costs of 
on-farm beekeeping, at a scale that covers an orchard’s pollination demands, are evidently too high. 
2.4 Discussion and conclusions 
The above presented equilibria result from a theoretical model that rests on the fundamental assumptions 
of neoclassical economics and perfect competition. This basic principle shall be subject to scrutiny. We 
have already included a qualitative discussion on the possible effects of transaction costs (cf. Sections 
2.2.2.1.b and 2.2.2.5), which are otherwise assumed to be zero. Evidently, the assumptions of perfect 
information (at zero cost) and profit maximization are often unrealistic: regarding the latter, the fact that 
many individuals engage in beekeeping as hobbyists or idealists casts further doubt on its plausibility. 
Moreover, being that the production factors for honey and crop pollination (i.e., labor, land and bees) are 
supplied by both transacting parties (and that wild pollinators may also contribute to crop pollination) 
imposes a challenge on the assignation and exchange of property rights; this for instance, seems to have 
hampered the establishment of pollination fees in some districts of the Lake Constance fruit producing 
region (cf. Section 2.3).  
For our model extensions we assume that the marginal benefits of managed bees set their baseline where 
wild bees have finished delivering their benefits (cf. Section 2.2.2.6). It is worth mentioning that this 
assumption undermines the fact that most introduced bee species (especially those with polylectic diet36) 
potentially compete with (and may marginalize) a great variety of native bee species, a competition that is 
especially asymmetric in favour of managed honeybees, as these are often given supplementary feeds 
when floral resources are scarce (Goulson 2003). The marginal benefits baseline for managed bees 𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒  (cf. 
Figure 2.5) may thus move closer to the origin as managed bees displace wild bees. Kleczkowski et al. 
(2017) further point out that the availability of commercial bees can mask a decrease in pollination 
services from wild pollinators, possibly past a local extinction threshold, which would otherwise 
encourage farmers to adopt conservation measures.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, the basic model by Rucker et al. (2012), in combination with our proposed 
extensions, may help better classifying and analyzing farmer-beekeeper interactions of particular 
agroecosystems and social contexts as we develop a more encompassing array of possible bioeconomic 
                                                     
 
36 A polylectic diet in bees (e.g., A. mellifera) consists of floral resources from many plant families and genera.  
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equilibria. This analytical framework provides a basis to identify the causes for a possible crop pollination 
under-provision and for hypothesis testing. For instance, associating a bee-mediated pollination dependent 
crop with an equilibrium where colony stocking density 𝑏𝑏∗ equals zero could hint at either relatively high 
transaction costs (that are prohibitive for a beekeeper-farmer cooperation), or at a healthy provision of 
pollination services from wild pollinators (i.e., low 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃 from managed bees vis-à-vis high opportunity 
costs of commercial beekeeping 𝑤𝑤∗, cf. Section 2.2.2.1).  
As a diagnostic tool, the proposed analytical framework can also inform the formulation of policies. 
Among the possible interventions, two are adequate for the following exemplary cases (identified 
according to Section 2.3):  
i) Given an important (already existing) crop pollination deficit (such as that which occurred in 
Chanthaburi, Eastern Thailand), to prepare for urgent corrective action by improving the institutions and 
information flow that facilitate the interaction between farmers and beekeepers (i.e., disburdening them 
from transaction costs), or which may help farmers adopting on-farm beekeeping.  
ii) Confronted with eventual wild pollinator declines due to intensified agriculture (as conceivable in 
Chiang Mai, Northern Thailand), a sensible preventive intervention could be implementing policies for the 
assessment and monitoring of bee declines and to support the adoption of adaptive management 
techniques that enhance pollinator conservation and habitat restoration (Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009). In 
this regard, Isaacs et al. (2017) recently introduced a comprehensive pollinator management concept that 
they coined “Integrated Crop Pollination”, which among other strategies recommends developing 
management protocols for native bee species and incorporates considerations by Biddinger and Rajotte 
(2015) regarding adjustments to Integrated Pest Management programs to protect pollinator health (i.e., 
both managed and wild pollinators), without compromising pest control.  
As a decision-supporting tool, our analytical framework is also potentially useful for comparing the 
benefits from hiring commercial crop pollination services with those from adopting on-farm beekeeping 
with the locally available domesticable bee species (cf. Section 2.2.2.7). In practice, this requires 
collecting information on the marginal productivity of the relevant bee species and for the crops in 
question, which may also frequently involve increasing the stock of pertinent knowledge with more 
meticulous and context-specific trials such as those offered by Ricketts and Lonsdorf (2013) for coffee in 
Costa Rica and by Blanche et al. (2006) for longan in Australia. 
Our analyses are founded on direct and indirect benefits provided by bees to humans through their hive 
products and pollination services respectively. Nevertheless, as noted by Kleijn et al. (2015), the delivery 
of crop pollination services is an insufficient argument for the conservation of wild pollinators as it 
discriminates in favor of a few species of dominant crop pollinators, while neglecting in the conservation 
efforts the threatened species that are rarely observed near crops. Bearing in mind that human preferences 
are not necessarily in keeping with the ecologic balance, the question arises as to which other benefits 
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(corresponding to e.g., option or existence values)37 might be neglected when optimizing the allocation of 
pollinating bees based solely on their honey and crop pollination services.  
The cases cited and reported in this study illustrate the global diversity of beekeeper-farmer interactions, 
which reflect how these actors adapt to the agro-ecological, socioeconomic and legal conditions that are 
peculiar to each region. So far, the economic literature has focused on describing and modeling well 
established crop pollination markets (such as in the Californian almond groves, where for instance 
beekeepers paying farmers, i.e., for exclusive rights to floral resources, is an exception), thus neglecting 
the possibility of other bioeconomic equilibria. Our extensions to the model by Rucker et al (2012) offer a 
broader analytical framework that accommodates the diverse circumstances under which bee-mediated 
pollination and apiculture may contribute to a region’s agricultural production. 
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Abstract 
Northern Thailand is orienting its agriculture towards intensive production systems at risk of being 
subjected to the current worldwide pollinator crisis. Bee-friendly pest management, improving native bee 
habitats within agro-forest ecosystems and fostering the husbandry of native bee species are three widely 
recognized strategies to conserve the local pollinating fauna. We attempted at eliciting farmers’ valuation 
of these measures and that of their potential effect on local native bees, by conducting a choice experiment 
with 198 longan (Dimocarpus longan) farmers. The results of a mixed logit model indicate a significant 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences, part of which was explained by the respondents’ attitude towards 
native bees, among other idiosyncratic variables such as gender. We also determined a generally positive 
willingness to pay for the above mentioned conservation measures, which implemented together were 
valued at approx. €18.1 by the average household, all else equal. Additionally, avoiding a 50% native bee 
population decline was valued in average at €40.5 per household. These estimates stand in strong contrast 
with the comparatively high economic losses such a decline could potentially entail in terms of reduced 
longan production and the relatively low investment costs to implement a conservation strategy aimed at 
preventing such losses. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The international community is showing increasing concerns regarding the continued decline of both wild 
and managed pollinator populations worldwide (Dias et al. 1999; Ricketts 2004; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 
2005; Kluser & Peduzzi 2007; FAO 2008; Gallai et al. 2009; Potts et al. 2010). Agricultural intensification 
has been recognized as the main driver for the decline of wild bee populations, especially due to the 
inappropriate use of pesticides and by reducing natural habitats through land-use change (Kremen et al. 
2002; Potts et al. 2010). 
Thailand is located in a bee diversity hotspot. With the exception of the European honeybee (Apis 
mellifera L), all other 8 honeybee species of the world are indigenous to Southeast Asia (Hepburn & 
Radloff 2011). There is also a great diversity of stingless bees in this subcontinent, with a large number of 
species recorded in Thailand, particularly in its northern provinces (Rajitparinya et al. 2001; Klakasikorn 
et al. 2005; Jongjitvimol et al. 2005). The region has therefore historically been a cluster for traditional 
beekeeping, which is mainly practiced by smallholders with rather rudimentary technologies that have 
been developed around the culture of the Asian honeybee (Apis cerana F.) and that of stingless bees.  
Northern Thailand is also rapidly orienting its agriculture to the production of high-value crops under 
intensive systems that are often characterized by the overuse of synthetic pesticides (Schreinemachers et 
al. 2011), which in connection with deforestation (Delang 2002) risk reproducing the case of other regions 
in the world, where intensive agriculture has driven pollinator populations to substantial declines 
(Biesmeijer et al. 2006; National Research Council 2007; Potts et al. 2010). Thailand has also responded 
to the continuously growing demand for longan (Dimocarpus longan L.), a fruit obtained from a bee-
pollination dependent crop (Blanche et al. 2006; Pham 2012), by dramatically expanding its cultivated 
area and its yields, i.e. from 12,094 ha (corresponding to 45,756 tons per annum) in 1983 to 168,517 ha 
(i.e. 976,729 tons per annum) in 2014 (Anupunt & Sukhivibul 2005; Thai Office of Agricultural 
Economics 2014). Currently, ~82% of the longan land is cultivated by 206,328 households in Northern 
Thailand, ~30% thereof by 69,330 households in Chiang Mai province (Thai Office of Agricultural 
Economics 2014), rendering this region the leading exporter of longan worldwide and its economy highly 
dependent on this crop (Anupunt & Sukhivibul 2005; Menzel & Waite 2005).  
Although there are yet no official reports on a pollinator crisis in Thailand, in June 2011 we collected 
anecdotal evidence from the eastern Thai province of Chanthaburi that supports the suspicion that a 
pollinator problem might exist, in at least that region: according to accounts from many local rambutan 
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(Nephelium lappaceum L.) farmers, habitat encroachment due to agriculture and pesticide overuse have 
dramatically reduced the population of wild bees with economically important consequences on their crop 
yields. In response, a local initiative is correcting such pollination deficiencies by promoting on-farm 
meliponiculture (i.e. keeping stingless bees). 
Against this background, Northern Thailand could benefit from a policy directed at conserving native 
pollinating bees. Such policy should take into account the perceptions of longan farmers with regards to 
the benefits of its implementation and the expected yield losses that could arise in the event of an 
important decline of pollination services. A pollinator conservation policy could consist of following 
measures: i) offering farmers bee-friendly alternatives to conventional pesticides (e.g., biological control 
and integrated pest management), ii) encouraging the protection and improvement of natural bee habitats 
within agro-forest ecosystems and iii) fostering the husbandry of native bee species. Expert interviews and 
focus group discussions with farmers helped us recognize that, among the recommendations of the Plan of 
Action of the International Pollinator Initiative (IPI-POA) (Byrne & Fitzpatrick 2009, cf. Section 1.3), 
these measures potentially have the greatest impact and implementation chances in Thailand’s current 
agricultural and political context.  
We conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) in Chiang Mai Province in order to understand the 
preferences of longan farmers with regards to the conservation strategies mentioned above and to 
hypothetical changes in the local population of native bees. The respondents had to choose between a 
status quo scenario, associated with an assumed 50% native bee population decline, and a series of 
alternative hypothetical policy scenarios in which the implementation of different conservation strategy 
combinations would avoid such declines. The choice decision also involved a single-payment tax 
hypothetically incured by the respondents before any conservation policy bundle could be implemented. 
Our analyses include by this design willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for the individual conservation 
policy attributes and for the bee population declines assumed in the DCE. Furthermore, we confront the 
value estimates obtained with the potential costs that would arise if some or all of the ecosystem services 
provided by local native bees to longan orchards would be lost, as calculated based on the bee-pollination 
dependence ratios given by Blanche et al. (2006) and Pham (2012) (cf. Section 3.2).   
3.2 The economic value of pollination services 
In several studies, the economic value of the contribution of pollinators to agricultural production has been 
estimated using a dependence ratio that accounts for the partial production loss of specific crops, attributed 
to the complete absence of pollinators (Morse & Calderone 2000; Losey & Vaughan 2006; Gallai et al. 
2009). Gallai et al. (2009) for instance estimated the total economic value of pollination services 
worldwide at €153 billion. Building upon this approach and having estimated the demand functions of a 
variety of insect-pollination dependent crops, the potential welfare losses from increases of food prices 
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that would result from the effect of insect pollination shortages on crop yields can be considered (Kevan & 
Phillips 2001). Accordingly, Southwick and Southwick Jr. (1992) estimated the annual value of crop 
pollination by managed honeybees (A. mellifera) in the USA to range between USD1.6 and USD5.7 
billion. 
Pollination experiments along replicated distance gradients have also been used to estimate the economic 
value of tropical forest patches that, serving as nesting sites for bees, contribute to the pollination of crops, 
such as coffee (Coffea arabica L. and Coffea robusta P.) (Ricketts 2004; Olschewski et al. 2006). Blanche 
et al. (2006) conducted similar experiments with longan (Dimocarpus longan) orchards in north 
Queensland, Australia, where they assessed the effect of their proximity to rainforests (as beneficial insect 
reservoirs) on this crop’s pollination. No monetary results were offered by this study, yet it concludes that 
initial fruit set in longan is substantially enhanced by insect pollination (i.e. 62% contribution), 
prominently from stingless bees. A similar result obtained by Pham (2012) for four different longan 
cultivars in Quoc Oai, Vietnam attributes 67% of their yields to floral visits by Asian honeybees (A. 
cerana), amounting to EUR 0.34 per kg of fruit in 2011.  
Other studies have measured the economic value of pollination services by directly observing the market 
prices of existing commercial pollination services that are contracted by farmers to substitute their failing 
ecosystem service counterpart, such as it occurs in the almond groves of California, USA (Rucker et al. 
2012). Another approach consists in calculating the cost of potentially having to replace pollination 
services with labor or capital (e.g., hand pollination, or pollen dusting, respectively), such as to maintain 
crop production at the same levels that are attained with pollination services from a healthy natural 
ecosystem (Allsopp et al. 2008).  
More recent studies have integrated the estimation of economic values for pollination services with spatial 
analyses. Ricketts and Lonsdorf (2013), for instance, calculated (discrete) marginal values for unit changes 
in pollinator habitats by combining the pollen limitation experiment results for coffee fields in Costa Rica 
from Ricketts et al. (2004) with a model by Lonsdorf et al. (2009) that predicts the supply of pollinators 
based on the surrounding land cover’s suitability to provide nesting sites and floral resources. On the other 
hand, Barfield et al. (2015) and Lautenbach et al. (2012) applied the pollination dependence ratio and crop 
vulnerability ratio approaches to plot economic value estimates at local and global scales, respectively; the 
former using a farm gate dataset for 55 crops in the US state of Georgia, while the latter combined FAO 
country-specific data for the years 1993 through 2009 with the global crop distribution maps of Monfreda, 
Ramankutty and Foley (2008). 
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3.3 Material and methods 
3.3.1 The discrete choice experiment 
The studies reported above (Section 3.2) estimate the so-called use value of pollination services relying 
upon market price observations of either pollination dependent crops or commercial pollination services. 
In contrast to such studies, DCEs have been deemed not suitable for the estimation of the economic 
benefits of pollination services, with the sensible argument that such stated preference methods would 
require respondents to possess a sound knowledge of the quantitative contribution that pollination delivers 
to their agricultural production (Mburu et al. 2006), i.e. a lack in ecological knowledge may hinder them 
from correctly assessing the use value of pollination. We do not dispute such argument, nor do we 
consider DCEs an alternative to studies that estimate the market value of pollination services. On the 
contrary, we think both approaches can complement each other: market-based valuation methods are 
important tools to estimate the use value of pollination, whereas DCEs can be used to assess peoples’ 
current preferences for measures to conserve bees and for avoiding their declines. After all, policy makers 
should take into account stakeholders’ preferences for the implementation and implications of the 
conservation policies considered in order to ensure some degree of public support. Thus, similar to the 
studies concerning wild geese conservation by Hanley et al. (2003) and compensatory wetland mitigation 
by Bauer et al. (2004), we propose approaching the economic valuation of pollination services from a 
perspective of public demand for policies aiming at conserving the native bees that deliver this ecosystem 
service in agro-forest landscapes. To this effect, the trade-offs that are stimulated in a DCE can capture the 
economic value of measures to conserve native bees. Furthermore, DCEs can also capture the existence 
value of pollinators and the option value of preserving them, disregarding the awareness that respondents 
may or may not have about how much pollinating bees contribute to the production of their crops. In this 
sense, one must be careful when interpreting DCE value estimates for changes in the population of native 
bees; these encompass several components of the total economic value of pollinating bees, contingent to 
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, and must not necessarily be equivalent to the true 
use values realized at specific levels of bee abundance. 
Hanley et al. (2015) insist in the importance of capturing non-market benefits when estimating the 
economic value of pollinators and that this may only be approached by means of stated preference 
methods such as the DCE. To our knowledge, this is the first study to apply the DCE method to obtain 
economic value estimates for the conservation of pollinating bees. 
3.3.2 Economic theory of discrete choice modelling 
According to random utility theory (RUT) (Thurstone 1927; Marschak 1960), human choice can be 
explained by the utility maximizing behavior of individuals when they are confronted with paired or 
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multiple comparisons of discrete choice alternatives. Each alternative potentially yields a certain level of 
utility that is known to the decision-maker, but unknown to the researcher. From the researcher’s 
perspective, the utility that an individual 𝑖𝑖 derives from a choice alternative 𝑗𝑗 (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) can be 
decomposed into a systematic (explainable) component (𝑉𝑉) and a stochastic (unexplainable) component 
(𝜀𝜀) that represents unobservable influences over the decision-maker’s choice. This can be formalized as 
follows: 
                                                                  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽´𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ,                                  (3.1) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observed variables that relate to the choice alternative and are weighted by 
parameters 𝛽𝛽 to account for their relative contribution to an individual’s utility (i.e. part-worth utilities). 
The decision-maker i chooses from a given set of J choices the alternative ℎ that maximizes her utility, 
strictly holding that the utility associated with alternative ℎ is superior to that of any other alternative 𝑗𝑗. 
The probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ of this choice outcome can be expressed as follows: 
                                         𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = 𝑃𝑃[(𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖ℎ > 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)] = 𝑃𝑃[(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) > (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ)]    ∀ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ ℎ                    (3.2) 
Assuming independent and identically distributed (IID) extreme value distribution type I error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
the choice probabilities can be expressed as the standard logit model (Train 2009). The mixed (random 
parameter) logit (ML) model (Hensher & Greene 2003) is an extension of the standard logit model that 
allows for taste variation in the utility function with parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖. As the researcher cannot observe 
individual parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, the (unconditional) choice probability 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ is the expected value of the standard 
logit probability over all the possible values of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, weighted by the continuous mixing distribution 𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽), 
the functional form of which is specified by the researcher. In this study the density of all attribute 
parameters 𝛽𝛽 is assumed to be normal. As such, the choice probability (2) is given by                                           
                                                                 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽´𝑋𝑋ℎ
∑ 𝑒𝑒
𝛽𝛽´𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽
𝑖𝑖=1
𝜙𝜙(𝛽𝛽|𝜃𝜃)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽,                                                    (3.3) 
where 𝜃𝜃 collectively denotes the moments of the normal density, which are the parameters to be estimated. 
Normally distributed random parameters enter the model as follows  
                                                             𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽 + 𝛿𝛿´𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,   𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  ~ 𝑁𝑁(0,1) ,                                 (3.4) 
where 𝛽𝛽 is the fixed population mean, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 are (observed) individual-specific characteristics that induce 
heterogeneity around the mean, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the individual (unobserved) specific heterogeneity and 𝜎𝜎 is the 
standard deviation of 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 around 𝛽𝛽. Some random coefficients may only present unobserved heterogeneity 
(homogeneous parameter means), in which cases the vector 𝛿𝛿 is set to zero. The introduction of additional 
stochastic elements through 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 in the utility function that may be correlated across alternatives and choice 
situations partially relaxes the restrictive IID assumption (Hensher & Greene 2003; Hensher et al. 2005).  
The integral (3.3) does not have a closed form and the choice probabilities 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ must therefore be 
approximated through computational simulation: for different moments 𝜃𝜃, values of 𝛽𝛽 are drawn from 
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𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽), with which the values behind the integral sign (Eq. 3.3) are calculated. This process yields the 
simulated probability 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖ℎ as a weighted mean of the probabilities calculated from the different draws of 𝛽𝛽. 
The parameters of the distribution 𝜙𝜙 are optimized by iteratively inserting (for different parameters of 𝜃𝜃) 
the resulting 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖ℎ into the log-likelihood function, yielding the maximum simulated likelihood estimator 
(MSLE).  
The estimated coefficients 𝛽𝛽 can be used to derive welfare measures, such as the change in the expected 
consumer surplus 𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), due to changes in the alternatives and/or choice set, as given by  
                                                 ∆𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) = − 1𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 [𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 �∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖=1 � − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 �∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖=1 �] ,                               (3.5) 
where the log sums 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 �∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=1 � express the expected maximum utility at the initial situation 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 
after the changes at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, and their difference is divided by the negative cost coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 (the marginal 
disutility of cost). The total change in consumer surplus in the population can be computed as the 
weighted sum of ∆𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖), with the weights reflecting the share of individuals in the population who share 
the same representative utilities as the sampled individual. The ∆𝐸𝐸(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) is consistent with RUT and often 
referred to as the willingness to pay (WTP) for changes in a choice alternative (McConnell, 1995; Lancsar 
& Savage 2004; Train 2009). Furthermore, it collapses to its simplest form, namely the marginal WTP 
(implicit price) for an attribute 𝑘𝑘, given equal changes in such attribute in all alternatives, ceteris paribus 
(c.p.):  
                                                                           𝑉𝑉𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 = −𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 ,                                                           (3.6) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 is the estimated coefficient of the attribute of interest. Obtaining economically meaningful WTP 
estimates becomes complex when it involves analyzing the ratios of two random parameters. When 
choosing a normal distribution, also the issue arises of how to handle extremely high WTP estimates as 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 
approaches zero. To solve this problem, 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 can be fixed in the model and point estimates of a normally 
distributed WTP obtained with mean −𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐⁄  and standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐⁄  (Hensher et al. 2005; Train 
2009). 
3.3.3 Hypotheses underlying this study and experimental design 
Unstructured interviews, with the experts that are listed below, helped in determining the general models 
We aim at explaining the choices made by longan farmers, regarding alternative policy profiles for the 
conservation of native bees. Accordingly, the alternative hypotheses stated in this study are: 
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H1: The presence of each of the three proposed bee conservation strategies has a positive contribution c.p. 
to the utility derived from the conservation policy alternatives that contain them. Similarly, an increase in 
the population of native bees increases c.p. the probability that a policy presenting this attribute level will 
be chosen, while the opposite is true for a decline.  
H2: The preference for the attributes constituting the choice alternative profiles varies among the 
population of longan farmers. This heterogeneity should be reflected in parameter standard deviations that 
are significantly different from zero and in parameter means that may interact with socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents. 
We defined the choice attributes with the assistance of provincial officers from the Thai Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment and from the Department of Agricultural Extension, who helped 
identifying the IPI-POA recommended conservation measures that could be implemented under the local 
political infrastructure. Focus group discussions with local longan farmers additionally contributed to 
formulating and phrasing plausible attribute levels that could be easily comprehended by the DCE 
participants. Consequently, we defined the attributes and levels (Table 3.1) as measures that would 
hypothetically be implemented at the village level and take effect with the support of extension services. 
With the implementation of a “bee-friendly pest control” program, the farmers would get information on 
methods (e.g., integrated pest management and spraying during times with low bee activity levels) and 
products that offer an alternative to conventional agro-chemicals, reducing the risk of bee poisoning. The 
“improving native bee habitat” measure would consist of the provision of expertise and native tree 
seedlings to promote local reforestation and habitat management campaigns in public lands and near 
cropland, aiming at offering nesting sites and food sources for native bees within agro-forest ecosystems. 
Extension services would also transfer technical knowledge on how to build bee hives to keep native bee 
species such as the Asian honeybee (Apis cerana F.) and stingless bee spp. (Heard 1999; Hepburn & 
Radloff 2011) on farm, under the “native bee husbandry” measure. The cost attribute represents a one-time 
fee that the farming households would pay to the local authorities for the implementation of the chosen 
policy alternative. 
Table 3.1. Choice alternative attributes and corresponding design levels  
Bee conservation policy attribute Levels 
Bee-friendly pest control no a), yes 
Improving  native bee habitat no a), yes 
Native bee husbandry no a), yes 
Changes in native bee population (%) −50 a), 0, +50 
Policy implementation costs (THB) b) 0 a), 250, 500, 750 
a) Attributes fixed at these levels for the status quo alternative. 
b) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. 
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A Bayesian efficient (Chaloner & Verdinelli 1995) subset of the full factorial design was generated using 
the Ngene 1.1.1 software. Efficient designs, in contrast with the traditionally preferred orthogonal designs, 
aim at data results that generate parameter estimates with as small as possible standard errors. Bayesian 
efficiency is achieved by pivoting the design around prior parameter estimates that are generated using 
data obtained from a pilot study (Rose et al. 2008; ChoiceMetrics Ltd. 2012). The prior parameter 
estimates used to generate the design for this study were based on a pilot study that we conducted with 27 
respondents. Finally, we generated 12 choice sets, one of which is presented below (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1. An example choice set. 
At the beginning of each DCE, we asked the respondents to imagine a hypothetical scenario under which a 
conservation plan was not instituted, therefore leading the population of native bees to decline to half of its 
current population. This scenario was presented as the status-quo alternative “No Policy” and it did not 
entail policy implementation costs. Alternatively, the respondents had the option to choose one of two 
unlabeled policies (i.e. Policy A or Policy B, whose names are not meaningful sources of utility and which 
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are only distinguishable by their attribute level combinations), containing at least one of the three 
proposed conservation measures, which if implemented could avoid a native bee population decline (0% 
change from the current population), or even increase it by 50%. Nevertheless, some of the policy 
implementation profiles also included the 50% native bee population decrease level. The levels describing 
the changes in abundance of native bees were defined with support of the focus group discussions and 
after pre-testing the questionnaire. Their three-level specification aims at reducing the respondents’ 
cognitive burden and the design and sample size requirements for their estimation. The implementation of 
a conservation policy was always bound to a single-payment implementation cost ranging between 
THB250 and THB750. We randomized choice sets across questionnaires before administering them to the 
interviewees, in order to avoid biases from order effects.  
In addition to the choice questions, the respondents were asked to provide information on their farm, 
socio-demographic characteristics and on their attitude towards the proposed native bee conservation 
measures. Previous to each interview, the respondents were informed about the importance of bee-
mediated pollination for the fruit-set of longan and about the current trends and consequences of pollinator 
declines worldwide. This supporting information was complemented with text and illustrations that, 
similar to the choice cards, were conveyed in colored cards. 
3.3.4 Survey and sampling 
The DCE survey was conducted in May-June 2013, in 10 villages of the districts of Chom Thong and 
Saraphi, which are located along the Upper Ping River Basin, in the lowlands of the Chiang Mai–
Lamphun valley (Figure 3.2). With 7,862 and 5,269 longan farming households (5,284 ha and 1,794 ha 
cultivated with longan) registered in the Thai Department of Agricultural Extension databases of Chom 
Thong and Saraphi respectively, these two districts amount the greatest extension of land cultivated with 
longan in Chiang Mai Province (DoAE 2015). We selected the villages randomly with the sampling 
technique of probability proportional to size, using the villages’ total longan acreage as the allocation 
criterion. Thereby, six villages were drawn from Chom Thong, while the other four were drawn from 
Saraphi.  
From 899 longan farming households registered under the 10 selected villages (DoAE 2015), a total of 
198 randomly selected individual heads of household (with a total of 187.6 ha cultivated with longan) 
understood and completed the choice exercise. Each respondent faced twelve choices, resulting in 2,376 
observations. A selection of variables that describe the sampled population is listed below (Table 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Research area: 10 villages along the lowlands of the Chiang Mai-Lamphun valley. Source: 
Own representation using vector data from the DCW and GADM databases (DIVA-GIS 2014). 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of the sampled population  
Variable Mean SD 
Age (years) 55.76  11.98  
Total cultivated acreage (rai) a) 7.15  7.49  
Longan cultivated acreage (rai) a) 5.92  6.09  
Annual revenue from longan (THB) b) 91,119  105,080  
Net annual agricultural income (THB) b) 76,415  96,822  
Net total annual income (THB) b)   
Male (𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒= 116)  302,085*  836,880  
Female (𝑁𝑁𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒= 82)  188,405*  191,008  
  Sample shares (%) 
Regard longan as their main income source   68.18 
Completed six years of primary school only [or less]  71.71 [5.55] 
Self-employed in agriculture  85.35 
Aware of positive effect of native bees on longan yields  87.37 
Engage in at least one of the bee-related activities below:  50.00 
 Allowing migratory beekeepers in their farm  28.79 
 Beekeeping c)  17.68 
 Honey hunting d)  20.71 
Individuals favoring [policy alternative] 45.58 [A]  43.52 [B]  10.90 [None]  
N = 198 respondents = 2376 choice observations. Total longan cultivated area = 187.63 ha. a) 1 rai = 0.16 ha. b) €1 = 
39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. c) A. mellifera or native bees (i.e. A. cerana and/or stingless bee spp.). 
d) Harvesting honey from wild bees in the forest. Respondent’s per household estimate. *Statistically significantly 
different: F(1, 196) = 9.04,  p = 0.003. 
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3.4 Results  
We analyzed the 2,376 choice observations using NLOGIT 5/LIMDEP 10 econometric software. All 
attributes were assigned generic coefficients (i.e. the utility specification was the same for the three choice 
alternatives). The three conservation measures entered the estimated models as dummy variables that take 
the values zero, if absent, and one if implemented. The cost attribute on the other hand was assigned a 
continuous variable, the coefficient of which relates changes in the utility to a cost increase of one Thai 
baht. We coded the native bee population change levels with two dummies representing a 50% increase 
and a 50% decrease respectively. We did not include alternative specific constants (ASCs) in our models 
due to the unlabeled nature of the presented policy alternatives. One could arguably regard the status-quo 
as a label and thus specify a constant term that is common for policy alternatives A and B, capturing 
possible preferences for any native bee conservation intervention being implemented over doing nothing. 
Nevertheless, in our study’s design we included in each policy alternative at least one of the three 
proposed conservation measures in every choice set; modelling ASCs would thus result in their estimates 
being confounded with the effects of the single attributes.  
We calculated two ML models, accounting for panel data structure and an assumed normal distribution for 
the random parameters: one with the full parameter vector set to be random  and, in order to also find 
economically meaningful WTP estimates, a second model in which only the cost attribute was held fixed 
(Table 3.3) (Train 2009; Hensher et al. 2005). Following a stepwise approach we finally explained part of 
the heterogeneity in the random parameter means by interacting them with four idiosyncratic covariates; a 
dummy indicating whether or not the respondent is aware of the positive effect that native bees may have 
on crop yields interacted with both the bee-friendly pest control and improving native bee habitat 
attributes. Another dummy indicating whether or not bees (i.e. A. mellifera and/or native bees) are kept in 
the household interacted with the native bee husbandry attribute in the “fixed-cost model” only. The native 
bee husbandry attribute (in the “all-parameters-random model” only) and the 50% increase in the 
population of native bees interacted with a third dummy indicative of whether or not the household 
engages in at least one of three economic activities involving bees, i.e. beekeeping, harvesting honey from 
wild bees in the forest (honey hunting) and/or charging migratory beekeepers a fee for bringing honeybees 
(typically A. mellifera) to forage longan nectar on their farms. Lastly, a fourth dummy representing the 
respondent’s gender interacted with the cost variable in the “all-parameters-random model” only. The 
simulations to approximate 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ (Eq. 3.3) were done using 100 Halton draw sequences (Train 2000). 
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Table 3.3. Mixed logit coefficients for an all-parameters-random model and for a fixed-cost model with 
corresponding WTP estimates  
  All-parameters-random model  Fixed-cost model 
Variable  Coefficient a) (SE)  Coefficient a) (SE) MWTP e) 
Bee-friendly pest control Mean 0.48746 (0.3737)  −0.23226 (0.3635) 0.0 f) 
 SD 1.39573 *** (0.2046)  2.15956 *** (0.1936) 629.4 *** 
Improving native bee habitat Mean 0.62168 * (0.3100)  0.09699 (0.2901) 0.0 f) 
 SD 0.18831 (0.1786)  1.27936 *** (0.1664) 372.9 *** 
Native bee husbandry Mean 0.60467 *** (0.1798)  0.48032 *** (0.1466) 140.0 *** 
 SD 1.26305 *** (0.1621)  1.35414 *** (0.1475) 394.6 *** 
−50% bee pop. (vs 0%) Mean −5.67399 *** (0.4507)  −5.46216 *** (0.4873) −1591.9 *** 
 SD 3.25209 *** (0.3795)  3.19020 *** (0.3658) 929.7 *** +50% bee pop. (vs 0%) Mean 2.83981 *** (0.3304)  2.36089 *** (0.2876) 688.1 *** 
 SD 2.30053 *** (0.3018)  1.82806 *** (0.3603) 532.8 *** 
Costs (THB) Mean −0.00540 *** (0.0005)  −0.00343 *** (0.0003) −1.0 
 SD 0.00369 *** (0.0003)  Fixed parameter 
Heterogeneity in random parameter mean (Covariate × Attribute) 
Thinks native bees boost yields (yes)        
 × Bee-friendly pest control 0.90528 * (0.3645)  1.12966 ** (0.3530) 329.2 ** 
 × Improving  native bee habitat 0.82310 ** (0.3096)  0.99251 *** (0.2854) 289.3 *** 
Beekeeper (yes)       
 × Native bee husbandry Fixed at zero  0.60022 ** (0.2145) 174.9 ** 
Economic activity bees (yes)        
 × Native bee husbandry 0.43869 * (0.2068)  Fixed at zero 
 × 50% bee pop. increase (vs 0%) 1.37934 *** (0.3760)  0.79309 * (0.3247) 231.1 * 
Male (yes)       
 × Costs 0.00133 ** (0.0005)  Fixed at zero 
Log-Likelihood (LL) −1455.6685  −1513.8718 
AIC/N  b) 1.2522  1.2945 
McFadden pseudo R-squared c) 0.3630  0.3375 
LRT c) d) 𝜒𝜒2 (df) (30) 1659.0624 ***  (22) 1542.656 *** 
a) Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. b) AIC = Akaike information criterion; N = 2376. c) 
Based on the LL function of a restricted model with two constants only, i.e. with choice probabilities set at each 
alternative’s sample shares. d) Likelihood ratio test. e) Thai baht (THB): €1 = 39.3048 THB, as of June 1, 2013. f) 
MWTP of attributes with coefficient estimates not significantly different from zero were calculated at zero THB. 
These models (Table 3.3) are statistically significant and their simulated probabilities correctly predict 
66.41% of the observed choices, in the full random parameter vector model, and 66.25% in the model with 
fixed cost coefficient. Their corresponding AICs and pseudo R2 indicate a good model fit.  
The estimate for the bee-friendly pest control parameter mean came out non-significant in both models. 
The estimates corresponding to the heterogeneity around the mean (i.e. std. deviation and covariate) of this 
parameter on the other hand indicate a highly significant large spread in the respondent’s value perception 
for this conservation measure and that being aware of the contribution of native bees to longan production 
76 
 
 
 
has a significant positive effect on the utility it generates. A similar interpretation can be offered for the 
coefficients corresponding to the native bee habitat improvement measure in the fixed-cost model, which 
resulted in a non-significant parameter mean estimate with significant high estimates for the heterogeneity 
around the mean.  
We obtained statistically significant estimates for the remaining parameter means and for the coefficients 
corresponding to the covariates and standard deviations in both models; the latter resulted smaller than in 
previous models that were estimated without interaction terms. Observing the assumption of normally 
distributed random parameters, we standardized the mean estimates [(𝛽𝛽 + 𝛿𝛿´𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) 𝜎𝜎⁄ ] from the all-
parameters-random model to obtain information on the share of respondents placing a positive value on 
the different attributes. Accordingly, the bee-friendly pest control measure generated a positive utility in 
50% of the respondents who did not believe in native bees positively contributing to their crop yields, 
while this was true for 74% of those thinking otherwise. Similarly, the shares of respondents (presenting 
the corresponding covariate characteristics) who increased their utility with the improving native bee 
habitat and native bee husbandry measures and with a 50% increase in the population of native bees were 
100%, 80% and 97% respectively. Only 4% of the entire sample expressed a positive preference for a 50% 
decrease in the population of native bees. 
Considering the expected negative sign in the cost coefficient, we used the significant values of the fixed-
cost model with confidence to calculate meaningful MWTP mean estimates along with their 
corresponding heterogeneity (Eq. 3.6). The mean MWTP estimates of the attributes with coefficient 
estimates that resulted not significantly different from zero were calculated at zero Thai baht. Thereby, 
each respondent’s expected MWTP𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 was calculated (Eq. 3.4) and aggregated over the whole sample, 
using the representative shares for each covariate (Table 3.2) as weights, in order to obtain the average 
longan farming household’s MWTP for each attribute 𝑘𝑘. We aggregated these values over the surveyed 
sample and the total population of the research area, and added them up to obtain average WTP estimates 
for a conservation policy bundle with all measures implemented (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4. Average and aggregated consumer surplus change estimates (THB) a) 
Attribute 
Average 
household  
Surveyed sample 
(N=198)  
Total research area 
(N=13,131) b) 
−50% bee pop. (vs 0%) −1,591.87  −315,190.17  −20,902,876.76 +50% bee pop. (vs 0%) 803.62  159,116.17  6,344,185.19 
Bee-friendly pest control  287.66  56,955.77  3,777,201.21 
Improving  native bee habitat 252.73  50,040.87  3,318,617.97 
Native bee husbandry 170.90  33,838.88  2,244,133.58 
All measures implemented   711.29  140,835.51  9,339,952.77 
Weighted with sample shares of idiosyncratic covariates (Table 3.2). a) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 
2013. b) Number of registered households in Chom Thong and Saraphi districts (DoAE 2015). 
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To compare these WTP estimates with the potential costs of losing a proportion of the pollination services 
provided by local native bees, we calculated the resulting longan yield reductions (Table 3.5) using a 60% 
bee-pollination dependence ratio [slightly conservative as compared to the ratios provided in the literature 
(Blanche et al. 2006; Pham 2012)], an average production of 5.55 metric tons per hectare per year and a 
farm gate price of 29 THB per kg of longan in Chiang Mai Province, in 2013 (Thai Office of Agricultural 
Economics 2014). Accordingly, the economic value of longan production attributed to bee pollination can 
be estimated at 17.4 THB per kg (0.44 EUR per kg) and 96,570 THB per hectare (2,457 EUR per ha) per 
year. 
Table 3.5. Estimated longan production losses a) attributed to declining bee pollination services (THB) b) 
Native bee  
population loss (%) 
Average farm 
(1.144 ha)  Surveyed sample (188 ha)  
Total research area 
(7,078 ha) 
100.00 −110,476.08  −18,155,160.00  −683,522,460.00 
50.00 −55,238.04  −9,077,580.00  −341,761,230.00 
5.00 −5,523.80  −907,758.00  −34,176,123.00 
a) Calculated with a 60% bee-pollination dependence ratio. b) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. 
Our calculations (Table 3.5) suggest that the actual forgone longan revenues incurred by the average farm 
from a 5% decline (assuming that natural pollination services are being provided at the ecologically 
necessary levels for a normal longan production) are much higher than our estimated WTP of an average 
household for avoiding a 50% native bee population decline and for the implementation of a policy that 
combines all three conservation measures; we also determined a great (but smaller) divergence between 
these values when aggregating them at the surveyed sample and the whole research area levels (Table 3.4). 
Nevertheless, one must be careful when interpreting the estimated WTP for a 50% native bee population 
decrease, as the abosulute value of this estimate, i.e. 1591.9 Thai baht, substantially exceeds the range of 
policy implementation costs that was presented to the respondents during the DCE (Table 3.1).  
3.5 Discussion  
We could reject the hypothesis of a zero mean preference (cf. H1) for all attributes, other than for the bee-
friendly pest control (in both models) and the improving native bee habitat (in the fixed-cost model only) 
measures (Table 3.3); an indifferent taste perception for these two measures could not be dismissed with 
confidence in the 12.63% share of the population who did not believe in a positive contribution of native 
bees to their crop yields (Table 3.2). Furthermore, the substantial discrepancy between the estimated WTP 
to avoid a 50% native bee population decline and the actual costs that such loss would imply in terms of 
forgone longan yield revenues (Table 3.4 and Table 3.5) hints at the respondents’ unawareness of the 
extent by which bees contribute to their crop production. These results accentuate the importance of 
education in the formation of value perceptions and thus that informing farmers about their crops 
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dependence on pollination services could be seen as an effective policy measure to have them deploy more 
of their own resources in conserving this ecosystem service.  
As suggested by the relevant interaction term coefficient, engaging farmers in economic activities 
involving native bees may also sensitize them for native bee population changes by attaching a direct use 
value to natural bee abundance (Table 3.3). Besides the obvious relation existing between being a 
beekeeper and an expected higher preference for participating in a native bee husbandry program, the 
significant result for this interaction may point out a demand for more sophisticated technologies and skills 
than those currently available to beekeepers. On-farm native husbandry is indeed considered a more 
sustainable alternative to honey hunting, as the latter activity (if not carefully carried out) may deplete 
wild bee colonies and damage their habitat (Partap, 2011). Moreover, on-farm beekeeping has encouraged 
orchard farmers in Chanthaburi province to use less pesticides on their crops as these would also harm 
their bees. The significant interaction of gender with costs, which suggests a lower reluctance to spending 
money c.p. by male respondents than by females, may relate to the significant income differences between 
male and female headed households (Table 3.2).  
The resulting standard deviation estimates indicate a statistically significant preference heterogeneity 
among the population of longan farmers, leading to the rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneous taste 
parameters (cf. H2). The variance in the value perceived by the population for the “native bee husbandry” 
measure could, for instance, be related to the difference in opinions that members of some of the surveyed 
communities expressed (in the additional comments section of the DCE survey) regarding bee husbandry. 
Modern beekeeping with the European honeybee (A. mellifera) is widely practiced in this region due to the 
valuable honey that can be obtained from longan nectar. Beekeepers therefore practice migratory 
beekeeping (i.e. relocating the hives in search for new bee foraging sources). In some villages, the 
respondents expressed a negative opinion regarding modern bee husbandry, based on their belief that 
honeybees carry the parasites that serve as vectors for witches' broom (Candidatus Phytoplasma spp.), a 
disease that affects longan and lychee (Litchi chinensis S.) trees in the region. Some individuals 
additionally stated believing that bees harm their yields by eating their crop’s flowers. On the other hand, 
these negative opinions contrasted with a general interest in native beekeeping that could be especially 
determined in individuals from communities that had an already established tradition for this activity.  
The parameter means of the “changes in native bee population” attribute suggest that avoiding a 50% loss 
of native bee populations is valued twice as much as an equally sized population increase, a result that is 
consistent with loss aversion behavior; a Wald test for linear restrictions led to the rejection of the 
hypothesis that the part-worth of these dummies could be captured as a single linear effect [𝜒𝜒2(1) = 36.56, 
p = 0.000]. In this regard, and considering the prospects of a local pollinator crisis such as we suspect 
might have stricken Chanthaburi province, avoiding the losses that could arise from even a small decline 
in the population of native bees (Table 3.5) justifies the comparably small investment in its prevention: the 
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cost of implementing a conservation policy that includes all the proposed measures amounts to less than 
five thousand Thai baht per village, which includes an extension service officer’s salary (72% of total 
costs), contracted farmers’ wages, tree seedlings and transportation expenses. Every household interested 
in native beekeeping could additionally acquire bee boxes at 150 Thai baht each, an investment that can 
readily be amortized with the sales of honey (THB 80/kg) and other valuable hive products; moreover, 
distributed among all longan farming households in a village (an average of 1,130 in the research area), 
the costs of implementing the full project would lay far below the sum corresponding to the average 
household’s WTP for such purpose.  
Placing the derived WTP estimates in the context of the average income earned by the sampled population 
of respondents (Table 3.2) also leads to the conclusion that these values conform to their expenditure 
capacity, especially due to the single-payment nature of the policy implementation costs. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach allowed us obtaining economic value estimates for 
longan farmers’ preferences for conservation measures of wild pollinators and for preventing a decline in 
the pollinator population. Investigating the perspective of farmers is of utmost importance, as they would 
ultimately be the most directly concerned stakeholders regarding conservation policies. The results of our 
study thus inform Thai policy makers about which conservation strategies require a greater government 
intervention and which ones can be expected to engage more efforts and resources from the targeted 
farming communities. In this regard, we estimated that, on average, the share of longan farmers who did 
not believe in the positive contribution of native bees to their crop production valued both the bee-friendly 
pest control and the improving native bee habitat strategies at zero THB. In contrast, an on average 
considerably higher willingness to pay (WTP) for these strategies could be determined for those farmers 
who were aware of the importance of bee pollination to their yields. Most of the surveyed longan farmers 
were willing to pay for the implementation of the native bee husbandry conservation strategy and an even 
higher bid was estimated for those individuals, who already engaged in beekeeping (or in other economic 
activities involving bees). 
We show that longan farmers very likely underestimate the true use value of pollination, when comparing 
their aggregated WTP for avoiding the presented hypothetical pollinator population declines (resulting 
from the DCE) with the expected production losses as calculated with a suitable pollination-dependence 
ratio. Indeed, the obtained WTP estimates for changes in the abundance of pollinating bees can be 
considered a byproduct of this study that, when compared to the actual costs of implementing the proposed 
conservation strategies, indicates how worthwhile this investment would be from the concerned farmers’ 
perspective. Accordingly, implementing an adequate bundle of conservation measures costs less than the 
farmers’ elicited WTPs for avoiding a 50 % decline in bee population. Hence, from a social point of view 
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and explicitly taking into account the preferences of stakeholders, a tailored conservation policy is 
worthwhile. 
Our results suggest that to galvanize a greater stakeholder engagement in the implementation of the 
proposed bee conservation strategies, Thai policy makers should start by educating farmers about the role 
of pollination in agricultural production, such as to bring their preferences for native bee abundance closer 
to the true use value of this ecosystem service. This could be achieved by using the already existing 
agricultural extension services provided by the Thai government and by the Royal Project Foundation to 
communicate to the farmers the benefits that pollination represent to their respective crops.  
Furthermore, longan flowers produce abundant nectar, of which honey can be sold at a premium price. 
This has attracted individuals and enterprises with great investment power to this region to develop a local 
beekeeping industry with the imported European honeybee (A. mellifera). Nevertheless, the potential for 
an additional income that beekeeping offers remains currently untapped by the great majority of longan 
farmers. Thus, fostering on-farm beekeeping with native bees can be seen as a strategy to reconcile private 
economic incentives of smallholders with the goals to conserve native pollinators and their habitats.  
We conclude by recognizing that Northern Thailand’s crop diversity presents a wide dependence range on 
animal-mediated pollination: from wind- or self-pollinated crops (e.g. rice and maize), through modestly 
animal-pollination dependent or profiting crops (e.g. strawberries and coffee), to crops substantially 
relying on pollination services (e.g. longan, litchi, squashes and pumpkins) (Klein et al. 2007). Therefore, 
realizing the full potential of a pollinator conservation policy in Northern Thailand would require 
promoting further research on the interdependency between the local pollinator fauna and the region’s 
broader agricultural landscape, assessing its economic implications from the production perspective and 
accounting for the preferences of the relevant farming communities. 
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3.8 Errata 
This chapter has been published as an article in a scientific journal [Ecosystem Services 18 (2016) 58–
67]39. Here, corrigenda are offered to the errata that have been identified, which nevertheless do not affect 
the key messages resulting from the published analyses.  
i) The final DCE survey was conducted in Chiang Mai, only during the month of June of 2013 (cp. 
Section 3.3.4). The month of May was spent carrying out the DCE pilot to obtain prior estimates for 
the final experimental design.  
ii) On Section 3.3.3 (page 71), it is incorrectly stated that a Bayesian efficient design was generated for 
the DCE survey. Instead, the underlying experimental design was generated to be efficient for a 
random parameters model without making use of Bayesian prior distributions. 
iii) The descriptive statistics on Table 3.2 mistakenly suggest that the total net annual income is 
significantly different between male and female headed households. The statistics presented to 
support such inference [t = 3.01, p = 0.03; F(1, 196) = 9.04,  p = 0.003] actually correspond to the 
difference between male and female headed households with regard to the gross annual income 
(revenue) from selling their longan production, i.e., excluding any other agricultural product 
(Female = THB 64,884.15 ; Male = THB 109,663.79). These statistics were accidentally put in 
place of those corresponding to the test associated to the presented claim [t = 1.20, p = 0.23; F(1, 
196) = 1.44,  p = 0.23], which is thus contradicted. There is nonetheless further evidence for income 
differences between male and female headed households, namely for differences in the total net 
agricultural income (Female = THB 49,937.80 ; Male = THB 95,131.35), which tested significant  [t 
= 3.31, p = 0.011; F(1, 196) = 10.94,  p = 0.001]. In view of this, it is still not farfetched to suggest 
that the significant interaction of gender with the cost attribute (i.e., reluctance to spending money) 
may be related to the significant household income differences brought about by gender differences 
(cp. Section 3.5, page 78). 
iv) The fixed-cost (MWTP) model presented in Table 3.3 estimates 25 parameters. The corresponding 
likelihood ratio test and pseudo R-squared were computed with the LL function of a restricted 
model with two constants only, thus resulting in K – 2 = 23 degrees of freedom, instead of 22 as 
mistakenly stated in Table 3.3   
v) During data entry, the binary variable “Beekeeping” (1 = yes; 0 = no) was wrongly coded for two 
respondents as 2, instead of 0. Accordingly, the percentage of respondents who are beekeepers 
changes from 17.68% to 15.66%, i.e. a difference of 4 counts resulting from two individuals that 
were each formerly counted as two. This variable also entered the fixed-cost (MWTP) model 
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presented in Table 3.3 as an interaction term, thus slightly changing its results and those presented 
in Table 3.4 as follows:    
Table 3.6. Corrigendum for fixed-cost model (with corresponding WTP estimates) of Table 3.3 
   Fixed-cost model 
Variable   Coefficient a) (SE) MWTP e) 
Bee-friendly pest control Mean  0.12722 (0.4058) 0.0 f) 
 SD  2.55661 *** (0.2402) 662.9 *** 
Improving native bee habitat Mean  0.22298 (0.3292) 0.0 f) 
 SD  1.73698 *** (0.1862) 450.4 *** 
Native bee husbandry Mean  0.67626 *** (0.1561) 175.4 *** 
 SD  1.59412 *** (0.1717) 413.3 *** 
−50% bee pop. (vs 0%) Mean  −5.29531 *** (0.4294) −1373.0 *** 
 SD  2.70436 *** (0.3431) 701.2 *** +50% bee pop. (vs 0%) Mean  2.64634 *** (0.3064) 686.2 *** 
 SD  1.99020 *** (0.2468) 516.0 *** 
Costs (THB) Mean  −0.00386 *** (0.0003) −1.0 
 SD  Fixed parameter 
Heterogeneity in random parameter mean (Covariate × Attribute) 
Thinks native bees boost yields (yes)     
 × Bee-friendly pest control 1.01974 ** (0.3921) 264.4 * 
 × Improving  native bee habitat 1.03041 ** (0.3245) 267.2 ** 
Beekeeper (yes)    
 × Native bee husbandry 0.92703 ** (0.2957) 240.4 ** 
Economic activity bees (yes)     
 × Native bee husbandry Fixed at zero 
 × 50% bee pop. increase (vs 0%) 0.93692 ** (0.3256) 242.9 ** 
Male (yes)    
 × Costs Fixed at zero 
Log-Likelihood (LL)  −1500.7022 
AIC/N  b)  1.2843 
McFadden pseudo R-squared c)  0.3433 
LRT c) d) 𝜒𝜒2 (df)  (23) 1568.995 *** 
a) Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. b) AIC = Akaike information criterion; N = 2376. c) 
Based on the LL function of a restricted model with two constants only, i.e. with choice probabilities set at each 
alternative’s sample shares. d) Likelihood ratio test. e) Thai baht (THB): €1 = 39.3048 THB, as of June 1, 2013. f) 
MWTP of attributes with coefficient estimates not significantly different from zero were calculated at zero THB. 
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Table 3.7. Corrigendum for Table 3.4: Avg. and aggregated consumer surplus change estimates (THB) a) 
Attribute 
Average 
household  
Surveyed sample 
(N=198)  
Total research area 
(N=13,131) b) 
−50% bee pop. (vs 0%) −1,591.87  −315,190.17  −20,902,876.76 +50% bee pop. (vs 0%) 803.62  159,116.17  6,344,185.19 
Bee-friendly pest control  287.66  56,955.77  3,777,201.21 
Improving  native bee habitat 252.73  50,040.87  3,318,617.97 
Native bee husbandry 167.37  33,139.17  2,160,595.70 
All measures implemented   707.76  140,135.81  9,256,417.92 
Weighted with sample shares of idiosyncratic covariates (Table 3.2). a) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 
2013. b) Number of registered households in Chom Thong and Saraphi districts (DoAE 2015). 
vi) Lastly, in Table 3.5, the estimated longan production losses for the average farm (second column) 
were calculated using an average farm size of 1.144 ha (i.e., 7.15 rai). This value nevertheless 
corresponds to the average total cultivated land of the farms in the sample, which was mistakenly 
put in place of the farms’ average longan acreage corresponding to 0.948 ha (i.e., 5.92 rai). 
Accordingly, the correct estimated longan production losses are presented in following Table (3.8):    
Table 3.8. Corrigendum for Table 3.5: estimated longan production lossesa) attributed to declining bee 
pollination services (THB) b) 
Native bee  
population loss (%) 
Average farm 
(0.948 ha)  Surveyed sample (188 ha)  
Total research area 
(7,078 ha) 
100.00 −91,513.24  −18,155,160.00  −683,522,460.00 
50.00 −45,756.62  −9,077,580.00  −341,761,230.00 
5.00 −4,575.6  −907,758.00  −34,176,123.00 
a) Calculated with a 60% bee-pollination dependence ratio. b) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. 
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Chapter IV 
 Regional differences in farmers’ preferences for a native bee conservation policy: the case of 
farming communities in Northern and Eastern Thailand40 
Manuel Ernesto Narjes, Christian Lippert  
University of Hohenheim, Germany 
Keywords: Thailand, Native bees, Crop pollination, Conservation policy, Generalized mixed logit, Scale 
heterogeneity. 
Abstract 
Evidence points to past bee-mediated crop pollination deficits in Chanthaburi province, Eastern Thailand. 
Conversely, no such evidence has yet been reported for Chiang Mai province (Northern Thailand), 
suggesting that wild pollination is delivered there above the requirements of local orchards. Discrete 
choice experiments (DCE) were conducted to elicit the preferences of pollinator-dependent orchard 
farmers with regard to three pollinator conservation measures and their possible effects on native bee 
populations in each region. We fitted mixed logit (ML) models on the resulting data to capture preference 
heterogeneity and to obtain willingness to pay (WTP) point estimates. To test our results’ robustness, we 
also inspected for scale heterogeneity by fitting generalized mixed logit (GMXL) models on the pooled 
and individual datasets. This yielded WTP space estimates (i.e., directly from WTP distributions) and 
made possible the comparison of farmers’ preferences for a native bee conservation policy in both regions. 
The results hint at significant WTP differences for some of the conservation policy attributes between both 
provinces. Furthermore, unobserved contributions to choice seem to have been more random in Chiang 
Mai. Our analyses also suggest that farmers who engage in bee-related activities are WTP more for a 
conservation policy that includes bee husbandry.  
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4.1 Introduction 
We elicited the preferences of orchard farmers in Chiang Mai province (Northern Thailand) and in 
Chanthaburi province (Eastern Thailand) regarding alternative policy scenarios aimed at conserving native 
pollinating bees. Two discrete choice experiments (DCEs) were conducted in 2013, the resulting data of 
which was fitted with the mixed logit (ML) and the generalized mixed logit (GMXL) models to identify 
possible sources of heterogeneity in respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for three recommended 
conservation measures (cf. Section 4.1.2) and for their potential effect on local native bees. The WTP for 
such measures are expected to be higher among those farmers who are beekeepers, considering that a 
previous, firsthand exposure to honeybees interacting with an agro-ecosystem could increase the 
awareness about the importance of conserving their native equivalents and habitat.  
We also inspected for choice behavior differences between the two regions and whether or not such 
differences could be traced back to individuals who believe having experienced an insufficient crop 
pollination due to native bee population declines, as this has been reported for Chanthaburi. In this regard, 
we emphasize that choice analysis addresses the value of perceived, rather than actual, changes in the 
provision of an environmental good. Furthermore, we inspect the potential influence of idiosyncratic 
characteristics on the overall importance that respondents place on the conservation policy attributes that 
we propose, relative to the unaccounted factors that also influenced their choices.  
4.1.1 Context: current status of beekeeping and pollination services in Thailand 
With the exception of the European honeybee, all other eight honeybee species are native to Southeast 
Asia (Kastberger et al. 2011). This region is also characterized by its stingless bee (Apidae, Meliponinae) 
diversity, with 32 species of the genus Trigona identified in Thailand to date (Klakasikorn et al. 2005; 
Rasmussen 2008). Beekeeping in Thailand traditionally consists of attracting wild swarms of the Eastern 
honeybee (Apis cerana F.) to bait-hives (typically an unsophisticated wooden box or hollowed-out trunk), 
where the colony will reside until a disturbance (e.g., honey harvest) causes them to abscond (Oldroyd and 
Wongsiri 2009). It is also a custom in rural Thailand to keep stingless bees (a practice known as 
meliponiculture), which has gained economic relevance in the past few decades. Farmers collect colonies 
from several stingless bee species in the forests and place them in artificial hives (of varying degrees of 
sophistication) on their farms for their pollination services and to harvest their honey (Heard 1999; 
Chuttong et al. 2014).  
Native bee husbandry has gained popularity in the Eastern Thai provinces of Chanthaburi and Trat, where 
orchardists started managing stingless bees to compensate for past pollination deficits of rambutan 
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(Nephelium lappaceum) (Thanuart and Makhonpas 2013; Boongird 2014; Chuttong et al. 2014). 
Moreover, in our 2013 survey in Chanthaburi, some respondents informed us that prior to finding this 
solution to the pollination deficit, some orchard farmers of the region had experimented with renting A. 
mellifera colonies from beekeepers. They preferred keeping stingless bees over honeybees due to their 
relatively simple maintenance and shorter flight range41, which can protect them from possible contact 
with pesticides from neighboring farms. These anecdotes corroborate a similar report by Boongird (2014) 
and raise the suspicion that a local pollination crisis might have taken place in this region in the past.  
Habitat loss and fragmentation (through, e.g., deforestation), pesticide overuse and pathogens are among 
the main drivers of pollinator declines worldwide (Priess et al. 2007; Potts et al. 2010; Goulson et al. 
2015). The occurrence of localized pollinator crises in Thailand is thus not unlikely, given the country’s 
sustained deforestation rates (Johnson 2015) and the four-fold increase in pesticide imports for agricultural 
applications over the past decade (Thapinta and Hudak 2000; Panuwet, et al. 2012; Siriwong and Robson 
2014). The official promotion of capital-intensive commercial crops within the framework of a national 
development strategy was one of the main drivers of deforestation in Thailand in the past (Delang 2002; 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 2013). More recently, the continuing increase in the price of rubber 
(Hevea brasiliensis) has led to the conversion of forests in the east, northeast and north of the country, as 
the rubber plantation area has become limited in Southern Thailand (Jawjit et al. 2010; Trisurat et al. 
2010). Furthermore, the overuse of pesticides in Thailand may be a result of the preventive (rather than 
curative) pesticide application strategy that cash-crop farmers have adopted (Schreinemachers et al. 2011; 
Grovermann et al. 2013).  
Currently, the Northern Thai lowlands are extensively cultivated with longan (Dimocarpus longan), a 
Sapindaceae fruit tree that relies heavily on bee-mediated pollination, particularly from A. cerana and 
stingless bees (Boonithee et al. 1991; Blanche et al. 2006; Pham 2012). Northern Thailand is the leading 
exporter of longan worldwide (US$274.3 million in fresh fruit in 2013), with approximately 138,500 ha 
and 206,000 households (47,300 ha and 69,330 households in Chiang Mai province) devoted to producing 
this fruit in 2013 (Thai Office of Agricultural Economics 2014), thus rendering this region’s economy 
highly dependent on this crop (Anupunt and Sukhivibul 2005; Menzel and Waite 2005; Ministry of 
Commerce 2015). The extensive cultivation of longan in Northern Thailand has also attracted large-scale 
beekeeping operations, which (February-March) move their ~120,000 A. mellifera hives to farms around 
                                                     
 
41 The flight range of stingless bees is proportional to their body size, which may constrain the dispersion capacity of 
smaller species within the limits of forest fragments, further increasing the risk of extinction in their local 
population (Araújo et al. 2004). Compared to the wide foraging range of honeybees (A. mellifera), typically 
reaching distances of 5 km (Beekman and Ratnieks 2000), stingless bees have a considerably smaller flight 
radius: e.g. ~600 m for the subgenus Trigona (Boontop et al. 2008). Boonithee et al. (1991), for instance, reported 
a high abundance of Trigona sp. in a longan orchard in Northern Thailand within distances of 50 and 200 m from 
the adjoining forest, yet decreasing sharply between 2.5 and 4 km.  
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the Chiang Mai-Lamphun valley each season in search of longan nectar foraging sources. They produce 
~4,200 metric tons of longan honey per annum, which is highly valued in the Asian markets, where it can 
be sold at a premium price (Wongsiri et al. 1998; Wongsiri et al. 2000; Seanbualuang 2012). 
Thailand is also one of the world’s leading producers of rambutan and durian, the former of which is a 
close relative of longan that also depends on bee pollination, i.e., predominantly from stingless bees and A. 
cerana (Shivaramu et al. 2012; Chuttong et al. 2014; Rincón-Rabanales et al. 2015). Rambutans are 
mostly consumed domestically (i.e., ~91% of the country’s total production) and partly exported fresh and 
canned (~US$20.2 million in 2013). The cultivation of this fruit tree employed 116,200 households and 
47,900 ha of land in 2013 and is mainly established in Eastern Thailand, with ~45% of the country’s 
production concentrated in Chanthaburi province (Salakpetch 2005; Thai Office of Agricultural 
Economics 2014; Ministry of Commerce 2015). In Chanthaburi, rambutans are commonly intercropped 
with mangosteens (Garcinia mangostana), which are often heavily sprayed with insecticides to comply 
with the high aesthetic standards (that, e.g., reject fruit presenting any signs of insect damage on its 
surface) imposed on fruits destined to export markets (Methaphat 2010; Chaisrichonlathan and Noomhorm 
2011). 
Although the accuracy of this information is disputed, honeybees (Apis) and stingless bees have also been 
credited with the pollination of durians, a belief that is commonly shared among durian farmers in 
Chanthaburi (Boongird 2014). In truth, durians owe this service exclusively to nocturnal pollinators 
(Bumrungsri et al. 2009). For this reason, a decline in the population of bees would have no consequence 
on durian yields. Nevertheless, we mention durian in this context as in our study we focus on farmers’ 
perceptions regarding the pollination of their crops.  
4.1.2 A policy to conserve native bees in Thailand 
Considering the economic importance of the pollination services provided by native bees to Thailand’s 
orchards, it would make sense to implement a policy to conserve them and their habitats. This is especially 
relevant for regions such as Northern and Eastern Thailand, where the agricultural output is vulnerable to 
future pollination shortages. Moreover, by taking into account the preferences of pollination-dependent 
crop farmers with regards to the conservation strategies constituting such a policy, one could make ex-ante 
policy recommendations based on which strategies can be expected to engage more efforts and resources 
from the targeted farming communities and which ones will require greater government intervention. 
The International Pollinator Initiative’s Plan of Action (IPI-POA, cf. Section 1.3) provides guidelines to 
enhance wild pollinator conservation and habitat restoration. Its adaptive management pillar recommends, 
among others, the following conservation strategies: i) offering farmers bee-friendly alternatives to 
conventional pesticides (e.g., biological control and integrated pest management); ii) encouraging the 
protection and improvement of natural bee habitats within agro-forest ecosystems; and iii) fostering the 
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husbandry of native bee species (Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009). We conducted expert interviews and focus 
group discussions with farmers where we identified these measures as potentially having the greatest 
impact and implementation chances in Thailand’s current agricultural and political context. 
Besides assessing farmers’ preferences for measures to conserve local native bee populations, we attempt 
at eliciting the existence value of native bees and the option value of preserving the pollination services 
they provide (among other value components), both of which are neglected by market prices. Indeed, this 
study does not attempt at estimating the market value of crop pollination by bees, nor does it offer a 
detailed examination of markets for pollination services. After all, the arguments for the preservation of 
bee diversity should reach beyond the crop pollination services that a set of dominant bee species may 
provide (Kleijn et al. 2015). 
4.2 Materials and methods 
4.2.1 Discrete choice experiments 
Hanley et al. (2015) have thoroughly reviewed the methods that have been applied to measure the 
economic value of pollination services and draw attention to the, until recently, unnoticed knowledge gap 
regarding the non-market benefits of this ecosystem service. They suggest that only stated preference 
methods, such as contingent valuation (CVM) and discrete choice experiments (DCE), may fill in this gap, 
and they proceed to present a first attempt by Mwebaze et al. (2010) at capturing non-market values within 
a CVM. Mwebaze et al. (2010) deliver WTP estimates for the existence value of protecting honeybees in 
the UK; however, due to a small and non-random sample, these results are unreliable (Hanley et al. 2015).  
The validity and reliability of CVM results have often been criticized for the inherent proneness of this 
method to estimation biases, such as the hypothetical bias and most notably the strategic bias (i.e., when 
respondents may deliberately misrepresent their preferences in the hope of influencing the succeeding 
decision-making process in their favor). In this regard, DCEs offer the advantage of overcoming some of 
these limitations and are especially suited to assessing trade-offs that involve multi-dimensional changes 
(Bennett and Adamowicz 2001; Hanley et al. 2001; Tisdell 2010).  
In a recent study, Narjes and Lippert (2016, Chapter 3) conducted a DCE with longan farmers in Chiang 
Mai province. Their per capita WTP for the combined implementation of the native bee conservation 
measures mentioned above (cf. Section 4.1.2) and for avoiding a potential 50% native bee population 
decline were estimated at €18.1 and €40.5, respectively. These estimates strongly contrast with the 
comparatively high economic losses from a potential pollination deficit in longan orchards, as 
approximated using the pollination-dependence ratios given by Blanche et al. (2006) and Pham (2012). On 
the other hand, the estimated farmers’ aggregated WTP exceeds the relatively low investment that 
implementing such conservation policy would actually cost. The DCE approach thus informs policy 
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makers about the relative support that each conservation strategy demands given the preferences of 
pollination-dependent crop farmers, who are ultimately the most directly concerned stakeholders. 
4.2.2 Mixed Logit (ML) and Generalized Mixed Logit (GMXL) models 
Narjes and Lippert (2016) fitted a mixed logit (ML) model that also allowed determining significant 
dispersions around the mean preferences, which they further explained with idiosyncratic factors such as 
the respondents’ gender and attitude towards native bees.  
However, the ML model has recently come under criticism for neglecting the fact that choice behavior 
may be more random for some respondents than for others (i.e., respondent-specific heteroscedastic 
errors). In other words, the heterogeneity in the preference for a single conservation policy attribute may 
actually (or partly) result from a scale effect, i.e., all attribute weights are scaled up or down 
proportionately across individuals (Louviere et al. 2002; Fiebig et al. 2010). Ignoring such a source of 
variation (i.e., confounding heteroscedasticity with preference heterogeneity) may result in biased 
estimates and thus lead to erroneous interpretation and policy conclusions (Scarpa et al. 2008). The ML 
model indeed accommodates heterogeneous scaling when all parameters are specified to be random and 
their corresponding errors are allowed to correlate (Rose et al. 2013). Nevertheless, a common practice to 
obtain WTP estimates in the ML context is to estimate a non-random cost coefficient (cf. Eq. 4.3 below). 
With the strong assumption of a homogeneous cost parameter, the researcher is implicitly assuming 
homogeneous scaling over the population; this would lead to biased estimates (i.e., from confounding 
scale and preference heterogeneity) in the likely case that either the true scale or cost parameters were 
indeed random (ibid).  
Fiebig et al. (2010) propose tackling this issue with the generalized mixed logit (GMXL) model, which 
explicitly specifies a scale parameter and thereby can disentangle the sources of preference heterogeneity 
into randomness in the attribute coefficients and randomness in the overall scale of utility.  
To comprehend the scale parameter, one has to first formulate an individual farmer’s behavioral choice 
rule from the researcher’s perspective. The researcher only controls 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the “representative” portion of the 
indirect utility 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  that a farmer 𝑖𝑖 derives from a conservation policy alternative 𝑗𝑗 (𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽), while 
the unobserved random “residual” term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  remains exclusively known to the farmer (Thurstone 1927; 
Marschak 1960). Assuming that 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is linear additive in the conservation policy attributes 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and their 
corresponding taste-weights 𝛽𝛽 (henceforth referred to as part-worths), as given by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ =
𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , a utility maximizing farmer would choose the alternative ℎ with superior utility from a given 
set of J conservation policy alternatives. Modeling this choice decision requires knowing the density of the 
unobserved residuals 𝑓𝑓�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ �, which for the standard logit model are assumed to be distributed 
independently and identically (IID), following an extreme value type 1 (EV1) distribution that exhibits 
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𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ � = 𝜎𝜎2(𝜋𝜋2 6⁄ ) (cf. Section 1.4.3.1). Thereby, the parameter 𝜎𝜎 becomes a scale parameter of the 
underlying standard EV1 distribution and is therefore often referred to as the scale of utility in the choice 
analysis literature. Normalizing the residual variance to that of a known theoretical distribution requires a 
standardization of the utility expression, i.e., moving the unknown scale factor to divide the representative 
utility 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The standardized utility  
                                                              𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎⁄ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝛽𝛽′ 𝜎𝜎⁄ )𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                           (4.1) 
therefore results from 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ 𝜎𝜎⁄  and has 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ 𝜎𝜎⁄ � = 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝜋𝜋2 6⁄ . From this transformation, 
the likelihood of the choice outcome described above can be expressed as the standard logit choice 
probability: 
                                                             𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖ℎ = exp (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝜎𝜎⁄ ) ∑ exp (𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎⁄ )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1�  .                                  (4.2) 
The variance of the unobserved residuals is definitionally linked to the implicit scale of utility. In fact, the 
standard logit model is usually modeled in its scaled form, resulting in part-worth estimates 𝛽𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝛽 𝜎𝜎⁄  that 
are not separately identifiable from scale (Train, 2009). Nonetheless, given the general IID assumption 
(i.e., 𝜎𝜎 is constant in the population) one can implicitly cancel out scale by dividing the part-worths of any 
two attributes 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾. Such coefficient ratios are calculated to, e.g., obtain marginal WTP estimates, 
as 
                                                                         𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 = −𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝜎𝜎⁄𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎⁄ = −𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 ,                                               (4.3) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 weights the attribute related to the costs of implementing the conservation policy.  
The unobserved utility variance can be accounted for by explicitly parameterizing the standardization step 
described above as the factor 𝜆𝜆 = 1 𝜎𝜎⁄  that scales the vector of part-worths, i.e., 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Thereby, it also becomes apparent that, for standard logit, the scale parameter 𝜆𝜆 equals unity. (Train, 
2009; Fiebig et al. 2010; Hensher and Greene 2015). Intuitively, 𝜆𝜆 is the weight that the respondents 
(equally) place on the utility they derive from 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, relative to the residual utility they derive from 
unobserved factors that contributed to their choice. In other words, the larger the parameter 𝜆𝜆, the smaller 
must be 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ �.  
In reality, the residual variance may differ for different decision makers, i.e., 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ � = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2(𝜋𝜋2 6⁄ ), 
resulting in a heteroskedastic scale that is strictly inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the 
residuals 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ . The GMXL specification handles the complexity that arises when simultaneously 
contemplating heterogeneity in scale and in the part-worths (Fiebig et al. 2010). It maintains the IID 
assumption for the residual term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, yet assigns part of the unobserved heterogeneity to the scale and part 
to the part-worths (respectively subscripted to each individual as 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖), as follows: 
                                                      𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖[𝛽𝛽 + ∆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖] + [𝛾𝛾 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝛾)]𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1] .                      (4.4) 
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Here 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 are observed individual-specific characteristics (indicating, e.g., whether the respondent believes 
she has experienced native bee pollination deficits) that induce heterogeneity in the part-worth mean, and 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 embodies 𝑖𝑖-specific (unobserved) deviations from the mean 𝛽𝛽 (thus capturing part-worth 
heterogeneity42). Some 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 may only present unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., homogeneous parameter 
means), in which cases the vector ∆ is set to zero. The vector 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 can take any distributional form, but in 
this study it is assumed to be multivariate normal. The extent to which the standard deviation of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 
depends on the scaling of 𝛽𝛽 is controlled by the parameter 𝛾𝛾. As such, setting 𝛾𝛾 = 1 results in GMXL I, a 
special case of GMXL that assumes that (𝛽𝛽 + ∆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) is independently scaled from the standard deviation of 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, whereas 𝛾𝛾 = 0 (GMXL II) imposes proportional scaling for both the part-worth means and their 
variances43 (Fiebig et al. 2010). 
Scale heterogeneity, on the other hand, may be expressed as a function of measurable individual-specific 
variables 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 (indicating, e.g., whether the respondent keeps bees on his farm or not) as follows: 
                                                       𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒�?̅?𝜆 + 𝛿𝛿′𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖�, 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 ~ 𝑁𝑁(0,1) ,                                  (4.5) 
where ?̅?𝜆 and 𝜏𝜏 respectively denote a mean parameter and standard deviation of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖 represents 
standard normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity. While the exponential form restricts 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 to being 
positive, its expected value must be normalized to 1 to identify 𝛽𝛽 as the mean vector of utility weights: 
given that 𝐸𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖] = exp(?̅?𝜆 + 𝜏𝜏2 2⁄ ), we set ?̅?𝜆 = −𝜏𝜏2 2⁄ . This results in scale heterogeneity 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 that is ~ 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(1, 𝜏𝜏2). We thus estimate the parameters that describe the variance of scale and not 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 itself (Fiebig 
et al. 2010). 
The GMXL choice probabilities are conditioned on the unobserved 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖. The analytical estimation of 
such a model would imply solving Eq. 4.2 in a multiple integral that does not have a closed form and 
therefore must be approximated through computational simulation. Indicating with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 1 policy 𝑗𝑗 
chosen by farmer 𝑖𝑖 in choice situation 𝑡𝑡, and with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 0 the alternatives not chosen, the simulated 
probability 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖 of observing farmer 𝑖𝑖 making a sequence of choices �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝑛𝑛=1
𝑇𝑇  is obtained as follows: 
                                                     𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑅𝑅 ∑ ∏ ∏ �𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗�𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛), 𝜀𝜀0𝑟𝑟, 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟=1  .                                  (4.6) 
Here, the term 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗�𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛), 𝜀𝜀0𝑟𝑟, 𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟� results from inserting (4.4) and (4.5) into the logit formula (4.2) and is 
solved for 𝑅𝑅 random draws {𝜀𝜀0𝑟𝑟,𝜂𝜂𝑟𝑟} that are sampled from the distributions underlying 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖. This 
simulation is made iteratively for different population moments of the assumed distributions (i.e., mean 
and variance-covariance of 𝛽𝛽, collectively denoted as 𝜃𝜃) and inserted into the log-likelihood function for 
                                                     
 
42 In this study, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 were allowed to induce correlation in the random coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖. 
43 GMXL I (𝛾𝛾 = 1): 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽 + ∆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ; GMXL II  (𝛾𝛾 = 0): 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽 + ∆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖). 
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all 𝑛𝑛 farmers. The model estimation consists of finding the parameters 𝜃𝜃 that maximize the simulated log-
likelihood function (Train 2009; Fiebig et al. 2010). 
The GMXL II case offers a framework that handles the challenges resulting from estimating WTP as the 
ratio of two random part-worths (e.g., the moments of the WTP ratio distribution are undefined). We may 
first rewrite utility as separable in the monetary attribute 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and the non-monetary attributes 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 contains all elements of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 except 𝑥𝑥1, the cost 
attribute, and 𝑘𝑘 = 2, … ,𝐾𝐾. Assuming that the cost’s preference heterogeneity is entirely captured by the 
scale parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 (i.e., by setting 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 to one and its corresponding row in 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 to zero), utility can be re-
formulated into the following equivalent specification (referred to in the literature as WTP space44):  
                              𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + (1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐⁄ )𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  .        (4.7)   
The random marginal WTP estimates 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 are directly estimated and independent of scale, while the scaled 
monetary part-worth 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒� ?̅?𝜆 + 𝛿𝛿′𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝜀𝜀0𝑖𝑖� is estimated by relaxing the −𝜏𝜏2 2⁄  restriction on ?̅?𝜆 
(Train and Weeks 2005; Fiebig et al. 2010; Greene and Hensher 2010; Hensher and Greene 2011).   
4.2.3 Hypotheses underlying this study 
In this study, we contemplate heterogeneity in farmers’ choice behavior regarding alternative interventions 
to conserve native bees, which should be reflected in part-worth and scale standard deviations that are 
significantly different from zero. We thus postulate:  
H3.1: There is significant part-worth heterogeneity, i.e., 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) ≠ 0 (cf. Eq. 4.4) and 
H3.2: There is significant heterogeneity in scale, i.e., 𝜏𝜏 ≠ 0 (cf. Eq. 4.5).  
We further hypothesize that such heterogeneity is partly explained by selected idiosyncratic variables that 
enter the part-worth and scale specifications as the vectors 𝐳𝐳𝑖𝑖 and 𝐠𝐠𝑖𝑖, and therefore we also postulate H4:  ∆≠ 0 and H5: 𝛿𝛿 ≠ 0 as follows:  
H4.1: Farmers who are beekeepers have higher preferences for the conservation of native bees.  
H4.2: Whether founded in evidence or not, the notion of a possible pollination deficit attributed by 
concerned farmers to native bee population declines may also have a positive effect on farmers’ value 
perceptions.  
H4.3: There are regional differences (i.e., between the two sampled provinces) in the preferences of 
farmers for the proposed conservation measures.  
H5.1: The presence of scale heterogeneity partly results from a subsample of respondents, who ascribe 
past pollination deficits to native bee population declines, applying a higher weight on the explained utility 
                                                     
 
44 Model specifications of this type owe their name to the distributions (e.g. normal or log-normal), which are 
assumed for the WTP measures that can thus be directly estimated. In contrast, when these distributions are 
assumed for the estimation of random part-worths 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, the model is said to be specified in preference space. 
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𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 than the others. In other words, we hypothesize that the choice behavior is more consistent among 
farmers whose memory of past pollination deficits may have imparted them greater preference consensus.  
H5.2: There are differences, between both sampled regions, in the relative importance that farmers place 
on the unobserved factors that contributed to their choices (i.e., 𝐸𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖]𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝐸𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖]𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).  
Similarly, scale heterogeneity may be also attributed to:  
H5.3: Gender differences and  
H5.4: A subsample of farmers who allow someone else’s bee hives on their farms and/or are beekeepers 
themselves. Such direct exposure to honeybees in an agro-ecosystem may sensitize farmers about the 
importance of conserving native bees and their habitats and/or lead to more informed and thus consistent 
choices. 
Although our analyses address farmers’ perceptions, we would like to stress that the notion of a past 
pollination deficit attributed to declines in the population of native bees may be more justified for farmers 
in Chanthaburi than in Chiang Mai: there is scientific and anecdotal evidence indicating that an actual 
crop-pollination crisis took place in the former (cf. Section 4.1.1), whereas no such evidence has been 
reported for the latter. Moreover, we hypothesize that  
H6: Compared to Chanthaburi farmers, Chiang Mai farmers are more likely to engage in activities 
involving bees manly for the direct economic benefits from the hive (e.g., honey), rather than to 
supplement their crops’ pollination. 
4.2.4 Experimental design and survey 
This study analyses the datasets resulting from two separate discrete choice experiments (DCEs). A 
conditional logit model fitted on the data of the first DCE45 delivered the prior parameter estimates that 
were assumed for the efficient design (Chaloner and Verdinelli 1995) underlying the second DCE. The 
latter was then conducted in November 2013 with 127 farmers in Chanthaburi province (Eastern 
Thailand). We interviewed 90 respondents in four villages of Makham district, while the remaining 37 
were questioned in two villages of Khao Khitchakut province (Figure 4.1).  
In January 2016, the database of the Thai Department of Agricultural Extension (DoAE) registered 3,369 
households in Makham, who together farm ~4,380 ha of rambutan, the largest extension of land dedicated 
to this fruit’s cultivation in a single district of Chanthaburi. The same database registered 1,456 farmers in 
Khao Khitchakut, who in total cultivate ~1,169 ha of rambutan, rendering this district Chanthaburi’s third 
largest rambutan producer.  
                                                     
 
45 The first DCE was conducted with 198 randomly selected individuals from 10 villages in Chiang Mai province 
(Northern Thailand) in June 2013, as described in Narjes and Lippert (2016). 
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In contrast to the first DCE, a random procedure was not applied to the selection of the Chanthaburi 
sample. The villages were mandatorily assigned by the provincial administration, and all of the village 
heads insisted on providing their own selection of respondents. A selection bias may thus affect the 
representativeness of the results obtained from this dataset. 
 
Figure 4.1. Research area in Chanthaburi. Source: Own representation using vector data from the DCW 
and GADM databases (DIVA-GIS, 2014). 
In twelve different choice occasions, each respondent had to choose one of three alternative scenarios. 
Each alternative was described by five attributes, namely the three adaptive management techniques we 
selected from the IPI-POA toolkit, their potential impact on the local population of native bees, and a 
single advance contribution to cover their combined implementation costs (cf. Section 4.1.2). 
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Table 4.1. Choice alternative attributes, corresponding design levels and other variable definitions  
Definition Levels coding variable name 
Bee conservation policy attributes (variables appearing in choice sets) 
Bee-friendly pest control no a), yes dummy PEST 
Improving native bee habitat no a), yes dummy HAB 
Native bee husbandry no a), yes dummy BEEKP 
Changes in native bee population (%) −50 a), 0, +50 2 dummies NB_DEC (−50%),  NB_INC (+50%) 
Policy implementation costs (THB) b) 0 a), 250, 500, 750 continuous COSTS 
Idiosyncratic variables 
Beekeeper (own bees) dummy BEEKEEPER 
Keeps bees on her farm (own bees or someone else’s)  dummy BEE_FARM 
Engages in at least one of the following activities: beekeeping, hunting for wild bee 
honey or charging a fee to allow someone else’s bees to forage on her farm  dummy ECON_BEE 
Rated native bees’ effect on her crop yields as good or excellent dummy POS_BEE 
Believes he has experienced a native bee-pollination shortage dummy POLL_DEC 
Farmer in Chanthaburi  dummy CHB 
Male respondent  dummy MALE 
a) Attributes fixed at these levels for the status quo alternative. b) The cost attribute represents a one-time fee that the farming 
households would pay to the local authorities for the implementation of the chosen policy alternative. €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht 
(THB), as of June 1, 2013.  
Two of the alternatives, generically named “Policy A” and “Policy B”, varied throughout the twelve 
choice sets by manifesting different attribute levels (Table 4.1), thus presenting different hypothetical 
scenarios of conservation policy implementation. These scenarios were associated with the full range of 
native bee population changes (i.e., −50, 0, +50) and were contrasted with an unvarying hypothetical 
status quo alternative, which described the absence of any conservation strategy (i.e., at zero cost) that 
would lead to a decline of half of the local native bees. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive data suggest important differences in the socio-demographics and farming practices of the 
Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi samples. Table 4.2 describes and compares these farming communities with 
selected variables, some of which we used to explain heterogeneity in part-worths and scale.  
It becomes evident that agriculture plays a more important economic role among the surveyed households 
of Chanthaburi than it does in the longan farming population of Chiang Mai: with a 92% share derived 
from agriculture, Chanthaburi farmers earn 42% higher net incomes than the latter. Household incomes of 
Chiang Mai longan farms, on the other hand, consist mainly in off-farm earnings, i.e., 70% of net income.  
Notably, the function of native bees as crop pollinators (POS_BEE) was more emphatically acknowledged 
by the respondents in Chanthaburi, who also present a significantly higher engagement in beekeeping 
activities (BEEKEEPER and BEE_FARM) than longan farmers in Chiang Mai. Moreover, being a 
Chanthaburi beekeeper is significantly related to POLL_DEC, the notion of a past crop pollination deficit 
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that the farmer attributes to local native bee declines [𝜒𝜒2(1) = 4.88, p=0.027; tetrachoric correlation: 𝜌𝜌 = 
0.308, SE = 0.132, p<0.05]. Such association could not be determined for the Chiang Mai sample, where 
beekeeping is thus more likely to be practiced only for its direct benefits. 
Table 4.2. Sample characteristics based on respondents’ per-household values, 2013  
 Chiang Mai a) Chanthaburi b) 
Variable Mean  (SD) Mean  (SD) 
Age (years) 55.76 (11.98) 44.89 *** g) (12.36) 
Cultivated acreage (rai) c)    
Longan  5.92 (6.09) 7.47 (5.82) 
Rambutan  - 9.54 (9.97) 
Durian  - 9.31 (9.65) 
Total cultivated acreage (rai) c) 7.15 (7.49) 25.42 *** g) (21.10) 
Net annual agricultural income (THB) d) 76,415 (96,822) 334,543 *** g) (361,809) 
Net total annual income (THB) d) 255,005 (654,567) 362,861 (367,551) 
 Variable name Sample shares (%) 
Male MALE 58.59 49.61 
Main occupation: self-employed in agriculture  - 85.35 99.21 *** h) 
Longan farmers i) [Total cultivated area (rai)] - 100.00 [1172.7] 13.39 [127.0] 
Rambutan farmers i) [Total cultivated area (rai)] - 0.00 [0.0] 70.87 [859.0] 
Durian farmers i) [Total cultivated area (rai)] - 0.00 [0.0] 88.19 [1043.2] 
Keep bees on their farm e) BEE_FARM 38.89 62.99 *** h) 
 Their own BEEKEEPER 15.66 59.84 *** h) 
 Someone else’s - 28.79 9.45 *** h) 
Honey hunters f) - 20.71 29.13 
Engage in at least one of the above bee-related 
activities ECON_BEE 50.00 72.44 *** 
h) 
Completed only six years of primary school [no 
formal education] 
- 71.72 55.91 *** h) 
- [5.56] [1.57] 
Rated native bees’ effect on their crop yields as 
good or excellent POS_BEE 87.37 96.06 ** 
h) 
Self-assessed knowledge regarding pollination 
before the survey: rated at least basic or [high] 
- 90.40 94.49 
- [7.58] [24.41] *** h) 
Blame past yield declines on bee pollination 
deficits 
POLL_DEC 38.38 47.24 
a) n = 198 respondents. b) n = 127 respondents. c) 1 rai = 0.16 ha. d) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. e) A. 
mellifera or native bees (i.e., A. cerana and/or stingless bee spp.). f) Harvesting honey from wild bees in the forest. Significantly 
different from Chiang Mai sample with *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 and *** p<0.001. g) F-test. h) Chi-squared test of independence. i) 
Cultivates at least (not exclusively) 1 ngan (0.25 rai) of specified crop. Source: own calculation. 
Also worth mentioning is the significant relationship between education and self-assessed knowledge 
regarding pollination [𝜒𝜒2(10) = 21.62, p<0.05] in the pooled dataset, where 171 respondents fell into the 
category of having acquired primary school education and having rated their pollination knowledge as 
basic. The independence of these categories could nevertheless not be rejected within the separate 
datasets, suggesting that their significant association in the pooled data results from a regional effect that 
may be explained with, e.g., the higher education level and higher pollination awareness in Chanthaburi. 
In fact, several initiatives supporting the research and development of native beekeeping have been hosted 
in Chanthaburi, including the Provincial Agricultural Occupation Promotion and Development Center 
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(Bee) of the DoAE, the Royal Development Study Center in Kung Krabaen bay (Figure 4.1) and a project 
sponsored by H.R.H. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn in Makham district that trained local farmers on 
how to produce wooden stingless bee hive boxes (Chuttong et al. 2014; DoAE 2016; MoAC 2016; RDPB 
2016).  
4.3.2 Identifying sources of preference and overall scale heterogeneity 
We used NLOGIT 5/LIMDEP 10 software to examine sources of choice heterogeneity with the ML and 
GMXL models. The GMXL I form is assumed in the analyses of this section to induce covariance in the 
vector of mean part-worths while allowing for independent standard deviations, thereby reducing the 
confounding46 of scale and part-worth heterogeneities. We relied on the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC)47 to indicate which model offers a better fit and is thus preferred. Herewith, a lower BIC from an 
ML model would suggest that choice heterogeneity is better explained by randomness in the part-worths 
alone. Conversely, preferring a GMXL could indicate a non-negligible contribution of scale variance to 
choice heterogeneity. The Akaike information criterion (AIC), on the other hand, guided the choice 
between variations of models that resulted from explaining heterogeneity in the part-worth means with 
idiosyncratic variables; the large number of parameters that is necessary to capture complex choice 
behavior with these models (e.g., error correlations) would otherwise be heavily penalized by BIC (Fiebig 
et al. 2010).  
Our first analysis consists of fitting a GMXL model to the Chiang Mai dataset to determine whether scale 
heterogeneity is present. To this end, we fitted several versions of this model approach, i.e., capturing 
scale and part-worth heterogeneity with different idiosyncratic characteristics. Table 4.3 reports the model 
results for the versions that minimized the BIC and AIC, which are to be compared with the ML models 
estimated by Narjes and Lippert (2016). For reference purposes, we also fitted a baseline ML without 
interaction terms in the mean part-worths to keep it at the minimum necessary number of parameters. In 
this way we produced a model with random part-worths (i.e., the full parameter vector) and correlated 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 
(M1). Model M2 is a GMXL that captures unexplained scale and random part-worths heterogeneity, while 
Models M3 and M4 partly explain scale heterogeneity with either of two dummies that indicate whether 
                                                     
 
46 For a more detailed discussion of this issue refer to Hess and Rose (2012).  
47 For N choice observations and K parameters BIC = −2 ln 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐾𝐾 ln𝑁𝑁, where L is the maximized value of the 
likelihood function. For 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 8, BIC tends to choose models that are more parsimonious than those favored by the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC = −2 ln 𝐿𝐿 + 2𝐾𝐾), as it imposes a larger penalty on the added parameters 
(Neath and Cavanaugh 2012). Between two candidate models, a ∆BIC > 2 is considered sufficient evidence to 
choose the model with the lower BIC (Kass and Raftery 1995). Given the few additional GMXL parameters, 
Fiebig et al. (2010) conclude that the BIC is the most reliable criterion to indicate whether scale heterogeneity is 
present or not. 
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the respondents i) believe they experienced a native bee-pollination shortage (POLL_DEC) or ii) keep 
their own or someone else’s bees on their farm (BEE_FARM). Model M5 further explains heterogeneity 
in the part-worth means of BEEKP and NB_INC; the former with a dummy that indicates whether the 
farmer is a beekeeper (BEEKEEPER) and the latter with a dummy (ECON_BEE) indicating whether the 
household engages in at least one of three economic activities involving bees, i.e., beekeeping, hunting for 
wild bee honey and/or charging other beekeepers a fee to let their colonies forage longan nectar on their 
farms. This latter model resulted from a stepwise backward elimination derived from the “All-parameters-
random” model reported by Narjes and Lippert (2016).  
According to the obtained BICs, models M2, M4 and M5 are superior to M1 and to the ML model by 
Narjes and Lippert (2016), i.e., a significant amount of heterogeneity can be attributed to scale differences. 
Furthermore, the negative coefficient in POLL_DEC (M4 and M5) suggests a reduced scale 
(corresponding to a higher 𝜎𝜎) among those farmers who stated that they had experienced a pollination 
deficit, which can be ascribed to the relatively higher contribution of unobserved factors to the utility they 
realized from their choices, i.e., a larger variance in residuals. Moreover, a reduced scale could also be 
significantly traced back to farmers keeping bees on their farms (M3) and to farmers’ increasing age 
[model not reported: 𝜏𝜏 =0.95487 (p<0.001) and 𝛿𝛿 = −0.00613 (p<0.01); 𝜒𝜒2(27)=1645.20, p=0.00; 
BIC/N=1.326; AIC/N=1.256]. No important BIC difference between models M4 and M5 was found, yet 
AIC prefers the latter, indicating a model fit improvement from adding interaction terms that explain the 
means of BEEKP and NB_INC. 
We also looked for sources of heterogeneity in the Chanthaburi dataset. The results are presented in Table 
4.4 and hint at a significantly (yet not very) heterogeneous scale (M7) that a further model (M8) explained 
with a dummy indicating gender (MALE), according to which male respondents would have made fewer 
random choices. These results notwithstanding, M6 (the baseline ML model) was preferred by BIC (yet 
not by AIC), signaling that the heterogeneous choice behavior in Chanthaburi is better explained by solely 
capturing it with the random part-worths. Table 4.4 also reports a GMXL model (M9) that looks for 
heteroscedasticity that may result from pooling the Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi datasets. To this end, we 
defined a dummy indicative of Chanthaburi respondents (CHB) to capture possible scale effects resulting 
from differences in the underlying experimental design and/or in the regions. A further model, where CHB 
was specified to capture heterogeneity in both scale and the part-worth means, resulted in a non-significant 
effect of CHB on scale [model not reported: 𝜏𝜏 =0.56502 (p<0.001) and 𝛿𝛿 = −0.02011 (p=0.79); 
𝜒𝜒2(30)=2438.00, p=0.00; BIC/N=1.339; AIC/N=1.288]. We thus compared M9 to a model in which CHB 
only has an effect on the part-worth means of the conservation policy attributes (M10), resulting in the 
latter being preferred by BIC and AIC in spite of its greater number of parameters. 
We also tested whether POLL_DEC can capture part of the part-worth heterogeneity in the Chanthaburi 
dataset, an effect that for Chiang Mai had already been discarded following a stepwise approach by Narjes 
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and Lippert (2016). A positive yet statistically (not quite) significant effect was detected for the 
POLL_DEC×BEEKP interaction [model not reported: 𝛽𝛽 =0.798 (p<0.01) and Δ =0.484 (p=0.057); 
K=28; 𝜒𝜒2(26)=827.00, p=0.00; BIC/N=1.439; AIC/N=1.341]. This result suggests that those farmers in 
Chanthaburi who believe having experienced a bee-mediated pollination deficit value the beekeeping 
measure more than the others. 
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Table 4.3. Mixed and generalized mixed logit (𝜸𝜸 fixed at 1) models fitted on Chiang Mai dataset 
M1: ML M2: GMXL M3: GMXL M4: GMXL M5: GMXL 
Variable Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) 
PEST Mean 1.29287 *** (0.2122) 1.56450 *** (0.2913) 1.56653 *** (0.2925) 1.55832 *** (0.2764) 1.45318 *** (0.2402) 
SD 1.48343 *** (0.2501) 1.79170 *** (0.2714) 1.80074 *** (0.2765) 1.66477 *** (0.2613) 1.41726 *** (0.2125) 
HAB Mean 1.28213 *** (0.1566) 1.45823 *** (0.2239) 1.46612 *** (0.2256) 1.50250 *** (0.2183) 1.47212 *** (0.1909) 
SD 0.55993 * (0.2835) 1.35947 *** (0.1709) 1.38437 *** (0.1712) 1.03063 *** (0.2061) 0.39712 * (0.1752) 
BEEKP Mean 0.84121 *** (0.1453) 1.02148 *** (0.1965) 1.03325 *** (0.1972) 1.03743 *** (0.1855) 0.85419 *** (0.1870) 
SD 1.31470 *** (0.1753) 1.67182 *** (0.1721) 1.66406 *** (0.1675) 1.68863 *** (0.2391) 1.61024 *** (0.1508) 
NB_DEC Mean −5.23836 *** (0.4294) −7.30680 *** (0.6523) −7.34405 *** (0.6569) −7.02944 *** (0.6309) −6.39451 *** (0.5266) 
SD 2.73449 *** (0.4493) 1.89658 *** (0.5036) 1.84724 *** (0.5163) 1.80021 *** (0.4363) 1.65209 *** (0.3225) 
NB_INC Mean 3.26981 *** (0.2945) 4.19878 *** (0.4282) 4.24664 *** (0.4324) 4.19584 *** (0.4067) 3.39856 *** (0.4108) 
SD 2.01934 *** (0.3018) 2.58636 *** (0.3661) 2.54772 *** (0.3668) 2.14896 *** (0.3657) 1.85950 *** (0.2556) 
COSTS (THB) Mean −0.00448 *** (0.0004) −0.00582 *** (0.0006) −0.00581 *** (0.0006) −0.00569 *** (0.0006) −0.00503 *** (0.0006) 
SD 0.00320 *** (0.0003) 0.00383 *** (0.0005) 0.00388 *** (0.0005) 0.00329 *** (0.0007) 0.00383 *** (0.0005) 
Heterogeneity in random parameter mean (Δ) 
BEEKEEPER (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): BEEKP - - - - 1.03810 ** (0.3474) 
ECON_BEE (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): NB_INC - - - - 1.42583 ** (0.4419) 
Parameters in scale: (𝜏𝜏) - 0.70201 *** (0.0239) 0.75972 *** (0.0345) 0.73007 *** (0.0301) 0.64482 *** (0.0296) 
BEE_FARM (𝛿𝛿) - - −0.22921 *** (0.0570) - - 
POLL_DEC (𝛿𝛿) - - - −0.40490 *** (0.0632) −0.38335 *** (0.0763) 
Log-Likelihood (LL) b) −1470.4834 −1462.9989 −1462.1765 −1454.0544 −1446.7320 
Parameters (K) 27 28 29 29 31 
BIC/N; [AIC/N] b) 1.326 [1.261] 1.323 [1.255] 1.326 [1.255] 1.319 [1.248] 1.319 [1.244] 
Adjusted [McFadden] R2 d) 0.353 [0.357] 0.356 [0.360] 0.356 [0.360] 0.360 [0.364] 0.363 [0.367] 
LRT c) d) (df) 𝜒𝜒2  (25) 1629.4328 *** (26) 1644.4018 *** (27) 1646.0464 *** (27) 1662.2907 *** (29) 1676.9355 ***
Refer to Table 4.1 for variable definitions. N = 2376 choice observations from 198 respondents. a) Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. b) Compare to “all-
parameters-random model” (Narjes and Lippert 2016; Chapter 3, Table 3.3): K = 32, LL = −1455.6685, BIC/N = 1.330, AIC/N =1.252. c) Likelihood ratio test. d) Based on the LL 
function of a restricted model with two intercepts only, i.e., choice probabilities set at each alternative's sample shares. Source: own calculation. 
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Table 4.4. Mixed (ML) and generalized mixed logit (GMXL; 𝜸𝜸 fixed at 1) models fitted on Chanthaburi dataset and GMXL fitted on pooled data 
M6: ML Chanthaburi d) M7: GMXL Chanthaburi d) M8: GMXL Chanthaburi d) M9: GMXL pooled data e) M10: GMXL pooled data e) 
Variable Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) Coefficient a) (SE) 
PEST Mean 1.21990 *** (0.1740) 1.06637 *** (0.1717) 1.07457 *** (0.1826) 1.19755 *** (0.1607) 1.17471 *** (0.1528) 
SD 1.65001 *** (0.1960) 1.54174 *** (0.1768) 1.55720 *** (0.1810) 1.52034 *** (0.1390) 1.58054 *** (0.1436) 
HAB Mean 1.74206 *** (0.2802) 1.69797 *** (0.2787) 1.63901 *** (0.2953) 1.25031 *** (0.1483) 1.16678 *** (0.1540) 
SD 1.49563 *** (0.2689) 1.24242 *** (0.3125) 1.21620 *** (0.3013) 1.06475 *** (0.1443) 1.04974 *** (0.1507) 
BEEKP Mean 1.04907 *** (0.2254) 0.98355 *** (0.2208) 0.95039 *** (0.2307) 0.84325 *** (0.1346) 0.72991 *** (0.1362) 
SD 1.35912 *** (0.1892) 1.31533 *** (0.2061) 1.25279 *** (0.2064) 1.43884 *** (0.1225) 1.39975 *** (0.1180) 
NB_DEC Mean −2.66051 *** (0.3450) −3.02800 *** (0.4114) −2.89768 *** (0.3550) −5.47557 *** (0.4004) −5.97960 *** (0.4567) 
SD 1.42451 *** (0.3303) 1.73858 *** (0.4156) 0.90328 *** (0.3458) 1.47275 *** (0.4144) 1.42407 *** (0.2626) 
NB_INC Mean 2.04788 *** (0.2750) 2.17420 *** (0.2884) 2.30901 *** (0.3135) 3.30631 *** (0.2490) 3.35288 *** (0.2440) 
SD 1.49773 *** (0.2535) 1.63267 *** (0.3557) 1.48040 *** (0.4000) 1.35985 *** (0.3795) 1.72152 *** (0.2851) 
COSTS (THB) Mean −0.00232 *** (0.0004) −0.00241 *** (0.0004) −0.00253 *** (0.0004) −0.00413 *** (0.0004) −0.00411 *** (0.0003) 
SD 0.00238 *** (0.0004) 0.00260 *** (0.0004) 0.00235 *** (0.0005) 0.00291 *** (0.0003) 0.00311 *** (0.0003) 
Heterogeneity in random parameter mean (Δ) 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): HAB - - - - 1.09402 *** (0.2800) 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): BEEKP - - - - 0.79023 *** (0.2257) 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): NB_DEC - - - - 2.46479 *** (0.6103) 
Parameters in scale: (𝜏𝜏) - 0.15063 *** (0.0224) 0.23764 *** (0.0410) 0.53793 *** (0.0214) 0.56236 *** (0.0175) 
MALE (𝛿𝛿) - - 0.52483 *** (0.3321) - - 
CHB (𝛿𝛿) - - - 0.23674 *** (0.0574) - 
Log-Likelihood (LL) −995.5278 −996.2910 −993.1677 −2488.6325 −2478.7133 
Parameters (K) 27 28 29 29 31 
BIC/N; [AIC/N] d) e) 1.436 [1.342] 1.442 [1.344] 1.443 [1.341] 1.338 [1.291] 1.337 [1.287] 
Adjusted [McFadden] R2 c) 0.286 [0.293] 0.286 [0.292] 0.288 [0.294] 0.327 [0.325] 0.327 [0.330] 
LRT b) c) (df) 𝜒𝜒2  (25) 823.4394 *** (26) 821.9130 *** (27) 828.1596 *** (27) 2418.1554 *** (29) 2437.9939 ***
Refer to Table 4.1 for variable definitions. a) Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. b) Likelihood ratio test. c) Based on the LL function of a restricted model with 
two intercepts only, i.e., choice probabilities set at each alternative's sample shares. d) Chanthaburi dataset: N = 1524 choice observations from 127 respondents. e) Pooled data (Chiang 
Mai + Chanthaburi): N = 3900 choice observations from 325 respondents. Source: own calculation. 
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Table 4.5. Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Thai Baht (THB) for Chanthaburi, Chiang Mai and pooled datasets (costs parameter fixed at 1 with std. dev=0) 
M11: Chanthaburi M12: Chanthaburi M13: Chiang Mai g) M14: Chiang Mai g) M15: pooled data 
Variable WTP a) d) e) (SE) WTP a) d) f) (SE) WTP a) d) f) (SE) WTP a) d) f) (SE) WTP a) d) f) (SE) 
PEST Mean 529.865 *** (95.000) 419.899 *** (95.352) 133.412 (129.062) 290.413 *** (64.659) 348.093 *** (32.0257) 
SD 715.175 *** (136.342) 711.365 *** (110.390) 508.534 *** (59.150) 577.934 *** (66.669) 512.506 *** (31.8897) 
HAB Mean 793.349 *** (141.483) 775.677 *** (152.726) 154.559 (81.246) 308.232 *** (50.114) 355.655 *** (41.8384) 
SD 988.039 *** (199.768) 969.279 *** (199.156) 333.378 *** (37.925) 407.100 *** (43.884) 450.952 *** (31.8897) 
BEEKP Mean 461.883 *** (106.975) 413.929 *** (112.223) 177.437 *** (40.384) 163.212 *** (40.838) 216.880 *** (37.3998) 
SD 903.766 *** (174.903) 794.669 *** (139.960) 318.904 *** (42.389) 357.238 *** (45.014) 452.149 *** (33.7453) 
NB_DEC Mean −1380.110 *** (321.745) −1295.380 *** (295.193) −1247.970 *** (101.096) −1445.340 *** (118.190) −1305.450 *** (95.0837) 
SD 1017.920 *** (232.051) 581.134 ** (216.825) 515.354 *** (101.177) 548.637 *** (91.153) 629.691 *** (72.5263) 
NB_INC Mean 939.196 *** (122.856) 1004.630 *** (120.128) 687.127 *** (57.803) 705.825 *** (78.973) 898.402 *** (45.3727) 
SD 704.132 *** (157.857) 752.330 *** (191.536) 370.411 *** (62.697) 474.329 *** (81.126) 576.426 *** (57.2815) 
Heterogeneity in random parameter mean (ΔWTP) 
BEEKEEPER (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): BEEKP - - 186.413 * (80.179) 211.108 ** (81.798) - 
ECON_BEE (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): NB_INC - - 225.422 *** (66.393) 220.832 * (95.221) - 
POS_BEE (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): PEST - - 204.683 (126.191) - - 
POS_BEE (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): HAB - - 178.478 * (73.040) - - 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): HAB - - - - 356.052 *** (62.3030) 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): BEEKP - - - - 265.419 *** (54.2947) 
CHB (𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖): NB_DEC - - - - 350.696 ** (124.4221) 
Parameters in scale: (𝜏𝜏) - 0.25310 (0.316) 0.75980 *** (0.127) 0.61819 *** (0.115) 0.54113 *** (0.1067) 
MALE (𝛿𝛿) - 0.66499 (1.173) - - - 
POLL_DEC (𝛿𝛿) - - −0.29629 (0.290) −15.55560 (0.34×107) - 
CHB (𝛿𝛿) - - - - 0.32619 (0.1999) 
Log-Likelihood (LL) −1012.8470 −1015.5205 −1500.6317 −1495.6878 −2558.9053 
Parameters (K); Obs. [N] 21 [1524] 23 [1524] 27 [2376] 25 [2376] 26 [3900] 
BIC/N; [AIC/N] 1.430 [1.357] 1.443 [1.363] 1.351 [1.286] 1.341 [1.280] 1.367 [1.326] 
Adjusted [McFadden] R2 c) 0.275 [0.280] 0.273 [0.278] 0.340 [0.343] 0.342 [0.346] 0.306 [0.308] 
LRT b) c) (df) 𝜒𝜒2  (19) 788.8001 *** (21) 783.4539 *** (25) 1569.1360 *** (23) 1579.0240 *** (24) 2277.6098 ***
Refer to Table 4.1 for variable definitions. a) Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. b) Likelihood ratio test. c) Based on the LL function of a restricted model with 
two intercepts only, i.e., choice probabilities set at each alternative's sample shares. d) €1 = 39.3048 Thai baht (THB), as of June 1, 2013. e) WTP point estimates from ML with fixed 
costs (M6, Table 4.4). f) WTP space (𝜸𝜸 fixed at 0) models. g) Compare to “fixed-costs model” (Narjes and Lippert 2016; Chapter 3, Table 3.3): K = 25, LL = −1513.8718, BIC/N = 
1.356, AIC/N =1.295. Source: own calculation.
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4.3.3 Willingness to pay estimation 
The analyses in Section 4.3.2. helped us to disentangle the sources of heterogeneity in scale and random 
part-worths, thus guiding the WTP space specifications with 𝛾𝛾 fixed at 0 (i.e., GMXL II, according to Eq. 
4.7) for the models M12 through M15 presented in Table 4.5. We first juxtaposed point estimates (M11, 
obtained from assuming a homogeneous COSTS part-worth in M6) with WTP space estimates (M12, 
guided by the part-worth and scale treatments of M8) for Chanthaburi to check for consistency in the signs 
and orders of magnitude. Similarly, we estimated two WTP space models for Chiang Mai to compare with 
the WTP point estimates model by Narjes and Lippert (2016): the first model (M13) was specified 
analogously to this WTP point estimates model, while the second (M14) was guided by the specification 
in M5. Finally, we tested for significant differences in the WTP of respondents from both regions by 
fitting a WTP space model (M14) on the pooled data, in which CHB explains heterogeneity in the 
conservation policy part-worths and in scale (the latter to rule out any possible regional effect on 
heteroscedasticity).   
The estimates from M11 and M12 seem fairly robust, although PEST and BEEKP were 21% and 10.4% 
lower, respectively, in M12, which would thus render the WTP space estimates comparatively more 
conservative. Nevertheless, M11 was preferred by both information criteria, and the non-significant 𝜏𝜏 in 
M12 corroborates a negligible scale heterogeneity in the Chanthaburi dataset. A further model (with lower 
explanatory performance) suggested that, as in the case of Chiang Mai, Chanthaburi beekeepers have a 
higher preference for BEEKP than non-beekeepers, the mean WTP of the latter being not significantly 
different from zero [model not reported: Δ𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =THB359, p<0.01; K=22; 𝜒𝜒2(20)=785.73, p=0.00; 
BIC/N=1.437; AIC/N=1.360]. It is thus not surprising that the model without the BEEKEEPER×BEEKP 
term is preferred: the majority of respondents in Chanthaburi are beekeepers and therefore BEEKP 
suffices to capture the mean preference for the whole sample. Similarly, in another model, Chanthaburi 
farmers who present the POLL_DEC characteristic (regardless of being beekeepers or not) are WTP more 
than those who did not believe having experienced a native bee-pollination shortage [model not reported: 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃�������𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =THB251 (p=0.054) and Δ𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =THB237 (p=0.07); K=22; 𝜒𝜒2(20)=782.13, p=0.00; 
BIC/N=1.439; AIC/N=1.362]. 
Model M13 also yielded estimates slightly similar to those reported by Narjes and Lippert (2016), insofar 
as the mean WTP for PEST and HAB was not significantly different from zero. Additionally, the mean 
WTP for NB_INC and BEEKP, and the estimates for BEEKEEPER×BEEKP and ECON_BEE×NB_INC, 
were almost identical. The remaining estimates, nevertheless, differed greatly between the two models. On 
the other hand, M14 is preferred over both M13 and the point estimates model offered by Narjes and 
Lippert (2016) according to both information criteria. Moreover, the significant estimates for both of 
M14’s interaction terms give further evidence of these terms’ robustness. 
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The final comparison hints at significantly different preferences for conservation policy attributes between 
respondents of the two sampled locations. According to M15, Chiang Mai farmers were willing to pay 
~THB356 for the implementation of the native bee habitat measure, while Chanthaburi farmers were WTP 
an additional THB356. This difference is slightly smaller than the ~THB485 difference between the 
estimates corresponding to M11 and M14. On the other hand, the additional THB265 that, according to 
M15, Chanthaburi farmers are WTP for BEEKP is a result almost identical to the corresponding difference 
between M11 and M14, given that Chiang Mai farmers are willing to pay THB196 for BEEKP in average 
(weighted by the 0.16 share of those keeping their own bees, presented in Table 4.2).  
With regard to the remaining attributes (with the exception of NB_DEC), the estimates of M15 also 
resemble the differences between the estimates from M11 and M14, provided that the weights 
corresponding to the sample size and interaction term shares are correctly applied. These results also hint 
at the robustness of the WTP estimates from the selected models.  
The idiosyncratic effects that were significant on the scale (i.e., 𝛿𝛿) of the GMXL I models were not 
significant in all of the analogous WTP space (i.e., GMXL II) models. This may result from the fact that in 
GMXL II, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 not only weights the means of the random parameters (as in GMXL I), but also weights in 
equal proportion their corresponding standard deviations (cf. Eq. 4.4). 
4.4 Discussion 
We could not reject H3.1 as there was significant part-worth heterogeneity for all attributes in all reported 
models. The sources of farmers’ choice behavior heterogeneity are an important issue in this article, and 
thus it should be recalled that scale heteroscedasticity was especially relevant in the Chiang Mai dataset. 
The negative sign in the POLL_DEC coefficient (i.e., farmers who believe they experienced a bee-
mediated crop pollination decline, place a relatively higher weight on unobserved attributes when making 
their choices) nevertheless came up as a surprise: we expected these farmers to place a higher weight on 
conservation policy attributes. We thus keep H5.1 with an unanticipated negative sign. A possible 
interpretation of this counterintuitive result is that an important pollinator deficit has not yet been 
experienced (or perceived as such) among farmers in Chiang Mai and that POLL_DEC instead captured 
the random answers of respondents who did not fully understand the ecosystem service provided by the 
bees. In other words, farmers with a low understanding of and/or skepticism about the need for an 
intervention to conserve native pollinators may have introduced different subjective factors into their 
choices, thus contributing to an increased variability in the residuals; such farmers are also prone to 
misunderstanding the question captured by the dummy POLL_DEC, to which they may have randomly 
answered yes or no. Explaining scale differences may therefore point at a heterogeneous level of relevant 
knowledge (with respect to the importance of conserving the environmental good in question) or 
understanding of the DCE exercise on the part of the respondents. It may nevertheless also indicate that 
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some attributes that were relevant to the choice decisions of a group of respondents were ignored by the 
researcher.  
The supposition of a poor understanding of pollination services in Chiang Mai, relative to Chanthaburi, is 
supported by the descriptive statistics: the latter presents a significantly larger share of individuals that 
acknowledge the positive effect of native bees to crop pollination and with significantly higher self-
assessed knowledge regarding this ecosystem service (Table 4.2). Although not directly providing 
evidence to test H6, a further indication of a lower awareness for the importance of bee-mediated 
pollination in Chiang Mai is given by the fact that there is a higher engagement in beekeeping in 
Chanthaburi, which only in this province correlates with the notion of having experienced bee-mediated 
pollination shortages. Between the two provinces, Chiang Mai farmers are thus more likely to perceive 
hive products as the only benefits they derive from bees.  
Accounting for scale heterogeneity in the Chiang Mai dataset indeed resulted in a simpler model (with 
respect to the interactions in the part-worth means), suggesting that the models offered by Narjes and 
Lippert (2016) were over-parameterized in the part-worth vector and may have yielded slightly biased 
estimates. Farmers in Chanthaburi, on the other hand, seemed consistent in their choices (i.e., they placed 
a comparatively homogeneous weight on the policy attributes relative to the residual utility contributions), 
a behavior that could be attributed to a better understanding of the importance of conserving native 
pollinating bees. This reasoning is not farfetched considering the local evidence from actual past 
pollination deficits in Chanthaburi and the efforts that have been summoned to counteract such problems 
in this region. 
The positive effect that CHB has on scale when modeling the pooled data (M9) may lead to the conclusion 
that Chanthaburi farmers place a greater weight than Chiang Mai farmers do on the overall conservation 
policy relative to 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. This regional effect, nevertheless, is more dominant as an interaction term on the 
individual attributes (M10): Chanthaburi farmers placed a higher value on HAB and BEEKP than Chiang 
Mai farmers, while comparatively caring less about NB_DEC. The regional dummy thus affected the part-
worth means individually, rather than acting proportionally over all attributes, i.e., we keep H4.3. A non-
significant effect of CHB on scale implies that farmers in Chanthaburi and Chiang Mai have equal 𝐸𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖] 
and therefore, on average, value conservation policy attributes in similar proportions to 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We thus reject 
H5.2. On the other hand, such a proportion is random for Chiang Mai farmers (i.e., individual-specific 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, 
given the significant 𝜏𝜏 estimate of the preferred model M5), whereas Chanthaburi farmers exhibit constant 
𝜆𝜆 (see preferred Chanthaburi model M6), i.e., we keep H3.2 for Chiang Mai, yet reject it for Chanthaburi.   
As a consequence of discarding a regional effect on scale (according to the preferred model M10), we can 
also rule out any significant effect on scale from differences in the underlying experiments, which indeed 
were designed differently for both regions. Moreover, although an effect on scale could neither be rejected 
for BEE_FARM in Chiang Mai, nor for MALE in Chanthaburi (correspondingly Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, 
109 
 
 
 
and hypotheses H5.3 and H5.4), the addition of these parameters did not contribute to improvements in 
model performance. 
The comparatively lower WTP of Chanthaburi farmers to avoid a 50% decline in native bee populations 
(M15) may result from the locally widespread adoption of traditional beekeeping (predominantly stingless 
bee spp.) that has endowed their farms with crop pollination independence, which otherwise is primarily 
mediated by wild bees. In contrast, traditional beekeeping in Chiang Mai mostly relies on A. cerana bees 
that are baited into man-made hives from which they eventually abscond back into their natural habitat 
(i.e., unlike stingless bees, which, once captured, can be kept indefinitely in box hives). At any rate, being 
a beekeeper plays an important role in forming preferences for the implementation of a native bee 
husbandry measure. This is also true for Chanthaburi, if we take into account that most farmers there are 
also beekeepers and that in an unreported model (cf. Section 4.3.3), the WTP for BEEKP only came out as 
significant for those individuals who keep bees. This leads us to keep H4.1. However, that model is less 
preferred than M11 probably because most farmers (60%) in Chanthaburi are also beekeepers. 
Furthermore, the notion of a possible native bee-pollination shortage (POLL_DEC) had a positive, yet 
ambiguous effect on Chanthaburi’s farmers’ preference for BEEKP (i.e., the beekeeping measure), which 
may result from POLL_DEC being confounded with BEEKEEPER (i.e., being a beekeeper) in this 
province. No confident decision could thus be taken regarding H4.2. 
By all means, one should be careful with the interpretation of the WTP estimates for the percentage 
changes in the population of native bees, as these considerably exceed the highest implementation cost 
presented in the choice cards (i.e., THB750). One should also be wary not to infer about the entire 
population of targeted Chanthaburi farmers, considering that it was not possible to survey this population 
in a representative fashion. 
We would like to close this section by situating this study’s GMXL application in the context of following 
recent discussion: According to Hess and Train (2017), scale heterogeneity is a form of correlation in the 
part-worths that cannot be separately identified from other sources of heterogeneity. Furthermore, Hess 
and Rose (2012) already warned that models such as the GMXL, with which a number of authors try to 
disentangle scale heterogeneity from taste heterogeneity, maintain the scale/part-worth confounding and 
that the gain in model fit from those specifications results from allowing more flexible distributions.  
In line with their criticisms, these authors suggest that a RPL specification is sufficient for capturing all 
sources of correlation, including scale heterogeneity (Hess and Rose 2012; Hess and Train 2017). In fact, 
Hess and Train (2017) argue that GMXL is a restricted form of RPL, unless the part-worths in the latter 
are assumed to be uncorrelated, in which case they consider the embedding is reversed. They further 
acknowledge that, if correlation is allowed in a full vector of random part-worths, the GMXL can 
accommodate scale heterogeneity. Nonetheless, they maintain that modelling scale imposes a restriction 
relative to RPL, arguing that in doing so, the covariance matrix is being captured by a single (scale) 
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parameter, which draws on the argument that the heterogeneity from scale and from taste cannot be 
disentangled (ibid). 
Indeed, the GMXL models we fitted (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4) do not separately identify scale 
heterogeneity. Instead, the specification proposed by Fiebig et al. (2010) assumes a functional form for the 
distribution of the scale parameter, such that its expected value equals unity. Thereby, one identifies the 
parameters that describe such distribution as the coefficients to be estimated, instead of estimating the 
scale parameter itself (see Section 4.2.2). Furthermore, the special case of GMXL that we applied (i.e., 
GMXL I, cf. Equation 4.4 and setting 𝛾𝛾 = 1) assigns heterogeneity to taste (through 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, which captures 
independent unobserved deviations from the mean part-worth vector), separately from the heterogeneity 
that enters the model as correlation in the part-worth vector [𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽 + Δ𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖)], i.e., through the random scale 
parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖. Having additionally allowed all part-worths to be correlated, our GMXL model 
specifications produced parameter estimates that separately described the distributions assumed for the 
part-worth vector (i.e., multivariate normal) and for the scale parameter (i.e., lognormal with 𝐸𝐸[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖] = 1). 
The question nevertheless remains as to whether the improved goodness of fit in several of the estimated 
GMXL models (according to e.g., AIC and BIC) resulted from assuming a mixture of distributions that is 
more flexible than that assumed for the RPL models (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  
As for the WTP space estimation (see Equation 4.7), Hess and Train (2017) affirm that such models allow 
for all sources of correlation as long as the price effect enters linearly the underlying utility specification, 
which is the case in our WTP analyses (see Table 4.5). 
4.5 Conclusions 
From the above analyses, we can dismiss the null hypotheses of homogeneous choice behavior between 
and within Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi farmers regarding alternative native bee conservation policies. 
We further conclude with confidence that such heterogeneous choices can be partly explained by the 
influence of observed idiosyncratic factors on the preference for the constituting policy attributes and on 
the unobserved residual variability.  
Our results suggest that those farmers in Chiang Mai who answered yes to the question of whether they 
believed they had experienced a past bee-mediated pollination deficit derived less utility from the 
conservation policy measures, relative to other (unobserved) choice decision influences. This result is 
nevertheless challenged by the lack of evidence for an actual pollinator crisis in Chiang Mai. We therefore 
suggest that, instead, this question captured the poor understanding of a portion of farmers regarding the 
agricultural importance of bees, which further led them to base their choice decisions, to a larger degree, 
on unobserved factors. Similarly, Chiang Mai farmers who keep their own or someone else’s bees on their 
farm may have incorporated relatively more unobserved factors into their decision process than farmers 
who do not keep bees. We presume that this effect results from longan farmers of Chiang Mai valuing 
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bees, almost exclusively, for their direct economic benefits: most farmers keep bees that belong to 
beekeeping entrepreneurs who pay them for the right to forage longan nectar, and the few farmers who 
keep their own bees probably do it entirely for the hive products.  
Engaging in activities that involve bees (which in Chiang Mai is likely to be mainly driven by their direct 
economic benefits) also has a significant effect on the preference for bee husbandry as part of a native bee 
conservation policy in this region. This finding, initially proposed in the study by Narjes and Lippert 
(2016), is substantiated by the GMXL estimates of the present analyses. Furthermore, this study preserves, 
to a considerable degree, the orders of magnitude and proportions of the willingness to pay (WTP) 
estimates for Chiang Mai from Narjes and Lippert (2016), thus indicating their robustness.  
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that the WTP for a native bee conservation policy was, 
in general, significantly higher in Chanthaburi than in Chiang Mai. The fact that the majority of 
Chanthaburi farmers (~60%) are also beekeepers (which in this region correlates with the notion of a past 
bee-mediated pollination deficit), makes it difficult to differentiate their value perceptions from those 
farmers who do not keep bees. Moreover, it suggests that the comparatively higher WTP of Chanthaburi 
farmers may result from the farmers’ actual need to manage their own crops’ pollination.  
We further propose that an actual local pollinator decline may have made Chanthaburi farmers more aware 
of the importance of conserving native bees, while (paradoxically) making them more independent from 
the provision of wild pollination services, as they started managing crop pollination with stingless bees.  
There are only a few species of domesticable honeybees and stingless bees in Thailand (Chuttong et al. 
2015). Relying solely on bee husbandry for their conservation may pose the risk of neglecting the rest of 
the native pollinator fauna, which already contribute substantially to crop pollination and may serve as 
important insurance in the event of managed bee shortages (Kremen et al. 2002; Steffan-Dewenter 2005). 
A native bee conservation policy should thus integrate all three IPI-POA recommended adaptive 
management strategies (presented in this study) and further raise awareness of the importance of 
pollinators among the general public and special interest groups through the dissemination of high quality 
and easy-to-understand information (Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009). Such a conservation policy should be 
seen as an investment, considering that the calculated costs of implementing the proposed conservation 
strategies would only amount to a fraction of the potential production losses that a bee-pollination deficit 
could entail (Narjes and Lippert 2016).  
On average, the three proposed conservation measures were valued positively, yet all models coincide in 
their significantly wide-ranging standard deviations. Although expected (and partly explained in this 
study), this result poses a challenge for the implementation of these measures; to increase these policies’ 
chances of success, policy makers could gain further insights from qualitative analyses that try to explain 
such part-worth heterogeneity.  
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Chapter V 
 Discussion and conclusions 
Manuel Ernesto Narjes 
University of Hohenheim, Germany 
The body of research of this thesis can be divided into two main parts. The first part consists of the 
(theoretical) microeconomic model presented in Chapter 2, which offers a generalized analytical 
framework that covers a broad range of farmer-beekeeper-nature interactions. The second part consists of 
the empirical analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4, in which choice modelling is applied to assess the 
preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) of bee-dependent crop farmers for three different bee 
conservation measures and for the potential effect of a bee conservation policy on the population of native 
(wild) bees in Thailand.  
This chapter discusses the main findings and contributions of both central parts of this thesis in Section 
5.1, and their caveats and limitations in Section 5.2. It concludes in Section 5.3 by delineating 
recommendations for future research directions that may depart from this dissertation.  
5.1 Contributions of this thesis 
5.1.1 Conceptual model  
This dissertation joins in the global efforts of mainstreaming the conservation of bees and pollination 
services into policy (Dias et al. 1999; Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009), especially in the agricultural sector. Its 
contribution to this endeavour begins by giving a comprehensive picture of the role that bees, wild and 
managed, play in agricultural production. This is achieved in Chapter 2, insofar the basic theoretical model 
of Rucker et al. (2012) is generalized into an analytical framework that systematically describes a wider 
spectrum of the globally found diverse farmer-beekeeper interactions. Until now, the marginal 
productivity of wild bees has been neglected in the economic analyses concerned with the formation of 
pollination fees, while the relationship between farmers and beekeepers has mostly been depicted as the 
extreme case where wild pollination is being fully replaced by commercial pollination services. 
Additionally, the economic potential for on-farm beekeeping that resides in several bee species has been 
rather overlooked in the body of scientific literature, at least as regards cost-benefit analyses. Such 
potential is also assessed in Chapter 2, where the adoption of on-farm beekeeping is methodically 
compared to hiring commercial pollination services by juxtaposing the costs of these two alternatives 
against the total benefits each of them yields in terms of crop pollination and hive products. The proposed 
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analytical framework thus also serves as a typology of farmer-beekeeper interactions and helps identifying 
the institutional settings and the economic and agro-ecological factors that are most likely to lead to a 
specific equilibrium supply of pollination. It thereby helps structuring the postulation of empirically 
testable hypotheses; this idea is elaborated with an example for potential future research in Section 5.3. 
5.1.2 Elicitation format 
The second part of this dissertation’s body of research (i.e., Chapters 3 and 4) contributes to the efforts of 
assessing the economic value of wild pollinating bees. Its novelty consists in having conceived an 
elicitation format that captures at least part of the non-use value of bees by means of discrete choice 
experiments (DCEs) and choice modelling, which so far have been deemed unsuitable for this purpose. 
Mburu et al. (2006) for instance had validly argued that stated preference methods are limited by the 
knowledge that respondents may or may not possess regarding the quantitative contribution of pollinators 
to agricultural production. In response to that limitation, this thesis proposes eliciting the value that 
farmers place on different measures aimed at conserving native bees and the ecosystem services they 
deliver, instead of just asking them to state their preference for this environmental resource. After all, the 
value that farmers attach to the conservation of native bees conceivably transcends their direct use benefits 
to include non-use values, such as their cultural significance.  
Under the proposed format, the relative value estimates may suggest potential loss aversion attitudes (as 
seemingly is the case in Chiang Mai province) and offer a ranking that hints at the expected commitment 
of farmers to the single bee conservation measures and at whether corrective or preventive measures are 
preferred. Furthermore, the total financial burden of implementing a comprehensive policy aimed at 
conserving native bees can be compared to the potential yield losses that would be attributed to their 
decline. Thus, eliciting the preference for bee conservation measures can be easily translated into policy 
recommendations. 
5.1.3 Choice modelling applicability 
A DCE dataset with enough choice observations lends itself to modelling preference heterogeneity, for 
which the random parameter (RPL) logit model has become increasingly popular among researchers and 
practitioners. The RPL can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train 2000) and is very 
flexible in that it allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns and correlation in the 
unobserved factors, thus overcoming three key limitations of standard logit (Train 2009). Chapters 3 and 4 
rely on RPL to estimate taste heterogeneity and to explain it by socio-demographic variables.  
The capability of RPL to model heterogeneity is nevertheless limited to capturing variation in the sample’s 
preference for the included DCE attributes and thus implicitly neglects the potential variation in the extent 
to which the choices of some (groups of) individuals have been influenced by unobserved factors, i.e. 
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heteroscedasticity. If such source of variation exists, the normalization of the error term translates into a 
scaling of the part-worth vector that is heterogeneous among individuals or subsamples. A heterogeneous 
scale is therefore another source of correlation, and one which the RPL model cannot disentangle from the 
correlation in the taste coefficients (Fiebig et al. 2010, but see Hess and Train 2017 and Section 5.2 of this 
dissertation). In order to deal with this issue, Fiebig et al. (2010) developed the generalized mixed logit 
(GMXL) model, which according to them solves the confounding of scale and taste heterogeneity.  
This thesis does not contribute with novel econometric models, yet it explores the applicability of GMXL 
in controlling scale heterogeneity in order to compare DCE datasets that differ in their underlying designs 
and in the regions where the surveys were administered (see Figure 5.1). To this end, one special GMXL 
case that reduces the confounding of scale and taste heterogeneity was specified, while a dedicated 
selection procedure that penalizes the added parameters in a differentiated manner (i.e., select models with 
lowest BIC for scale heterogeneity and with lowest AIC for taste heterogeneity) was applied. This work is, 
to my knowledge, the first comparative study of this kind.  
 
Figure 5.1 The scale parameter 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊 is the ratio of the representative utility 𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 to the variance of the 
residuals 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 that results from normalizing the latter (cf. Section 4.2.2). This proportion may differ between 
DCE datasets (as hypothesized for Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi, cf. Section 4.2.3) due to differences in 
e.g., the experimental designs and/or the extent to which unobserved factors may influence individuals’ 
choices. Controlling for 𝝀𝝀𝒊𝒊 thus offers a common scale to meaningfully compare utility 𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 changes (i.e., 
from choosing an alternative 𝒊𝒊) between groups of individuals 𝒊𝒊, e.g., 𝒅𝒅𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝑴𝑴𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋 𝑴𝑴𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊 vs. 𝒅𝒅𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊𝑴𝑴𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒃𝒃𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊. 
Source: own representation with data from DIVA-GIS (2014).  
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5.1.4 Literature review 
The literature on choice modelling has traditionally been produced by authors that are mostly affiliated to 
the fields of transportation and market research, which widely rely on (and often combine) both revealed 
and stated preference data (Agresti 2003; Train 2009); its language may thus often seem arcane to the 
outsider. It is only recently that other fields, including those of agricultural and environmental economics, 
started contributing with examples of DCE applications in the valuation of non-marketed goods. The 
growing scope of disciplines that rely on this method and the fast development of modelling capabilities 
(which have been made possible due to simulation advances in the wake of improved computational 
power) have enriched the choice modelling literature, yet they have also imparted it an inconsistent jargon 
that can easily lead to confusion. This became evident to me when I started consulting the relevant 
literature for this work. To remedy this problem, the second part of this dissertation’s body of research 
contributes with the literature review that I prepared for the articles presented in Chapters 3 and 4. There, I 
attempt at breaking down the theory of choice modelling (especially with regards to RPL and GMXL) in a 
language that is consistent with and relatable to the econometrics vernacular used by agricultural and 
environmental economists. 
5.1.5 Case studies 
Finally, this work presents two case studies (see Chapters 3 and 4) that report anecdotal evidence on the 
state of pollination services as perceived by farmers from two regions that are arguably characterized by 
different agro-ecosystems. Notwithstanding the lack of measured evidence on the trends in diversity and 
distribution of native bee populations in Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi, these reports raise a red flag 
regarding the potential loss of local native bees due to the practice of intensive agriculture. Herewith, this 
thesis appeals to the international pollinator initiatives (Dias et al. 1999; Byrne and Fitzpatrick 2009; see 
Section 1.3) to address the possibility of such declines by monitoring the pollinator communities of 
Thailand and by promoting their conservation.  
5.2 Caveats 
The knowledge gained from this work is nevertheless not without its caveats. During my research it 
became apparent that its theoretical backdrop, assumptions and applied methods are subject to limitations 
that deserve being discussed. In this section I identify such limitations and warn about their potential 
implications on the interpretation of this dissertations’ results. 
First, the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2 is subject to following simplifications: 
i) It models the optimal stocking density of bees based solely on their marginal productivity (i.e., per 
unit of land cultivated with honey plants) as regards honey and their contribution to fruit production. 
Here, their value (i.e., the equilibrium bee wage) is thus ultimately determined by the demand and 
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supply of these marketed goods, which yield benefits that typify (direct and indirect) use values. 
Therefore, as it stands, this conceptual model is prone to underestimating the total value of bees 
(wild48 and managed); it inherently neglects their non-use values and, even if one would know such 
values (e.g., from estimates such as those obtained in Chapters 3 and 4), one could hardly 
incorporate them into the model in order to obtain a corrected theoretical optimum: this would 
require additionally modelling, in three-dimensional space, the demand of farmers for non-use 
benefits from bees (i.e., per additional colony on a unit of land) on a utility scale that applies an 
equivalence factor between wild and managed bees. 
ii) The long-run equilibria of the proposed model extensions display a clear cut inflection at the point 
where the marginal benefits from wild bees are replaced by those derived from managed bees (cf. 
Figure 2.5). Thereby, the model rules out potential pollination synergies between managed and wild 
bees, such as those that Brittain et al. (2013) describe for Apis and non-Apis bee species.  
iii) It additionally fails at taking into consideration the dynamic processes that may play a role in long-
run equilibria. Path-dependence and economies of scale could, for instance, have partly explained 
why a honey industry that is based on the costly business of keeping a non-native bee species has 
been successfully established in Chiang Mai province, disregarding that the necessary factors of 
production (i.e., land cultivated with honey plants and abundant domesticable native honeybees) are 
freely available to orchardists (cf. Section 2.2.2.3 and Chapter 3). Under different historical 
circumstances and in the absence of economies of scale, such setup could conceivably have 
favoured economies of scope to the advantage of farmers instead. The analytical framework can 
nevertheless accommodate such influences in a complementary qualitative assessment, such as that 
made for transaction costs in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.5.  
Secondly, the estimated value of longan yield losses that were calculated for hypothetical scenarios of 
declines in the population of local native bees in Chiang Mai Province (see Chapter 3; Table 3.5) may be 
subject to the following underestimation: 
iv) These yield losses were obtained by applying a bee-pollination dependence ratio of 60% [following 
the experiment results reported by Blanche et al. (2006) and Pham (2012)] to an average yield of 5.5 
metric tons per hectare [as reported by the Thai Office of Agricultural Economics (2014) for 2013]. 
This reference production level nevertheless corresponds to an assumedly full (100%) delivery of 
crop pollination from the surrounding natural habitats. Should this not be the case, as local native 
bees had already undergone population declines before 2013, these calculations would result in an 
underestimation of the entailed economic losses. 
                                                     
 
48 An underestimation is of particular concern with respect to wild (native) bees, as these are more prone to (local) 
extinctions than managed bees. 
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Thirdly, the DCE elicitation format used to obtain the value estimates presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
presents following drawbacks:  
v) Although our DCE estimates capture non-use values, there is no way to know to which extent such 
values contribute to the (lower bound) total economic value (TEV) of (conserving) native bees, 
given that the use value that farmers perceived (for crop pollination and bee hive products) during 
the DCE is likely to significantly deviate from the actual (measurable) value of crop pollination 
deficits and reduced wild honey corresponding to losing half of the local population of wild bees.  
vi) The experimental design underlying the DCE that we conducted in Chanthaburi was generated by 
Ngene software using the part-worth estimates from Chiang Mai as prior values. This was done in 
order to minimize the standard errors of the parameters estimated with the data from Chanthaburi, 
however resulting in both provinces being surveyed with differing experimental designs. Thus, the 
parameter estimate accuracy was gained at the expense of confounding a potential regional effect on 
the scale of utility with that from differences in the underlying designs. 
vii) Preceding each DCE interview, the respondents were informed about the importance of bee-
mediated pollination to their crops and about the current trends and consequences of pollinator 
declines worldwide. This constitutes an “information bias” that, although indispensable for the 
survey49, may misrepresent the target population and further lead to the extrapolation of 
overestimated values. Such bias could have been accounted for by deliberately withholding 
aforementioned information from a large group of randomly selected respondents (preferably from 
half of the DCE sample), thus introducing it as a treatment effect in a DCE that was administered to 
individuals in Chanthaburi and Chiang Mai, following a randomized block design. Ideally, the 
experimental design underlying the DCEs would have also been the same in Chiang Mai and 
Chanthaburi, in order to avoid confounding a potential effect on utility scale from design 
differences with that from regional differences. At any rate, conducting a DCE in which the 
information bias is controlled would also have given some notion of the extent to which non-use 
values play a role in forming preferences regarding the conservation of native bees, provided that 
the subsample of treated respondents was given precise information about the (per unit of cultivated 
land) contribution of wild bees to their production. An effect of such information on utility would 
thus have considerably corresponded to the use value that farmers perceive for wild native bees. 
Accordingly, if determined significant, one could have subtracted such effect from the part-worths 
corresponding to changes in the local population of wild native bees in order to obtain an 
                                                     
 
49 DCEs are based on the assumption that the target population has already formed preferences, which is unlikely in 
the case of unfamiliarity with the good in question. In view of this, it was indispensable to assist the formation of 
preferences for the conservation of native bees by informing the DCE participants about the role that pollinators 
play in crop production.    
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approximate estimate of their non-use value. Nevertheless, controlling for an information bias 
would have entailed costs in terms of either sacrificing explanatory power (with regard to the 
hypotheses postulated in Sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.3) or investing additional resources for a larger 
survey (preferably twice as large), the latter of which was an unfeasible option due to a limited 
budget.  
Lastly, the following caveat is concerned with the inherently variable nature of preferences: 
viii) As a general rule, empirical findings are expected to be replicable for the published facts to be 
verified, although this is not necessarily the case in the social sciences [(Schmidt 2009), but cf. 
Camerer et al. (2016) for replicability of laboratory experiments in economics]. Given that 
preferences tend to change (conceivably faster than individual economic behaviour and incentives), 
DCE replications are especially unlikely to consistently deliver data that reproduces value estimates 
over time, even if the replications would involve the same subjects and the same experimental 
design of the original survey. 
5.3 Outlook 
The first part of this thesis’ body of research (i.e., Chapter 2) offers an analytical framework that 
generalizes the theoretical model developed by Rucker et al. (2012), which describes the particular case of 
commercial beekeepers interacting with almond farmers in California, USA. Rucker et al. (2012) use their 
basic theoretical model to analyse the determinants of pollination fees and to deduce hypotheses regarding 
the statistical dependence between the stocking densities of rented honeybee colonies and a series of 
explanatory variables (i.e., crop acreage, the expected prices of honey and crops, and the manifestation of 
cost relevant honeybee ailments), which they tested using a panel of 180 stocking density observations. 
Similarly, our model extensions (see Section 2.2.2) could guide the deduction of hypotheses for a broader 
spectrum of beekeeper-farmer interactions. In the case of Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi, for instance, one 
could hypothesize that the magnitude and direction of the payments between farmers and beekeepers 
depends on the productivity and prices of crops and managed bees, and on the abundance of wild 
pollinating bees from surrounding habitats. Testing such hypotheses would involve the estimation of a 
spatial econometric model using relevant cross-sectional data and some indicator for the average supply of 
wild bees per unit of cultivated land. The former data could be obtained via surveys (during which 
additional information such as geospatial location of the farms, abundance of managed pollinators and of 
nesting sites and floral resources, among other biophysical variables, could be collected), while for the 
latter one could think of the “Pollinator Abundance: Crop Pollination” model of InVEST (Sharp et al. 
2016). This model estimates an index for the spatial abundance of wild bees (i.e., for each cell on a 
landscape), based on the predicted availability of nest sites and floral resources within the flight ranges of 
bees. The InVEST pollination model is also capable of producing an index of the contribution of local 
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wild bees to agricultural production. Herewith, determining a significant effect of changes in the 
population of wild bees (or of changes in the ecological factors that affect them) on the magnitude and 
direction of payments between beekeepers and farmers could, for instance, lay the foundation for 
modelling scenarios with different provision levels of crop pollination services. Such normative models 
could become a useful tool for the evaluation of different conservation policies. In any event, the 
postulation of hypotheses should also be assisted by a thorough qualitative research of each specific case 
of beekeeper-farmer interactions, in order to avoid the quantitative analysis to result in misguided 
generalizations.  
As for the models presented in the second part of this thesis’ body of research (i.e., Chapters 3 and 4), one 
obvious use would be the transfer of values estimated for Chiang Mai and/or Chanthaburi (i.e., the study 
sites) to policy sites with similar agroecosystems, and preferably also in similar socio-cultural contexts. In 
principle, discrete choice experiment estimates are well-suited for the value function approach to benefit 
transfer (Pascual et al. 2010). One could thus use the estimates from Chiang Mai to derive a demand 
function for a policy site with a relatively healthy wild bee population, while the estimates from 
Chanthaburi could be applied to a policy site where wild bee declines are thought to have already affected 
crop yields. Nevertheless, our estimates for changes in the population of native bees are given in 
percentages, which could be problematic considering that the reference population levels are believed to 
differ between Chiang Mai and Chanthaburi. Transferring our DCE estimates would thus require 
transforming the value estimates for changes in the population of wild bees to their absolute value 
equivalents; this could for example be achieved by estimating the population of wild bees in Chiang Mai 
and Chanthaburi with the InVEST pollination model (Sharp et al. 2016), provided that the reference levels 
assumed by the respondents during the DCE have not dramatically changed since the time when the 
surveys were conducted. In any respect, one should be wary about the proneness of preferences to change 
over time whenever applying the benefit transfer approach (see Section 5.2).  
Finally, from our analyses in Northern Thailand (see Section 3.4), we learned that, although longan 
farmers underestimated the true use value of crop pollination, their willingness to pay for a comprehensive 
bee conservation project by far exceeded the implementation costs that each faming household would have 
to incur for its realization. From a social perspective in Northern Thailand, it would therefore be clearly 
economically suboptimal to abstain from implementing such a pollinator conservation program. Also, in 
view of the globally diverse beekeeper-farmer-nature interactions (see Section 2.2.2), it is quite likely that 
many regions of the world can still benefit from an optimization of their agro-ecological conditions by 
means of the implementation of pollinator conservation programs. In this regard and against the theoretical 
framework developed in this thesis, one should assess the economic viability of such programs for 
ecologically critical cases, by assessing the net benefits resulting from their implementation vis-à-vis the 
costs associated with the risk of declines in local pollinator populations. This way, as demonstrated for the 
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case in Chiang Mai, the (social) profitability of pollinator protection measures can become an argument 
for the promotion of nature conservation and may support political efforts to prevent ongoing biodiversity 
erosion.     
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SUMMARY 
During the last few decades, worldwide reports of declines in the population of wild and managed bees 
(especially in Europe and North America) have raised the alarm about the harmful effect of intensive 
agriculture on pollinators (especially in connection with the misuse of synthetic pesticides) and about the 
consequent reduction in pollinator-dependent crop outputs. Although most reports concern the European 
honeybee (Apis mellifera) and bumblebees, these species often act as proxies for the overall health of the 
ecosystems they share with other pollinators. These concerns have prompted the international community 
to coordinate global pollinator conservation efforts and to call for research into the economic value of bees 
and into the economic impact of declines in the population of pollinators. As Thailand’s agriculture is also 
rapidly converting to the production of cash crops under intensive farming systems, this development, in 
combination with the loss, fragmentation and degradation of natural habitats, threatens its rich bee fauna, 
which includes eight indigenous Apis species and a great diversity of stingless bees, especially from the 
genus Trigona. In fact, according to accounts from farmers growing pollinator-dependent crops in Eastern 
Thailand (a region characterized by intensive fruit farming), pollinator declines have already negatively 
affected their yields, which they first mitigated by renting honeybee hives and later by managing stingless 
bees themselves. In contrast, we discovered that in Northern Thailand (a region with a comparatively less 
degraded forest cover), beekeepers tend to pay longan farmers a fee for the exclusive right to bee forage 
on their farms; longan (Dimocarpus longan) is a fruit tree that produces valuable honey. 
The first article of this cumulative thesis addresses the diversity of beekeeper-farmer interactions that, 
until now, could not be accommodated within the existing microeconomic models concerned with this 
issue. The most prominent of such theoretical models is dedicated to describing the determinants of colony 
stocking densities and of equilibrium wages that, for decades, have been paid by farmers to commercial 
beekeepers in the Californian almond monocultures, which are highly reliant on bee-mediated pollination. 
We generalized this basic model by taking into account the marginal productivity of a given agro-
ecosystem’s wild bees and the opportunity costs that farmers incur when assigning labor time to 
beekeeping. In that regard, we assessed the economic potential of on-farm beekeeping (which can involve 
several bee species) by juxtaposing this activity’s net benefits from crop pollination and hive products 
against those from hiring commercial pollination services. In addition to serving as a classification tool for 
a plurality of farmer-beekeeper-nature interactions and related optimization problems, the resulting 
analytical framework helps identifying the institutional settings that are most likely to lead to a specific 
bioeconomic equilibrium supply of pollination. What is more, it illustrates the interplay of the pertinent 
economic and agro-ecological factors, thus assisting the postulation of empirically testable hypotheses. 
We also conducted two separate discrete choice experiments (DCEs) with orchardists from the provinces 
of Chiang Mai (N = 198 respondents) and Chanthaburi (N = 127), in order to elicit their preferences for 
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changes in the population of local wild bees that would hypothetically result from a conservation policy 
consisting (along with a per-household implementation fee) of at least one of the following three 
measures: (i) offering farmers bee-friendly alternatives to conventional agro-chemicals, (ii) enabling the 
protection and/or rehabilitation of natural bee habitats near cropland, and (iii) fostering the husbandry of 
native bee species by transferring technical knowledge on the practice of on-farm beekeeping.  
In this context, for the second article we fitted random parameter logit (RPL) models on the Chiang Mai 
DCE dataset. They yielded a significant willingness to pay (WTP) for the presented conservation measures 
and suggested that the disutility the respondents perceived for a 50% decline in the local population of 
native bees was greater than the utility they would derive from experiencing a bee population increase of 
the same magnitude, thus hinting at loss aversion. Moreover, comparing our aggregated WTP estimates to 
the expected production losses (as calculated with a realistic 60% dependence on bee pollination), showed 
that longan farmers underestimated the true use value of pollination. On the other hand, the average WTP 
for all conservation measures combined by far exceeded the costs that, according to our calculations, each 
household would incur for such a project to be implemented. Our RPL models also indicated a significant 
preference heterogeneity in the sampled population, which we could partly explain with idiosyncratic 
variables such as gender and the respondents’ attitudes towards native bees and beekeeping.  
Finally, in the third article we further examined the sources of randomness in the observed choice 
behavior, by modelling the unknown choice decision-relevant influences that could not be captured during 
the DCEs. To that end, we fitted generalized mixed logit (GMXL) models on the pooled datasets, which 
allowed comparing, on a common utility scale, the part-worth (value) estimates from Chiang Mai and 
Chanthaburi, where different experimental designs were applied. Our results reveal that farmers in 
Chanthaburi, who reported having experienced crop declines that they attributed to insufficient 
pollination, introduced less subjective factors into their choices than their Chiang Mai counterparts, who 
may have been less familiar with the importance of conserving bees. Moreover, the GMXL results also 
suggest that Chanthaburi farmers placed a significantly higher value on the above-mentioned measures (i) 
and (ii), while caring comparatively less about a 50% decline in local wild bee colonies. One can thus 
hypothesize that an actual local pollinator decline may have made Chanthaburi farmers more aware of the 
importance of conserving native bees, while paradoxically making them more independent from the 
provision of wild pollination services, as they started managing crop pollination with stingless bees. 
As depicted in our analytical framework and econometrically exemplified in two regions of Thailand, 
many regions of the world may draw net benefits from optimizing their agro-ecological conditions with 
regard to crop pollination. In that respect, an assessment of the social profitability of conserving wild bees 
in ecologically critical cases is advisable and expected to result in conservation arguments for the 
protection of wild pollinators, their habitats and related ecosystems services, and of the biodiversity that 
supports them. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Berichte über einen weltweiten Bestandsrückgang bei wildlebenden und domestizierten Bienen, 
insbesondere in Europa und Nordamerika, sowie die einhergehenden schädlichen Effekte einer intensiven 
Landwirtschaft (vor allem in Verbindung mit der übermäßigen Nutzung synthetischer Pestizide) und die 
resultierenden Ertragseinbußen, haben in den letzten Jahrzenten zunehmend Anlass zur Sorge gegeben. 
Obwohl die meisten Berichte die Europäische Honigbiene (Apis mellifera) und Hummeln betreffen, 
handelt es sich bei diesen Arten oft um Indikatoren für den allgemeinen Gesundheitszustand der 
Lebensräume, die sie mit anderen Bestäubern teilen. Aus diesem Grund hat die internationale 
Gemeinschaft angeregt, globale Anstrengungen zum Schutz bestäubender Insekten zu koordinieren und 
zum ökonomischen Wert von Bienen sowie den wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen eines Verlustes an 
Bestäubungsleistungen zu forschen. 
Da Thailands Landwirtschaft sich in einem raschen Wandel hin zur vermehrten Erzeugung sogenannter 
“cash crops” in intensiven Bewirtschaftungssystemen befindet, ist davon auszugehen, dass diese 
Entwicklung, in Kombination mit dem Verlust, der Fragmentierung und Schädigung natürlicher Habitate, 
die artenreiche Bienenfauna, die acht einheimische Honigbienenarten und zahlreiche stachellose Bienen 
(vor allem aus der Gattung Trigona) umfasst, massiv bedroht. So berichten Landwirte aus Ostthailand – 
eine Region die durch intensiven Obstbau gekennzeichnet ist –, dass Bestäuberverluste bereits zu 
Ertragsrückgängen bei bestäubungsabhängigen Kulturen geführt hätten.  Dieses Problem wurde von den 
Betroffenen zunächst durch die Anmietung von Bienenstöcken, später dann durch die eigene Haltung 
stachelloser Bienen abzumildern versucht. Im Gegensatz hierzu konnten wir für Nordthailand – eine 
Region mit vergleichsweise großen und zusammenhängenden Waldgebieten – feststellen, dass dort die 
Landwirte dazu neigen, von den Imkern eine Gebühr für das Aufstellen von Bienenstöcken in Longan-
Plantagen (Dimocarpus longan) zu verlangen. Dabei ist zu bedenken, dass Longan-Nektar einen sehr 
wertvollen Honigertrag erbringt. 
Der erste Artikel dieser kumulativen Dissertation behandelt mögliche Imker-Landwirte-Interaktionen, die 
bisher nur zum Teil mit den hierfür entwickelten mikroökonomischen Modellen analysiert werden 
konnten. Das bekannteste dieser theoretischen Modelle bezieht sich auf die hochgradig von der 
Bienenbestäubung abhängigen kalifornischen Mandel-Monokulturen, in denen seit Jahrzenten 
kommerzielle Imker für Bestäubungsleistungen entlohnt werden. Das Modell analysiert die 
Bestimmungsgründe für die Besatzdichten an Honigbienen sowie für die Gleichgewichtslöhne der 
Bestäubungsimker. In dieser kumulativen Dissertation wird dieses Modell erweitert, indem zusätzlich (1) 
die Grenzproduktivität von Wildbienen in einem Agrarökosystem sowie (2) die Opportunitätskosten 
derjenigen Landwirte, die sich selbst der Bienenhaltung widmen, berücksichtigt werden. In diesem 
Zusammenhang wurde das ökonomische Potenzial, das sich für Landwirte aus der eigenen Haltung (u. U. 
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von verschiedenen Arten) von Bienen ergibt, explizit berücksichtigt und dabei den Nettonutzen aus den 
Bestäubungsleistungen und den anfallenden Imkereiprodukten dem Nettonutzen aus „zugekauften“ 
Bestäubungsleistungen gegenübergestellt. Der von uns entwickelte analytische Rahmen dient einerseits 
zur Klassifizierung der vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen Landwirtschaft, Imkerei und Natur sowie den 
entsprechenden Optimierungsproblemen und hilft andererseits bei der Identifizierung institutioneller 
Lösungen, die jeweils geeignet erscheinen, ein bioökonomisches Gleichgewicht für ein optimiertes 
Angebot an Bestäubungsleistungen herbeizuführen. Darüber hinaus stellt er das Zusammenspiel der 
relevanten agrarökologischen und ökonomischen Einflussfaktoren dar und ermöglicht damit, empirisch 
überprüfbare Hypothesen abzuleiten. 
Neben diesen theoretischen Analysen haben wir zwei voneinander unabhängige sogenannte “Discrete 
Choice”-Eperimente (DCE) mit Obstbauern in den thailändischen Provinzen Chiang Mai (N = 198 
Teilnehmer) und Chanthaburi (N = 127) durchgeführt, um deren Präferenzen hinsichtlich der 
Veränderungen der örtlichen Wildbienenpopulation zu ermitteln. Diese Veränderungen können sich 
jeweils aus hypothetischen Kombinationen von Teilnahmegebühren und den folgenden 
Naturschutzmaßnahmen ergeben: (i) Angebot von bienenschonenden Alternativen zum konventionellen 
chemisch-synthetischen Pflanzenschutz, (ii) Ermöglichung von Schutz und/oder Wiederherstellung 
natürlicher Bienenhabitate auf den Plantagen sowie den angrenzenden Flächen, und (iii) Förderung der 
Haltung einheimischer Bienenarten auf den eigenen landwirtschaftlichen Flächen durch Wissenstransfer 
zur Bienenhaltung. 
In diesem Zusammenhang, haben wir im zweiten Artikel “Random Parameter Logit (RPL)”-Modelle für 
das in Chiang Mai durchgeführte DCE geschätzt. Diese ergaben signifikante Zahlungsbereitschaften 
(WTP) der Befragten für die oben genannten Maßnahmen sowie einen dem 50%-igen Rückgang der 
Bienenpopulation beigemessenen negativen Nutzen, der dem Betrag nach größer war als der mit einer 
entsprechenden Populationszunahme einhergehende Nutzen, was auf Verlust-Aversion hindeutet. Ein 
Vergleich der aggregierten WTP-Schätzung mit den realistischerweise zu erwartenden Ertragseinbußen, 
die anhand einer 60%-igen Abhängigkeit des Ertrags von der Bienenbestäubung errechnet wurden, zeigte 
zudem, dass der wahre Wert des Bestäubungsnutzens von den befragten Longan-Anbauern unterschätzt 
wird. Außerdem zeigten auf den Modellergebnissen beruhende Berechnungen, dass die durchschnittliche 
Zahlungsbereitschaft für das Bündel aller drei Schutzmaßnahmen die für den einzelnen Haushalt 
kalkulierten Teilnahmekosten im Fall einer Projektumsetzung bei weitem übertreffen. Unsere RPL-
Modelle haben darüber hinaus eine signifikante Präferenzheterogenität bei den Befragungsteilnehmern 
ergeben, die wir teilweise mit idiosynkratischen Variablen, wie z. B. dem Geschlecht und der Einstellung 
der Befragten zu einheimischen Bienen und zur Imkerei, erklären konnten. 
Im dritten Artikel sind wir schließlich den möglichen Ursachen der Zufallskomponente des beobachteten 
Wahlverhaltens nachgegangen, indem wir die unbekannten entscheidungsrelevanten Einflüsse, die wir in 
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unseren beiden DCE nicht abbilden konnten, modelliert haben. Zu diesem Zweck wurden sogenannte 
“Generalized Mixed Logit (GMXL)”-Modelle für den aus beiden Regionen zusammengefügten (“pooled”) 
Datensatz geschätzt. Dies ermöglichte den Vergleich der Teilnutzenschätzer für Chiang Mai mit denen für 
Chanthaburi auf einer gemeinsamen Nutzenskala, obwohl in Chiang Mai ein anderes experimentelles 
Design verwendet wurde. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Landwirte in Chanthaburi, die bereits von 
Ertragseinbußen wegen (nach ihrer Ansicht) unzureichender Bestäubung berichteten, weniger subjektive 
Faktoren in ihre Wahlentscheidungen einfließen ließen als ihre Kollegen in Chiang Mai. Letztere scheinen 
insgesamt weniger mit der Bedeutung des Bienenschutzes vertraut gewesen zu sein. Außerdem legen die 
GMXL-Ergebnisse nahe, dass die Landwirte in Chanthaburi einen signifikant höheren Wert auf die obigen 
Maßnahmen (i) und (ii) legen, während sie dem 50%-igen Rückgang der örtlichen Wildbienenpopulation 
einen relativ geringeren Wert beimessen. Daher kann man die Hypothese vertreten, dass es dort in der 
Vergangenheit bereits zu einem Rückgang lokaler Bestäuber gekommen ist und die Landwirte in 
Chanthaburi sich deshalb der Bedeutung des Schutzes einheimischer Bienen stärker bewusst sind. Die in 
diesem Zusammenhang paradox anmutende geringere Gewichtung eines Populationsrückgangs mag sich 
dadurch erklären, dass die Landwirte bereits damit begonnen haben, die Bestäubung mit Hilfe stachelloser 
Bienen zu bewerkstelligen, was sie von den Bestäubungsleistungen wilder Bienen unabhängiger macht. 
Es ist davon auszugehen, dass weltweit viele weitere Regionen hinsichtlich der Kulturpflanzenbestäubung 
von einer Optimierung der agrarökologischen Verhältnisse profitieren können, ähnlich wie wir dies 
zunächst anhand des entwickelten Analyserahmens und schließlich durch ökonometrische Studien im 
Detail für zwei thailändische Regionen zeigen konnten. In diesem Kontext ist die systematische Erhebung 
und Bewertung des volkswirtschaftlichen Nutzens von Wildbienen insbesondere in ökologisch 
problematischen Fällen zu empfehlen. Dies dürfte in vielen Fällen überzeugende Argumente für den 
Schutz wilder bestäubender Insekten, ihrer Habitate und der einhergehenden Ökosystemleistungen 
erbringen und damit allgemein den Erhalt der Biodiversität befördern. 
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